Habeas corpus detention is tested on the return date; valid remand warrants can sustain custody despite an earlier procedural defect.

In habeas corpus review, detention is assessed on the date of return, so an earlier irregularity in the remand process does not justify release if later valid remand warrants by the competent court exist. The absence of a specific remand order on 5.5.2005 did not render custody illegal because subsequent warrants supported lawful detention. The fifteen-day limit in the first proviso to Section 309(2) applies to a Magistrate, not to a Court of Session, and a remand by warrant is sufficient compliance where adjournment reasons are recorded and the accused is duly remanded. The challenge to custody therefore failed.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the petitioners' detention became illegal because no specific remand order was passed on 5.5.2005 when the case was placed before an officer who was not appointed as the Special Court Judge under the MCOC Act, 1999; and (ii) whether the remand orders extending custody beyond fifteen days at a time were invalid under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): whether the petitioners' detention became illegal because no specific remand order was passed on 5.5.2005 when the case was placed before an officer who was not appointed as the Special Court Judge under the MCOC Act, 1999.

Analysis: The governing principle in habeas corpus proceedings is that legality of detention is tested with reference to the date of return, not merely the date of filing. By the returnable date, the record showed subsequent remand warrants passed by the competent Special Court Judge, and the earlier defect, if any, could not sustain release once valid custody orders existed. The absence of a regular order-sheet remand on 5.5.2005 was not where the later warrants evidenced lawful custody.

Conclusion: The detention was not liable to be held illegal on this ground, and the contention failed.

Issue (ii): whether the remand orders extending custody beyond fifteen days at a time were invalid under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Special Court under the MCOC Act exercises powers according to the stage of the case, and in a sessions-triable matter it functions with the powers of a Court of Session. The fifteen-day restriction in the first proviso to Section 309(2) applies to a Magistrate and not to a Court of Session. The Court also held that a remand by warrant is sufficient compliance with Section 309(2), provided reasons for adjournment are recorded and the warrant duly remands the accused.

Conclusion: The remand orders and their extensions were valid, and the challenge on this ground was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners' custody stood supported by valid remand orders on the date of return, and the writ petition for habeas corpus did not merit relief.

Ratio Decidendi: In habeas corpus proceedings, detention is tested on the date of return, and where a competent court has passed valid remand orders by warrant, the custody is lawful; the fifteen-day limit in Section 309(2) applies to a Magistrate and not to a Court of Session.

---