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Issues: (i) Whether the expression "Sugar Free" was a coined or suggestive mark entitled to exclusive protection, or a descriptive and generic expression open to bona fide descriptive use by competitors; (ii) Whether the respondents' use of the expression "Sugar Free" amounted to passing off or justified a wider injunction, including restraint on the font size used.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "Sugar Free" was a coined or suggestive mark entitled to exclusive protection, or a descriptive and generic expression open to bona fide descriptive use by competitors.
Analysis: The expression was held to be a combination of two common English words directly conveying the quality of goods that do not contain sugar. The Court applied the principles underlying Sections 9, 30 and 35 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and held that a term which designates the character or quality of goods is not inherently distinctive. Even assuming that the mark had acquired some distinctiveness in relation to the appellant's artificial sweeteners, that distinctiveness was confined to that product segment and did not confer a monopoly over the phrase across all food products. The Court also held that the phrase was commonly used in the trade and was not an unusual linguistic invention.
Conclusion: The expression "Sugar Free" was not entitled to exclusive monopoly protection as a coined or suggestive mark, and its descriptive use by others could not be prohibited.
Issue (ii): Whether the respondents' use of the expression "Sugar Free" amounted to passing off or justified a wider injunction, including restraint on the font size used.
Analysis: The Court accepted that the respondents were using the expression in a descriptive sense and not as a trade mark to identify source. The relevant consumer base for the appellant's product was specialized and informed, reducing the likelihood of deception. The Court held that mere use of a descriptive phrase, even if prominently displayed, did not by itself establish misrepresentation, confusion or damage. However, the restriction imposed by the learned Single Judge on the oversized font was upheld as an interlocutory measure to ensure that the use remained descriptive and did not suggest source association.
Conclusion: No passing off injunction could be granted against the respondents' descriptive use, and the limited restraint on font size was justified.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the respondents' use of the phrase was treated as bona fide descriptive use rather than trade mark use, and the limited interlocutory restraint was maintained.
Ratio Decidendi: A descriptive expression that denotes the character or quality of goods, even if it has acquired some distinctiveness in a limited product segment, cannot be monopolised so as to prevent bona fide descriptive use by competitors, unless the use is shown to misrepresent source or cause passing off.