Corrupt practice in election law must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; vague pleadings and conjecture will not sustain the charge.

An election petition alleging corrupt practice under section 123(7) failed because the pleadings were sufficiently clear to meet the challenge of vagueness, and the verification substantially complied with the statutory requirements, so no prejudice was shown. The Court further held that corrupt practice, being quasi-criminal, must be proved by clear and cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt; circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable alternative hypothesis. On the facts, the meeting was called on the Bishop's initiative, the police officer's presence was explained, and the evidence did not reliably show that he acted at the candidate's instance. The allegation that the candidate procured the officer's services was therefore not proved.

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Issues: (i) Whether the election petition suffered from vagueness or defective verification so as to invalidate the challenge; (ii) whether the returned candidate had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 by obtaining or procuring the services of a police officer for the furtherance of his election prospects.

Issue (i): Whether the election petition suffered from vagueness or defective verification so as to invalidate the challenge.

Analysis: The objection of vagueness was not available in respect of the material allegations relating to the alleged corrupt practice under section 123(7), since the pleadings were sufficient to enable a defence and no prejudice was shown. The verification was also held not to be defective, because the affidavit substantially complied with section 83(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and Rule 94A read with Form 25 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.

Conclusion: The challenge on vagueness and defective verification failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the returned candidate had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 by obtaining or procuring the services of a police officer for the furtherance of his election prospects.

Analysis: A charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in nature and must be proved by clear and unambiguous evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence can sustain the charge only if it points unerringly to guilt and excludes every reasonable alternative hypothesis. On the evidence, the meeting was convened by the Bishop on his own initiative, the police officer's presence at Palai was satisfactorily explained, and the material witnesses did not reliably establish that he addressed the meeting at the candidate's instance or exhorted the audience to support him. The inference that the candidate obtained or procured the officer's services rested on conjecture and probability rather than proof.

Conclusion: The corrupt practice under section 123(7) was not proved.

Final Conclusion: The election of the returned candidate could not be sustained on the alleged corrupt practice, and the election petition failed in consequence.

Ratio Decidendi: A corrupt practice in an election petition must be established beyond reasonable doubt by clear and cogent evidence, and circumstantial evidence must be such that it excludes every hypothesis except the guilt of the candidate.

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