Court sets aside lower court decisions, rules on property ownership and succession under personal law.

The High Court allowed the Second Appeal, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. It concluded that Tarabai did not become the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of her nomination, and Section 30 does not alter the rule of succession laid down by personal law. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed with no orders as to costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the compromise decree obtained by Ramdas in Civil Suit No.206/1980.
2. Whether the suit property was partitioned and if Ramdas got title to the suit property.
3. Status of Tarabai's nomination u/s 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
4. Rights of Tarabai's children in the suit property.
5. Interpretation of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act regarding succession.

Summary:

Issue 1: Validity of the Compromise Decree
The Trial Court found that the decree obtained by Ramdas in Civil Suit No.206/1980 was collusive and fraudulent, thus not binding on the plaintiff. This finding was upheld by the First Appellate Court, which concluded that the compromise decree does not bind the plaintiff.

Issue 2: Partition and Title to the Suit Property
The Trial Court determined that the suit property was not partitioned and that Ramdas did not acquire title to the suit property under the alleged partition. The First Appellate Court also held that there was no partition effected among the family members and that Ramdas did not get the suit plot as his share.

Issue 3: Status of Tarabai's Nomination u/s 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act
The Trial Court held that Tarabai became the absolute owner of the suit property due to her nomination by her deceased husband Shivram u/s 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act r/w Rule-25 of the Rules framed thereunder. However, the High Court, relying on precedents, concluded that a valid nomination does not confer ownership but only authorizes the nominee to deal with the society. The nominee holds the property in trust for the real owners.

Issue 4: Rights of Tarabai's Children
The Trial Court concluded that Tarabai's children had no right, title, or interest in the suit property due to her nomination. The High Court, however, clarified that Tarabai, along with her four children, were Class-I heirs of Shivram, and thus, Tarabai did not have the authority to alienate the property to the exclusion of the other legal heirs.

Issue 5: Interpretation of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act
The High Court addressed whether Section 30 provides a special rule of succession altering the personal law. It was held that Section 30 does not create a new rule of succession but only specifies who the society should deal with upon a member's death. The nominee does not become the owner but holds the property for the legal heirs.

Conclusion:
The High Court allowed the Second Appeal, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. It was concluded that Tarabai did not become the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of her nomination, and Section 30 does not alter the rule of succession laid down by personal law. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed with no orders as to costs.

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