Employer representation before industrial tribunals is not exhaustive under Section 36(2); authorised agents may appear subject to procedural control.

Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is enabling rather than exhaustive, so it does not confine employer representation before an industrial tribunal only to the specified categories of persons. The Bombay High Court held that other duly authorised agents are not excluded, provided the tribunal's procedural control under Section 11 is respected. Rule 32 of the Bombay Rules was noted as consistent with broader representation rights. The tribunal's order permitting representation through an authorised person was therefore sustained, and the challenge failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 exhaustively limits the manner in which an employer may be represented before an industrial tribunal; (ii) whether an employer may be represented by an authorised agent outside the categories specified in Section 36(2), subject to the tribunal's procedural control.

Issue (i): Whether Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 exhaustively limits the manner in which an employer may be represented before an industrial tribunal.

Analysis: The opening words of Section 36 speak in enabling terms, conferring an entitlement to be represented, rather than imposing a restrictive code. The provision does not state that representation shall be only by the specified categories of persons. Reading the clause as exhaustive would lead to anomalous results, including denial of personal appearance where available and the practical defeat of an employer's right to be heard, particularly in the case of incorporated bodies and local authorities. The scheme of the Act does not support an implied curtailment of representation rights merely because certain classes of representatives are expressly recognised.

Conclusion: Section 36(2) is not exhaustive.

Issue (ii): Whether an employer may be represented by an authorised agent outside the categories specified in Section 36(2), subject to the tribunal's procedural control.

Analysis: Once Section 36(2) is treated as conferring an assured right to representation by the specified classes, it does not follow that other lawful modes of agency are excluded. The tribunal's power under Section 11 to regulate its own procedure preserves its authority to control audience and representation in an appropriate case. The right of a party to have its cause heard may be exercised through an agent, unless the governing law or procedure specifically prohibits that mode of representation. Rule 32 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay Rules), 1956 also recognises that representatives may address the authority and examine witnesses, reinforcing that representation under the Act is broader than the categories listed in Section 36(2).

Conclusion: An employer may be represented by a duly authorised person outside Section 36(2), subject to the tribunal's judicial discretion under Section 11.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the tribunal's order failed, and the tribunal's view permitting representation of the employer by the authorised person was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory provision stating that a party is entitled to be represented by specified persons is enabling and not exhaustive unless the statute clearly excludes other lawful modes of agency; the tribunal retains procedural control, but such control cannot impliedly extinguish the employer's right to be heard through an authorised representative.

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