Primary fact non-disclosure permits reassessment, and Tribunal findings stand absent a specific perversity reference.

Non-disclosure of a primary material fact, such as a transaction bearing directly on under-assessment, justified reopening under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922; the mere use of the word "information" in the reassessment order did not change the jurisdictional basis or attract section 34(1)(b). Once reasonable grounds existed to believe that a material fact had not been fully and truly disclosed, the reassessment was within jurisdiction and not time-barred on the basis contended. In advisory reference jurisdiction, the High Court could not reappraise evidence or disturb the Tribunal's findings of fact unless a specific question that those findings were without evidence or perverse had been properly referred, so the factual findings stood.

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Issues: Whether the second reassessment under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was valid and within time, and whether the High Court could interfere with the Tribunal's findings of fact in the absence of a specific reference that those findings were without evidence or perverse.

Analysis: The assessment for the relevant year was reopened on the footing that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts, particularly the Bombay transaction, which was a primary fact bearing on under-assessment. The Court held that the use of the word "information" in the orders did not convert the case into one under section 34(1)(b), because the real basis was non-disclosure attracting section 34(1)(a). It further held that, once reasonable grounds existed to believe that a material primary fact had not been disclosed, jurisdiction under section 34(1)(a) was properly assumed. On the challenge to factual findings, the Court held that in its advisory jurisdiction it could not reappraise evidence or disturb the Tribunal's findings unless the specific question that the findings were without evidence or perverse had been referred. Since no such reference was obtained, the findings had to be accepted.

Conclusion: The reassessment under section 34(1)(a) was valid, was not barred by limitation under section 34(1)(b), and the Tribunal's factual findings could not be disturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee has failed to disclose a primary material fact bearing on assessment, the Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen under section 34(1)(a); in a reference under section 66(1), the High Court must accept the Tribunal's findings of fact unless a specific question that such findings are without evidence or perverse is properly referred.

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