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Issues: Whether the High Court should invoke its inherent and supervisory jurisdiction to quash an order of discharge when the petitioner had an revisional remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but did not avail it within limitation.
Analysis: The petition was founded on Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The order challenged before the High Court was one passed in revision, and the petitioner had a further revisional remedy under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court applied the settled principle that inherent powers under Section 482 are not to be used where a specific statutory remedy exists, and that such power is to be exercised sparingly only to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. It also applied the principle that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not ordinarily invoked when an adequate alternative legal remedy was available, absent compelling or extraordinary circumstances. As the petitioner allowed the available revision to become time-barred and no exceptional ground was shown, the Court held that neither provision could be invoked to bypass the statutory remedy.
Conclusion: The invocation of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not warranted, and the petition was liable to be dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific statutory remedy is available and is allowed to lapse, the High Court will not ordinarily exercise inherent or supervisory jurisdiction to grant relief, except in compelling or extraordinary circumstances.