Limitation and registered-post service presumptions: sworn denial can rebut presumed service and shift the burden back to the sender.

A second appeal was treated as within limitation because the memorandum was incomplete without the required copy of the first-instance judgment, and the appellant could exclude the time spent obtaining that copy. On service of notice by registered post, a presumption of service may arise under the Evidence Act and the General Clauses Act, but it is rebuttable. A sworn denial by the addressee that no tender or refusal occurred was accepted as sufficient to rebut the presumption, shifting the burden back to the sender to prove actual service. The presumption of service failed, the tenant succeeded, and the eviction petition remained dismissed.

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Issues: (i) whether the second appeal was within time despite the absence of a certified copy of the original order at the time of filing; (ii) whether a presumption of service of notice by registered post arose and, if so, whether the tenant's sworn denial rebutted that presumption.

Issue (i): Whether the second appeal was within time despite the absence of a certified copy of the original order at the time of filing.

Analysis: The appeal memorandum in second appeal had to comply with the applicable court rules, which required a copy of the judgment of the court of first instance unless exempted by the appellate court. Since no exemption was sought or granted, the appeal was incomplete until the copy of the original order was obtained. The appellant was therefore entitled to exclude the additional time taken in procuring that copy for limitation purposes.

Conclusion: The second appeal was held to be within time and the limitation objection failed.

Issue (ii): Whether a presumption of service of notice by registered post arose and, if so, whether the tenant's sworn denial rebutted that presumption.

Analysis: Where a notice is properly addressed and sent by registered post, a presumption of fact may arise under section 114 of the Evidence Act and a presumption of law may arise under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Actual proof of tender by the postman is not a prerequisite to drawing the presumption. Both presumptions are rebuttable. A sworn denial by the addressee that the letter was never tendered and therefore not refused is ordinarily sufficient rebuttal evidence and shifts the burden back to the sender to prove actual service, commonly by examining the postman or other supporting evidence. On the record, the tenant's sworn denial was accepted as sufficient rebuttal.

Conclusion: The presumption of service stood rebutted, and the landlord failed to prove actual service of notice.

Final Conclusion: The tenant succeeded in the appeal, the appellate order was set aside, the controller's dismissal of the eviction petition was restored, and the eviction petition stood dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A registered post endorsement of refusal raises a rebuttable presumption of service, and a sworn denial by the addressee that no tender was made is ordinarily enough to rebut that presumption and shift the burden to prove actual service back to the sender.

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