Supervisory Jurisdiction Limits: Article 227 cannot replace appellate remedies or revive statutory protection after missed rent deposit deadlines.

Article 227 is an extraordinary supervisory power, not a substitute for appellate or revisional jurisdiction, and interference is justified only for grave dereliction, perversity, abuse of power, or manifest injustice. On the stated facts, the High Court was said to have erred in using that power to reopen concurrent rent control orders and enlarge time for deposit of rent arrears. The tenants were also found ineligible for Section 11(2)(c) because they did not deposit the arrears, interest, and costs within the statutory or allowed time; a stay order did not create a fresh right or extend statutory protection. The impugned order was set aside and the eviction order restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could invoke Article 227 to interfere with concurrent orders under the rent control statute and extend the time for deposit of arrears of rent as if exercising appellate or revisional power; (ii) Whether the tenants, having failed to deposit the arrears within the time allowed under the statute and subsequent orders, were entitled to the benefit of Section 11(2)(c).

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could invoke Article 227 to interfere with concurrent orders under the rent control statute and extend the time for deposit of arrears of rent as if exercising appellate or revisional power.

Analysis: The power of superintendence under Article 227 is extraordinary and discretionary. It is meant to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and is not to be used as a substitute for appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Interference is warranted only where there is grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse of power, perversity, or manifest injustice. A proceeding under Article 227 is not an extension of the statutory remedies provided by the rent control statute, and the High Court cannot treat it as conferring an automatic right to reopen final statutory orders or enlarge time in the ordinary course.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in exercising Article 227 in the manner it did, and its interference was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the tenants, having failed to deposit the arrears within the time allowed under the statute and subsequent orders, were entitled to the benefit of Section 11(2)(c).

Analysis: The statutory scheme makes an eviction order executable after the expiry of the prescribed period, subject only to timely deposit of arrears with interest and costs within the time allowed by the Act or by a competent order. The tenants did not deposit the arrears within the period granted after the revisional order, did not challenge the refusal of extension effectively, and deposited the amount only much later. A stay order, if any, does not by itself create a fresh statutory right or extend the statutory protection. On the admitted facts, the tenants failed to satisfy the conditions for availing the benefit of Section 11(2)(c).

Conclusion: The tenants were not entitled to the benefit of Section 11(2)(c), and the eviction order had attained finality and executability.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the orders of the appellate and revisional authorities were restored, leaving the eviction order against the tenants in force.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 227 cannot be used as an ordinary appellate or revisional remedy to reopen final statutory orders or to grant time for compliance unless exceptional circumstances such as grave injustice or jurisdictional error are shown.

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