Company dues cannot be enforced as personal liability of a managing director; writ jurisdiction remains available despite alternative remedy.

Liability for dues of an incorporated company remains that of the company as a juristic person and cannot be fastened on a managing director merely because he acted for the company. The Managing Director could not be arrayed as a personal certificate-debtor for company dues under the Bihar Public Demands Recovery Act, and recovery could be made only from company assets. The existence of a revisional remedy did not bar writ jurisdiction where relegating the petitioner to revision would be unjust and onerous in light of the absence of personal liability. The impugned order was modified accordingly.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appellant, being a Managing Director of the company, could be arrayed as a certificate-debtor for the company's dues under the Bihar Public Demands Recovery Act. (ii) Whether the writ petition ought to have been refused on the ground of availability of the revisional remedy under section 62 of the Act.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant, being a Managing Director of the company, could be arrayed as a certificate-debtor for the company's dues under the Bihar Public Demands Recovery Act.

Analysis: The liability for dues of an incorporated company is that of the company as a juristic person and cannot be fastened on its directors or managing director merely because they signed on behalf of the company. The statutory definition of certificate-debtor also contemplates the person named as debtor in the certificate, and the company's dues could be realised only from the assets of the company. The appellant's inclusion as a personal debtor was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The appellant could not be personally proceeded against as a certificate-debtor for the company's liability.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition ought to have been refused on the ground of availability of the revisional remedy under section 62 of the Act.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Since the appellant was not personally liable for the certificate dues, relegating him to revision would have compelled a substantial deposit for a liability not attributable to him. In these circumstances, the High Court could examine the matter on merits notwithstanding the revisional remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and the appellant was not required to be relegated to revision.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified to clarify that the appellant's name could appear only for description of the company and not as a person personally liable for the dues, and the challenge succeeded to that extent.

Ratio Decidendi: Dues of an incorporated company cannot be recovered from its directors or managing director as personal liability, and the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where insisting on that remedy would be unjust and onerous in the circumstances.

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