Trade restriction on essential commodities upheld where temporary crusher ban served supply control, rational classification, and emergency regulation.

A temporary ban on khandsari power crushers was upheld as a reasonable restriction on trade under Article 19(1)(g) because it served the statutory objective of securing sugar availability and equitable distribution during shortage. The challenge under Article 14 and excessive delegation failed, as clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 was supported by the policy of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and the distinction between sugar mills and khandsari units had a rational basis. Clause 8 was read as authorising temporary stoppage, and no prior hearing was required. The exemption for vertical crushers was discriminatory, but that word was severable.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the temporary ban on khandsari power crushers was a reasonable restriction on the petitioners' right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) and within the scope of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. (ii) Whether the notification and clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 were invalid under Article 14 for excessive delegation, hostile discrimination, or lack of rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (iii) Whether clause 8 authorised a temporary prohibition of working the crushers and whether principles of natural justice or clause 11 of the Control Order required a prior hearing. (iv) Whether the exemption for vertical power crushers was discriminatory and, if so, whether that part was severable.

Issue (i): Whether the temporary ban on khandsari power crushers was a reasonable restriction on the petitioners' right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) and within the scope of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Analysis: The restriction was imposed in the context of an acute shortage of sugar and was directed to securing greater availability and equitable distribution of an essential commodity at fair prices. The measure was limited to a short period, applied only in the reserved area, and left the petitioners' production of gur and rab untouched. The Court treated the consumer interest and the need to boost sugar production as the dominant considerations and held that the temporary stoppage of crushers bore a direct nexus to the statutory purpose.

Conclusion: The restriction was a reasonable one and did not violate Article 19(1)(g); the challenge on this ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the notification and clause 8 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 were invalid under Article 14 for excessive delegation, hostile discrimination, or lack of rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

Analysis: Clause 8 conferred power on the Central Government, a high authority, and the power was controlled by the scheme and policy of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Court accepted the distinction between sugar mills and khandsari units on the basis of recovery, scale, market use, and the wider public distribution function of mill sugar. On the materials placed, the Court found a rational basis for treating the two groups differently and held that the policy choice was not arbitrary or unguided.

Conclusion: The challenge based on Article 14 and excessive delegation was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether clause 8 authorised a temporary prohibition of working the crushers and whether principles of natural justice or clause 11 of the Control Order required a prior hearing.

Analysis: The Court read the words "period or hours to be worked" in clause 8 as authorising regulation either of daily hours or of the period for which the units may operate, including a temporary stoppage. The notification was treated as a legislative measure framed to meet an emergency in the supply of sugar, and in that setting the doctrine of prior hearing was held inapplicable. Clause 11 was also held not to apply because the notification did not amount to revocation or cancellation of the licence.

Conclusion: Clause 8 supported the notification, and neither natural justice nor clause 11 invalidated it.

Issue (iv): Whether the exemption for vertical power crushers was discriminatory and, if so, whether that part was severable.

Analysis: The Court found no proved material distinction between vertical and horizontal power crushers for the purpose of the notification. The exemption of vertical crushers while banning horizontal crushers was therefore held to be discriminatory. At the same time, the offending word was found severable from the rest of the notification, so the valid portion could stand independently.

Conclusion: The use of the word "vertical" was struck down, but the remainder of the notification was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners' constitutional challenges largely failed, the notification was substantially sustained, and only the discriminatory vertical-crusher exemption was severed from it.

Ratio Decidendi: A temporary restriction on trade in an essential commodity is valid if it is imposed in public interest under a statutory scheme, bears a reasonable nexus to the object of equitable distribution and supply, and operates as a legislative measure not requiring prior hearing; a discriminatory part of such a measure may be severed if it is independently detachable.

---