Tribunal impartiality restriction upheld: former CESTAT office-holders barred from appearing before the same forum to avoid bias.

A forum-specific bar preventing former CESTAT members, vice-presidents and presidents from appearing before the same tribunal was upheld as a reasonable restriction in public interest. The Court held that the measure was designed to preserve actual and apparent impartiality, promote confidence in adjudication, and did not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 21 because it limited appearance before one forum rather than the right to practise generally. The bar was held to apply to former office-holders who had already demitted office, and the absence of corresponding amendments in related fiscal statutes did not affect its operation. The restriction also applied notwithstanding a claim based on authorised representative status.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 is unconstitutional as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether the bar under Section 129(6) applies only prospectively and not to former members, vice-presidents and presidents who had demitted office before its insertion; (iii) Whether the absence of corresponding amendments in the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1994 renders the impugned provision inapplicable or incongruous; (iv) Whether the restriction could be avoided on the footing of an authorised representative's right to appear before CESTAT.

Issue (i): Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 is unconstitutional as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The impugned provision was upheld as a forum-specific restriction aimed at preserving the appearance of impartiality and strengthening public confidence in the administration of justice. The absence of empirical instances of misuse did not undermine legislative competence or validity, because the rule against bias rests on the need to avoid even a reasonable apprehension of partiality. The provision was also found to be non-discriminatory, since the fact that similar restraints had not yet been extended to every other tribunal did not make the chosen reform arbitrary. As the restriction did not extinguish the petitioners' right to practise generally but only restricted appearances before one tribunal, it was held to be a reasonable restriction in public interest.

Conclusion: The challenge under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 failed and the provision was held constitutionally valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the bar under Section 129(6) applies only prospectively and not to former members, vice-presidents and presidents who had demitted office before its insertion.

Analysis: The expression "on ceasing to hold office" was read as attaching the disability to the status of a former office-holder, not as limiting the provision to future demissions only. The Court held that the provision regulated the right of appearance before CESTAT and did not take away any vested right to practise, since the right to appear before a particular forum is capable of regulation by law. No distinction was accepted between those who had demitted office before the amendment and those who would do so thereafter.

Conclusion: The bar was held applicable to former office-holders notwithstanding that they had ceased to hold office before the amendment.

Issue (iii): Whether the absence of corresponding amendments in the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1994 renders the impugned provision inapplicable or incongruous.

Analysis: CESTAT was treated as a single common forum adjudicating customs, excise and service tax matters, and the disability was held to attach to the forum rather than to any particular stream of law. Once a person had served as a member, vice-president or president of that tribunal, the statutory bar against appearance before the same tribunal operated irrespective of the absence of parallel amendments in the other fiscal enactments.

Conclusion: The omission of corresponding amendments in the other enactments did not affect the operation of Section 129(6).

Issue (iv): Whether the restriction could be avoided on the footing of an authorised representative's right to appear before CESTAT.

Analysis: The Court held that the statutory bar was directed to the right of appearance before CESTAT by any person who had held the specified office, whether as a legal practitioner or as an authorised representative. Therefore, the absence of a parallel amendment in the provisions governing authorised representatives did not dilute the prohibition.

Conclusion: The plea based on authorised representative status was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar against former members and office-bearers of CESTAT appearing before the same tribunal was upheld as a valid regulatory measure designed to secure impartial administration of justice, and all the writ petitions were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A law barring former members, vice-presidents and presidents of a tribunal from appearing before that same tribunal is a valid forum-specific regulatory restriction enacted in public interest to avoid real or apparent bias, and it applies to all former office-holders regardless of when they demitted office.

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