Concurrent military and civil jurisdiction under the Army Act turns on military authority's forum choice and substantial compliance with notice rules.

Where an offence is triable both by the ordinary criminal court and by court-martial under the Army Act, the statutory machinery allocates the initial choice to the competent military authority. Notice and stay requirements arise only when the military authority has opted for court-martial and the accused is to be proceeded against in that forum. If the authorities, with knowledge of the charge, release the accused to civil authorities for trial, the civil court may proceed without issuing notice, and substantial compliance with the jurisdiction-adjustment scheme is sufficient to preserve the trial.

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Issues: (i) Whether the trial and conviction of a person subject to the Army Act by the ordinary criminal court were invalid for non-compliance with the statutory procedure governing concurrent jurisdiction between the criminal court and the court-martial. (ii) Whether, on the facts, the military authorities had already decided that the accused should be tried by the ordinary criminal court, so that notice under the relevant provisions was unnecessary.

Issue (i): Whether the trial and conviction of a person subject to the Army Act by the ordinary criminal court were invalid for non-compliance with the statutory procedure governing concurrent jurisdiction between the criminal court and the court-martial.

Analysis: Under the Army Act, where an offence is one which may be tried both by the ordinary criminal court and by court-martial, the statute provides a machinery to resolve conflict of jurisdiction. The scheme of the provisions leaves the initial choice to the designated military authority. The criminal court's duty to issue notice and stay proceedings arises only when the military authority has chosen court-martial as the forum and the accused is to be dealt with accordingly. The absence of notice does not by itself vitiate the trial if the statutory scheme has been substantially complied with and the military authorities have already indicated that the accused may be tried civilly.

Conclusion: The mere omission to issue notice did not render the trial void or illegal.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts, the military authorities had already decided that the accused should be tried by the ordinary criminal court, so that notice under the relevant provisions was unnecessary.

Analysis: The record showed that the military authorities were aware of the allegation, participated in the investigation process, and ultimately released the accused from military custody to the civil authorities for trial. That conduct was treated as an indication that the competent military authority had decided not to insist on court-martial. Once that position was taken, the criminal court was not required to follow the notice procedure designed for a contrary situation.

Conclusion: The statutory procedure for notice was inapplicable on the facts, and the trial before the criminal court was valid.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was sustained because the relevant provisions governing concurrent jurisdiction were substantially complied with and the criminal court's trial of the accused was not vitiated.

Ratio Decidendi: Where military authorities, having knowledge of the charge, release an accused subject to the Army Act to the civil authorities for trial, the criminal court may proceed without issuing notice under the adjustment-of-jurisdiction rules, and substantial compliance with the statutory scheme is sufficient to sustain the trial.

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