Guided forum-selection discretion under the Army Act was upheld, with constitutional and procedural challenges rejected.

A statutory discretion to choose trial by court-martial or ordinary criminal court was upheld as guided by relevant considerations such as discipline, the nature of the offence, service exigencies and the need for speedy trial, and because the choice remained subject to statutory control. No violation of Article 22(1) was shown, as the record did not establish a clear request for a civil lawyer of choice that was refused. The death sentence was not shown to breach the two-thirds concurrence requirement, since the official certificate supported compliance. The further remedy under Section 164 was also not denied, as no additional departmental review was required where the Central Government was the confirming authority.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 125 of the Army Act, 1950 conferred unguided discretion and thereby violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether denial of representation by a legal practitioner of choice at the court-martial violated Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. (iii) Whether the death sentence was invalid for want of concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the court-martial under Section 132(2) of the Army Act, 1950. (iv) Whether the scheme of Section 164 of the Army Act, 1950 denied the petitioner an effective further remedy after confirmation by the Central Government.

Issue (i): Whether Section 125 of the Army Act, 1950 conferred unguided discretion and thereby violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The power to decide whether a person subject to the Act should be tried by court-martial or by ordinary criminal court was not left uncontrolled. The Act and the rules indicated relevant considerations, including maintenance of discipline, nature of the offence, persons affected, exigencies of service, and the need for speedy trial. The choice of forum was also subject to the control of the criminal court and the Central Government under the statutory scheme. In that setting, the discretion could not be treated as arbitrary or unguided.

Conclusion: Section 125 of the Army Act, 1950 did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (ii): Whether denial of representation by a legal practitioner of choice at the court-martial violated Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The record did not establish that any clear request to engage a practising civil lawyer of choice had been made and refused. The petition did not state such a request in straightforward terms, and the allegations showed only inability to contact relatives for arranging civilian representation. On that footing, there was no proven denial of the constitutional right claimed.

Conclusion: There was no violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

Issue (iii): Whether the death sentence was invalid for want of concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the court-martial under Section 132(2) of the Army Act, 1950.

Analysis: The certificate signed by the presiding officer and the Judge-Advocate stated that the sentence of death had been passed with the concurrence required by law. The petitioner had no direct means of knowing the private voting of members, and there was no sufficient basis to disbelieve the official certificate or to hold that the statutory requirement had not been met.

Conclusion: There was no non-compliance with Section 132(2) of the Army Act, 1950.

Issue (iv): Whether the scheme of Section 164 of the Army Act, 1950 denied the petitioner an effective further remedy after confirmation by the Central Government.

Analysis: Section 164 provided two successive remedies, but the further petition contemplated by the provision was only to an authority superior to the confirming authority. Where the Central Government itself acted as the confirming authority, it was the highest authority contemplated by the provision and no further departmental remedy could arise. The statutory scheme did not require two higher authorities to examine the matter in every case.

Conclusion: Section 164 of the Army Act, 1950 did not support the petitioner's grievance.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional and statutory challenges failed, and the conviction and sentence were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory discretion to choose the forum of trial is not unconstitutional when the enactment and its related scheme supply relevant guiding considerations and place the choice under higher statutory control.

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