Death sentence delay and Article 21: execution may be examined for fairness, but no automatic commutation follows.

Prolonged delay in executing a death sentence is a relevant factor, but it does not create an automatic rule for commutation or quashing once a fixed period has passed. Relief depends on the cause of delay, the prisoner's own conduct in pursuing proceedings, the nature of the offence, and the surrounding circumstances. Article 21 applies at the stage of execution as well as trial and sentencing, so supervening events and inordinate delay may be considered to determine whether execution would remain fair, just and reasonable. The resulting position is that delay may justify relief on the facts, but only after an individualised assessment.

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Issues: (i) whether delay exceeding two years in the execution of a death sentence automatically entitles the condemned prisoner to have the sentence quashed or commuted; (ii) whether Article 21 of the Constitution applies at the stage of execution of a death sentence so that supervening circumstances and inordinate delay may be considered in deciding whether the sentence should be executed.

Issue (i): whether delay exceeding two years in the execution of a death sentence automatically entitles the condemned prisoner to have the sentence quashed or commuted.

Analysis: Prolonged delay in executing a death sentence is a relevant circumstance, but the existence of delay by itself does not justify a rigid rule that the sentence must be set aside once a fixed period has elapsed. The Court rejected a hard and fast two-year formula and held that the cause of delay, the conduct of the prisoner in pursuing repeated proceedings, the nature of the offence, and the surrounding circumstances must all be considered before granting relief.

Conclusion: There is no automatic entitlement to commutation or quashing of the death sentence merely because execution has been delayed beyond two years.

Issue (ii): whether Article 21 of the Constitution applies at the stage of execution of a death sentence so that supervening circumstances and inordinate delay may be considered in deciding whether the sentence should be executed.

Analysis: Article 21 was held to extend beyond trial and sentencing to the stage of incarceration and execution. The Court recognised that even a lawfully imposed death sentence may become harsh, unjust or unfair to execute because of supervening events, including prolonged uncertainty and delay, and that the procedure governing execution must remain fair, just and reasonable. The Court accordingly accepted that such circumstances can be examined in an appropriate proceeding, though they do not create an automatic rule of commutation.

Conclusion: Yes. Article 21 applies at the stage of execution, and supervening circumstances may be taken into account, but only on the facts of the individual case.

Final Conclusion: The decision preserves the Court's power to examine whether a death sentence, though validly imposed, has become unjust to execute because of subsequent events, while rejecting any absolute time-based rule for commutation.

Ratio Decidendi: Prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is a relevant factor under Article 21, but it does not by itself mandate commutation; the court must assess the cause of delay and all supervening circumstances to decide whether execution would be fair, just and reasonable.

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