Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Extends to Formally Accused Persons Linked by Allegations, Not Just Named Suspects

Article 20(3) applies once a formal accusation relating to an offence is made, even if the person is not specifically named, where the materials clearly connect him with the alleged offence. The privilege against self-incrimination protects only compelled answers that tend to incriminate; it does not excuse responses that are not self-incriminatory. On the facts, the arrest grounds and FIR linked the petitioner, as the bank officer in charge, to the same transaction, so he was treated as a person accused of an offence and could not be compelled to answer incriminating questions.

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Issues: Whether, on the facts, the petitioner had become a person accused of an offence so as to attract the protection against testimonial compulsion under Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

Analysis: The arrest grounds and the subsequent first information report related to the same exchange transaction and imputed responsibility to the petitioner as the officer in charge of the bank. The legal position applied was that Article 20(3) is attracted once there is a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence which may in the normal course result in prosecution. A person need not be specifically named if the materials and allegations clearly connect him with the offence. The protection, however, extends only to answers that are self-incriminatory and does not excuse answering questions that are not of that character.

Conclusion: The petitioner was a person accused of an offence within Article 20(3) and could not be compelled to answer questions tending to incriminate him.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 20(3) is attracted when a formal accusation relating to an offence is made against a person, and the privilege against self-incrimination protects only compelled answers having a tendency to incriminate that person.

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