Limitation under the Police Act barred prosecution started after the three-month period for the specific absence allegation.

A prosecution for an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, 1861 had to be commenced within three months of the act complained of under section 42. On the facts described, the charge was confined to absence from duty on 25 November 1963, while the first prosecuting step occurred on 10 January 1966, well outside the statutory period. The argument that the matter involved continuing absence was rejected because the conviction was based only on the specific alleged absence on that date. The stated effect was that the prosecution was time-barred and the conviction and fine could not stand.

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Issues: Whether the prosecution for an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, 1861 was barred by limitation under section 42 of the Act because it was commenced more than three months after the act complained of.

Analysis: Section 42 required prosecutions for acts done or intended to be done under the Police Act to be commenced within three months after the act complained of. The charge against the appellant was specifically for absence from duty on 25 November 1963, and the earliest prosecuting step was the notice issued on 10 January 1966. Even if that notice were treated as the commencement of prosecution, it was far beyond the statutory period. The attempt to treat the case as one of continuing absence was rejected because the courts below had tried and convicted the appellant only on the specific allegation of absence on 25 November 1963. The limitation bar under section 42 therefore applied.

Conclusion: The prosecution was barred by limitation under section 42 of the Police Act, 1861 and the conviction and fine could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution for an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, 1861 must be commenced within three months of the act complained of, and if initiated thereafter it is barred by limitation under section 42 of the Act.

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