Probation law applies to pending criminal cases; probation officer's report is mandatory before sentencing.

The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was treated as a beneficial reforming statute capable of applying to pending criminal proceedings, and section 11 was read broadly to permit appellate and revisional courts to act under section 6 even where the trial conviction predated the Act's extension to the area. On that construction, the earlier conviction did not bar consideration of probationary relief at the later stage. Section 6(2) was also held to require the court to call for and consider a probation officer's report before deciding sentencing, making that step mandatory. The conviction remained undisturbed, but the sentencing order required fresh consideration under the Act.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appellate court and the High Court could invoke section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, read with section 6, in a case where the conviction had been recorded before the Act was extended to the area. (ii) Whether the requirement of calling for a probation officer's report under section 6(2) was mandatory before sentencing an offender under section 6(1).

Issue (i): Whether the appellate court and the High Court could invoke section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, read with section 6, in a case where the conviction had been recorded before the Act was extended to the area.

Analysis: The Act was treated as a beneficial reforming measure, and its application to pending proceedings was held not to offend Article 20 of the Constitution of India because it did not create a new offence or enhance punishment. Section 11(1) was construed broadly to empower not only the trial court but also the appellate court and the High Court to make orders under the Act when the case came before them. Reading section 11 with section 6, the expression "the court by which the person is found guilty" was held to include an appellate court or revisional court that affirms or records guilt in a pending criminal proceeding. On that construction, the fact that the trial court had convicted the accused before the Act was extended to the area did not exclude the application of section 6 at the appellate or revisional stage.

Conclusion: Yes. The appellate court and the High Court could apply section 6 through section 11, and the appellant was entitled to have the matter considered under the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the requirement of calling for a probation officer's report under section 6(2) was mandatory before sentencing an offender under section 6(1).

Analysis: Section 6(2) was held to impose a mandatory obligation on the court to call for and consider a probation officer's report, together with any other relevant information, before deciding whether it would be undesirable to deal with the offender under sections 3 or 4. The report was treated as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to sentence the offender to imprisonment under section 6(1), and the omission to follow that procedure meant that the matter had not been dealt with in accordance with the Act.

Conclusion: Yes. Compliance with section 6(2) was mandatory, and the case had to be reconsidered after following that procedure.

Final Conclusion: The conviction itself was left undisturbed, but the sentencing order could not stand without application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, in accordance with sections 6 and 11, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration under the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: A beneficial probation statute may be applied by an appellate or revisional court to a pending criminal proceeding under the statute's broad appellate power, and the statutory requirement to obtain and consider a probation officer's report before imposing imprisonment on a qualifying offender is mandatory.

Dissenting Opinion: Raghubar Dayal, J. held that the appellate court could not apply the Act where the trial court had no power to do so on the date of conviction, and that the appeal should therefore fail.

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