Concurrent law repugnancy displaces an earlier State amendment and applies the later, more lenient criminal procedure to pending cases.

A later Central amendment in a concurrent field was held to displace the earlier West Bengal amendment by implication because the two enactments created inconsistent punishment and procedure schemes. The general saving rule did not preserve the State amendment once the Central law showed a contrary intention, so the earlier harsher regime ceased to govern prosecutions. The amended law also applied to pending cases, including summary trial under section 16A, because an accused has no vested right to insist on the former punishment or procedure. The consequence was that pending prosecutions were governed by the amended scheme and attracted the reduced punishment.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Central Amendment Act impliedly repealed the West Bengal Amendment Act and, if so, whether the saving provisions preserved the earlier State amendment for pending prosecutions and punishment. (ii) Whether the later statutory scheme, including summary trial under section 16A, governed pending cases and entitled the accused to the reduced punishment under the Central Amendment Act.

Issue (i): Whether the Central Amendment Act impliedly repealed the West Bengal Amendment Act and whether the earlier State amendment survived for pending prosecutions and punishment.

Analysis: The later parliamentary amendment operated in the same field as the State amendment and laid down a different and comprehensive scheme both as to punishment and procedure. In a concurrent subject, a later Central law repugnant to a State law prevails to the extent of inconsistency, and the State law stands displaced by implication. The saving provisions of the General Clauses law do not preserve a repealed enactment where the new legislation shows a contrary intention. The earlier State amendment could not therefore continue to govern the field once the Central amendment came into force.

Conclusion: The West Bengal Amendment Act stood impliedly repealed, and it did not continue to govern the prosecution or punishment after the Central Amendment Act came into force.

Issue (ii): Whether pending proceedings were governed by section 16A and whether the accused was entitled to the reduced punishment under the Central Amendment Act.

Analysis: A later law dealing with the same offence and prescribing a different, lesser punishment can apply to pending matters where it mitigates the rigour of criminal law. The accused has no vested right to insist on the continuation of the former harsher punishment or the former forum and procedure. The amended scheme therefore applied to pending prosecutions, including the summary trial procedure under section 16A, while the benefit of the reduced punishment also followed.

Conclusion: Pending proceedings were governed by the Central Amendment Act, and the accused was entitled to the reduced punishment under the amended law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the post-amendment statutory regime displaced the earlier State law, applied to pending cases, and entitled the accused only to the benefit of the amended punishment and procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: When Parliament enacts a later law in the same concurrent field that repugns to an earlier State law, the State law is repealed by implication, and unless a contrary intention appears, the general saving rule does not preserve the earlier harsher punishment or procedure for pending prosecutions.

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