Delegation of authority in criminal complaints fails where bye-laws reserve the power to sue and no further authorisation exists.

A power of attorney holder was held incompetent to institute and maintain criminal complaints where the federation's bye-laws vested the power to sue and be sued in the Managing Director, and no material showed authorisation from the Board of Directors for any further delegation. In the absence of express authority from the competent governing body, the general power of attorney executed by the Managing Director did not validly extend to prosecution of complaints under Section 200 CrPC or the connected appeals. The dismissal of the complaints was therefore justified.

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Issues: Whether the power of attorney holder was competent to institute and maintain the criminal complaints and the appeals on behalf of the complainant federation.

Analysis: The complainant federation was represented by its power of attorney holder under a general power of attorney executed by the Managing Director. The governing bye-laws, however, vested the power to sue and be sued in the Managing Director, and there was no material to show that the Board of Directors had authorised the Managing Director to further delegate that power to another person. In the absence of such authority, the power of attorney holder could not validly prosecute the complaints under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The power of attorney holder was not competent to maintain the complaints or the appeals, and the dismissal of the complaints was /justified.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the power to institute proceedings is vested in a designated office-bearer by the governing rules, that power cannot be delegated further in the absence of express authorisation by the competent governing body.

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