Delegated rule-making cannot impose a filing deadline where statute authorises only the manner of compliance.

Under section 3-G of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the phrase "in such manner" was construed as governing the mode and particulars of compliance, not as authorising the rule-making authority to impose a filing deadline. Applying the same approach used for similar language in the Central Sales Tax Act, the Court held that a limitation period requires express statutory words. Rule 12-C(2) was therefore ultra vires section 3-G to the extent it fixed a time-limit for filing Form III-D, and the declarations could not be rejected merely as time-barred; they had to be considered on merits.

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Issues: Whether, under section 3-G of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the rule-making authority could prescribe a time-limit for filing form III-D.

Analysis: The expression "in such manner" in section 3-G was construed as regulating the mode and particulars of compliance, not as conferring power to fix a limitation period. Relying on the interpretation of similar language in the Central Sales Tax Act, the Court held that if the Legislature intended a filing deadline, it would have used specific words authorising prescription of the time within which the declaration had to be filed. Rule 12-C(2), to the extent it imposed a time-limit for filing form III-D, therefore exceeded the statutory power conferred by section 3-G.

Conclusion: Rule 12-C(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules, 1948 was held ultra vires section 3-G of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 insofar as it prescribed a time-limit for filing form III-D.

Final Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to have the declarations considered on merits and not rejected merely as time-barred on the basis of the impugned rule.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory phrase empowering prescription of the "manner" of compliance does not, without express words, authorise the delegated authority to impose a filing time-limit.

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