Transfer of earmarked civic-use land remains valid absent express statutory prohibition; executive circulars cannot impose a contrary ban.

Section 3(3)(a)(iv) of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 regulates the use of land reserved for schools, hospitals, community centres and similar amenities, but does not by itself impose an express prohibition on transfer of ownership. The right to transfer remains incidental to ownership unless clearly curtailed by statute, and the earmarked civic purpose is preserved so long as the land continues to be used for that purpose. Executive circulars cannot create a ban on transfers or override the statutory framework, and bona fide transferees acquiring interests for value cannot be deprived of their rights in the absence of a statutory bar or pleaded fraud.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 3(3)(a)(iv) of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and the licence conditions prohibit transfer of land reserved for schools, hospitals, community centres and other community buildings to third parties or only regulate its user for the specified purpose. (ii) Whether the impugned executive circulars could validly impose a ban on such transfers and affect bona fide transferees.

Issue (i): Whether Section 3(3)(a)(iv) of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and the licence conditions prohibit transfer of land reserved for schools, hospitals, community centres and other community buildings to third parties or only regulate its user for the specified purpose.

Analysis: The statutory scheme was held to regulate the use of land and the development obligations of a colonizer, not to impose an express prohibition on transfer of ownership. The obligation under Section 3(3)(a)(iv) was to construct the specified amenities at the colonizer's own cost or get them constructed by another institution or individual at its cost, or to transfer the earmarked land to the Government free of cost if so required. The Court treated the right to transfer as incidental to ownership and held that such a right can be curtailed only by clear statutory mandate. It further held that the expressions relating to development works and amenities could not be conflated so as to infer a total ban on transfer, and that the statute did not declare such transfers void or illegal. The regulatory purpose was satisfied once the land continued to be used for the earmarked civic purpose.

Conclusion: No statutory prohibition on transfer could be inferred from Section 3(3)(a)(iv) or the licence conditions, and the transfers were not invalid merely because the sites were earmarked for community amenities.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned executive circulars could validly impose a ban on such transfers and affect bona fide transferees.

Analysis: The Court held that an executive instruction cannot curtail a proprietary right where the statute itself does not do so. The later circulars were treated as an attempt to create a restriction that was absent in the parent Act and the licence framework. The Court also noted that the transferees had acted on public advertisements and had acquired interests for value, and there was no pleaded fraud or collusion. In the absence of a statutory bar, a transfer that is at most irregular could not be converted into an illegal transfer by executive fiat, nor could the State's earlier acceptance of similar transfers be ignored.

Conclusion: The executive circulars could not lawfully impose the alleged ban, and the rights of bona fide transferees could not be jeopardised on that basis.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside, the appeals succeeded, and the State authorities were left free to proceed against any future non-compliance with the statutory obligations.

Ratio Decidendi: A restriction on the owner's right to transfer land cannot be inferred by implication from a regulatory statute where the statute does not expressly prohibit transfer or declare such transfers void; executive instructions cannot override the statute, and land earmarked for a specified civic use remains transferable so long as that use is preserved.

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