Retrospective forfeiture under NDPS Chapter VA upheld where statutory language and legislative purpose covered past convictions.

Chapter VA of the NDPS Act was construed to apply retrospectively as well as prospectively, because section 68A(2)(a) uses the phrase "has been convicted" and the scheme of forfeiture, including section 68C, shows legislative intent to reach persons already convicted. Jurisdiction under section 68D was held not to depend on the notification naming the officer individually; valid appointment of a competent authority of the prescribed rank was sufficient. On the opportunity and source-of-funds issue, notice, replies and hearings were found adequate, and the appellants failed to prove lawful acquisition because they produced no reliable income records or supporting evidence. The forfeiture order was upheld in full.

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Issues: (i) Whether Chapter VA of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 applies retrospectively to persons convicted before its insertion. (ii) Whether the competent authority lacked jurisdiction because the notification did not name the officer by name. (iii) Whether the appellants were denied sufficient opportunity and failed to establish lawful acquisition of the properties.

Issue (i): Whether Chapter VA of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 applies retrospectively to persons convicted before its insertion.

Analysis: The expression in section 68A(2)(a), namely, a person "who has been convicted", was read as intentionally covering past convictions and not merely future convictions. The scheme of Chapter VA, including the limiting proviso in section 68C, showed that Parliament had contemplated application of the forfeiture regime to persons already convicted under the Act. The presumption against retrospectivity was held not to prevail where the language and legislative purpose required retrospective operation.

Conclusion: Chapter VA applies both retrospectively and prospectively, and the appellants are covered by it.

Issue (ii): Whether the competent authority lacked jurisdiction because the notification did not name the officer by name.

Analysis: Jurisdiction under section 68D depended on valid appointment by the Central Government of a competent authority of the prescribed rank. The notification was not required to name the officer individually, and the fact that the impugned order was passed by the authorised officer did not create any jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The challenge to the jurisdiction of the competent authority failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants were denied sufficient opportunity and failed to establish lawful acquisition of the properties.

Analysis: The appellants were given notice, replied to it, and were afforded hearing dates, including adjournment at their request. They produced no reliable evidence of lawful income, no books of account, no bank records, and no supporting material for the claimed job-work income. The assessed returns and unverified assertions were insufficient to discharge the burden under section 8 of SAFEMA, and the plea that documents had been seized by police was rejected for want of proof.

Conclusion: The appellants had sufficient opportunity and failed to rebut the finding that the properties were illegally acquired.

Final Conclusion: The forfeiture order was upheld in full, and the challenge to it failed on every substantive ground.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory language expressly uses the past tense to identify the class of persons covered, the provision may operate retrospectively if that construction best advances the legislative purpose and the scheme of the enactment.

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