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Issues: (i) Whether under section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, separate permissions were required for a recovery suit and for execution of the decree, or whether a composite permission could suffice. (ii) Whether the permission already granted by the Board covered the execution proceedings in the facts of the case.
Issue (i): Whether under section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, separate permissions were required for a recovery suit and for execution of the decree, or whether a composite permission could suffice.
Analysis: Section 22(1) suspends specified proceedings against an industrial company unless consent is obtained from the Board or the appellate authority, but it does not prescribe any particular mode of granting such consent. The provision, even after the 1994 amendment, does not create a statutory requirement of two distinct orders, one for institution of the suit and another for execution. A composite permission is not prohibited, and the competent forum may grant consent covering both stages where the circumstances justify it.
Conclusion: Separate permissions were not required, and composite permission was legally permissible.
Issue (ii): Whether the permission already granted by the Board covered the execution proceedings in the facts of the case.
Analysis: The Board clarified that its earlier permission extended to execution as well, and that clarification was not challenged. The same view was accepted by the Single Judge and left undisturbed in the appeal. In these circumstances, the later objection that execution required a fresh consent could not be sustained, particularly when the decree had already been affirmed upto the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The permission granted by the Board covered the execution proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the execution proceedings failed because the statutory consent was held to be sufficient for both the suit and its execution, and the decree-holder was entitled to proceed.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 does not require separate permissions for institution of a recovery suit and execution of the resultant decree, and a composite consent granted by the competent authority is valid.
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