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Issues: (i) whether the District Judge acting under section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, while dealing with an application under section 31, functions as a persona designata or as a civil court of ordinary jurisdiction; (ii) whether applications under section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 are governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and, if so, which article applies.
Issue (i): whether the District Judge acting under section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, while dealing with an application under section 31, functions as a persona designata or as a civil court of ordinary jurisdiction.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of sections 31 and 32 shows that the District Judge receives and adjudicates the Corporation's claim through judicial procedure, including notice, investigation, and orders passed in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 insofar as applicable. The provision also authorises appeal to the High Court from orders passed under section 32, which is inconsistent with the notion of a persona designata. The earlier Supreme Court authorities relied upon were treated as settling that the District Judge acts as a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction under the Act.
Conclusion: The District Judge under section 32 is not a persona designata but a civil court of ordinary jurisdiction.
Issue (ii): whether applications under section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 are governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and, if so, which article applies.
Analysis: The Act does not prescribe any separate period of limitation for an application under section 31. The definition of "application" under the Limitation Act, 1963 includes petitions, and the residuary Article 137 applies to applications presented to a civil court where no other specific period is provided. Article 112 is confined to suits by or on behalf of Government, and Article 136 applies only to execution of decrees or orders, neither of which fits a section 31 application. The court therefore treated Article 137 as the governing provision and held that the period is three years from the date the right to apply accrues.
Conclusion: Applications under section 31 are governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered on the preliminary legal questions, with the applications under section 31 held maintainable only subject to Article 137, and the connected appeals were left to be decided on merits by the appropriate Bench.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute confers adjudicatory power on a District Judge as a civil court and prescribes no limitation for the application, the residuary limitation provision for applications to civil courts applies.