Ministerial scrutiny cannot become adjudication: tribunal registry officers lack power to finally reject interlocutory impleading applications.

A Registrar of the Debts Recovery Tribunal has only ministerial scrutiny functions under section 22 and the Procedure Rules, and cannot exercise judicial power to finally refuse or dismiss an interlocutory impleading application unless such authority is expressly conferred. The power under Rule 5 is confined to registration and rectification of defects, and administrative scrutiny cannot be treated as adjudication. The note also records that, despite procedural irregularity and a lack of fair opportunity, the impugned orders were not set aside because the applicants were not debtors, sureties or guarantors and could pursue their claimed rights, including disputed title issues, in appropriate proceedings.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Registrar of the Debts Recovery Tribunal had authority under the Act, the Procedure Rules and the Regulations to refuse registration of, or otherwise finally deal with, an interlocutory impleading application by exercising judicial power; (ii) Whether the impugned order and the final order in the original application were liable to be interfered with for violation of natural justice and want of jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the Registrar of the Debts Recovery Tribunal had authority under the Act, the Procedure Rules and the Regulations to refuse registration of, or otherwise finally deal with, an interlocutory impleading application by exercising judicial power.

Analysis: The scheme of section 22 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and Rules 4, 5, 13, 14, 22 and 23 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 shows that the Tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, but the Registrar is only a ministerial officer with limited scrutiny-related functions. The power conferred under Rule 5 is confined to scrutiny, registration and allowing rectification of defects, and the statute does not authorize rejection or dismissal of an interlocutory application. The Regulations also do not confer judicial power on the Registrar, and no valid order of delegation from the Presiding Officer was shown.

Conclusion: The Registrar had no authority to exercise judicial power or to finally decline the impleading application in the manner adopted.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order and the final order in the original application were liable to be interfered with for violation of natural justice and want of jurisdiction.

Analysis: The record indicated procedural irregularity and denial of a fair opportunity, and the Tribunal ought to have treated the impleading request in accordance with law. At the same time, the petitioners were not debtors, sureties or guarantors, and their substantive claim related to rights asserted under sale agreements. The Court held that disputed questions of title and competing remedies could be pursued in appropriate proceedings, and that the petitioners were not left without remedy in the recovery process. In these circumstances, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not invoked to set aside the impugned orders.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were not set aside.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were disposed of by recognizing the Registrar's lack of authority, but without disturbing the orders under challenge and with liberty to the petitioners to pursue remedies available in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A Registrar of the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot be vested with judicial power to finally decide an interlocutory application unless such power is expressly conferred by the statute or rules; administrative scrutiny functions cannot be treated as adjudicatory authority.

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