Company Court inherent powers yield to specific statutory remedy, while delay and lack of title defeat discretionary relief.

Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 cannot be invoked where a specific statutory remedy exists under Section 446(2)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 for deciding questions of law or fact arising in winding up, including disputes over the company's land and the validity of its sale. The inherent powers of the Company Court are therefore excluded in such matters. The commentary also notes that equitable relief may be refused where the claimant approaches after inordinate delay, offers no satisfactory explanation for laches, and fails to establish title or interest in the disputed land, especially when revenue records stand against the claim.

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Issues: (i) Whether the application under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was maintainable in view of the specific remedy available under Section 446(2)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956; (ii) Whether the application deserved dismissal for inordinate delay and laches and for failure to establish any right in the disputed land.

Issue (i): Whether the application under Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was maintainable in view of the specific remedy available under Section 446(2)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956.

Analysis: Rule 9 preserves the inherent powers of the Company Court, but those powers operate only where no specific statutory provision governs the dispute. The controversy raised related to whether the land sold by the official liquidator belonged to the company in liquidation and whether the sale was valid. That question fell squarely within Section 446(2)(d), which empowers the Company Court to decide any question of law or fact arising in the course of winding up. Since a specific statutory route was available, the inherent jurisdiction under Rule 9 was excluded.

Conclusion: The application under Rule 9 was not maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the application deserved dismissal for inordinate delay and laches and for failure to establish any right in the disputed land.

Analysis: The sale had taken place in 1984, possession had been delivered to the auction purchaser, and the application was filed only in 1997. No satisfactory explanation was offered for this prolonged delay. The applicants also failed to produce convincing documentary material to show title or interest in the land, while the revenue entries stood in favour of the auction purchaser and were not challenged. In these circumstances, the Court found no basis for invoking discretionary relief or for holding that the official liquidator had abused the process of the Court.

Conclusion: The application was liable to be dismissed for delay, laches, and absence of proven entitlement.

Final Conclusion: The application was rejected on both maintainability and equitable grounds, with costs imposed on the applicants.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific statutory mechanism exists for adjudicating a dispute arising in winding up proceedings, the Company Court will not invoke its inherent powers under Rule 9; discretionary relief may also be refused where the claimant approaches after unreasonable delay and fails to establish title or interest.

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