Limitation in winding-up claims: Section 458A suspends time for enforceable claims but cannot revive a barred debt.

Section 458A of the Companies Act excludes, for limitation purposes, the period from the commencement of winding up until the winding-up order and one further year thereafter, but it does not create a fresh cause of action. Read with section 446(2) and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the provision benefits only claims that were still legally enforceable when winding up commenced. A claim already time-barred on the date the winding-up petition was presented cannot be revived merely because a winding-up order is later made. The settled position is that section 458A suspends limitation for enforceable claims in winding-up proceedings, but does not resurrect extinguished claims.

---

---

Issues: Whether section 458A of the Companies Act extends limitation only by excluding the specified winding-up period and one further year, or whether it also revives a claim that was already barred when the winding-up petition was filed.

Analysis: Section 458A was construed as a provision that merely excludes, for limitation purposes, the period from the commencement of winding up until the winding-up order and the additional year thereafter. Read with section 446(2) and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the provision supports claims that were legally enforceable when winding-up commenced, but it does not create a fresh cause of action. A claim already barred on the date of presentation of the winding-up petition cannot become enforceable merely because a winding-up order is subsequently made.

Conclusion: Section 458A does not revive a time-barred claim; the appeals were therefore decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The law was settled that section 458A only suspends the running of limitation for enforceable claims in winding-up proceedings and does not resurrect claims already extinguished by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 458A of the Companies Act excludes a prescribed period in computing limitation for claims in winding-up proceedings, but it does not confer a fresh cause of action or revive a claim that was already barred on the relevant date.

---