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Issues: Whether limitation for an application under section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking a claim on behalf of a company in winding up, begins from the date of the winding up order or from the date when the underlying cause of action arose, and whether the period specified in section 458A is to be excluded while computing limitation under article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: Section 446(2) confers a special jurisdiction on the company court to entertain claims by or against the company, and that jurisdiction becomes available only after the winding up order is made. The remedy under section 446(2) is distinct from the underlying cause of action and is governed by article 137 as the residuary provision for applications. Since limitation under article 137 runs from the date when the right to apply accrues, the relevant date is the winding up order, not the date of the last transaction. Section 458A expressly requires exclusion of the period from commencement of winding up to the date of the winding up order, both inclusive, and one year immediately thereafter, in computing the three-year period.
Conclusion: Limitation for an application under section 446(2) commences from the date of the winding up order, and the exclusion contemplated by section 458A must be given effect while computing limitation under article 137. The question was answered in favour of the claimant.