GSTAT Appeals: Does the Extended Filing Deadline under Section 112(1) Also Extend the Tribunal's Power to Condon Delay?

Introduction

The operationalisation of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) has finally enabled taxpayers to file long-pending second appeals under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 ('CGST Act'). To facilitate filing of appeals relating to orders passed before the Tribunal became functional, the Central Government issued Notification No. S.O. 3502(E) dated 30 June 2026 prescribing 31 July 2026 as the last date for filing such appeals. A significant legal issue, however, remains unanswered: Whether the Appellate Tribunal can condone delay under Section 112(6) of the CGST Act even after 31 July 2026 in respect of these legacy appeals?

This article examines the statutory provisions, the scope of the Government's notification, and the principles of statutory interpretation to conclude that the Tribunal's power under Section 112(6) remains available even for appeals covered by the notification. Consequently, subject to the existence of sufficient cause, delay may be condoned for a further period of three months beyond 31 July 2026.

Statutory Framework

Section 112(1) of the CGST Act provides that an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal shall be filed within three months from the date of communication of the order or such later date as may be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the GST Council, whichever is later.

In exercise of this power, the Central Government initially issued Notification dated 17 September 2025, prescribing 30 June 2026 as the last date for filing appeals relating to orders communicated before 1 April 2026. This notification was subsequently superseded by Notification No. S.O. 3502(E) dated 30 June 2026, whereby the deadline was extended to 31 July 2026 for all orders communicated before 1 May 2026.

Section 112(6) independently empowers the Appellate Tribunal to admit an appeal within three months after the expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (1) if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period.

The crucial interpretational issue is whether the expression 'period referred to in sub-section (1)' refers to the notified date of 31 July 2026 or only to the ordinary period of three months from communication of the order.

Whether the Notification Alters the Statutory Limitation

The notification dated 30 June 2026 is not an executive relaxation granted dehors the Act. It has been issued in exercise of the specific statutory power conferred by Section 112(1). Parliament itself contemplated that, in appropriate circumstances, the Government may prescribe a different date for filing appeals before the Tribunal.

Accordingly, once such a notification is issued, the notified date becomes an integral part of the limitation prescribed under Section 112(1). For appeals covered by the notification, the statutory period under Section 112(1) stands substituted by 31 July 2026.

Therefore, the limitation applicable to such appeals is no longer determined by the original three-month period but by the notified date itself.

Scope of Section 112(6)

Section 112(6) assumes considerable significance. The Legislature has not provided that delay may be condoned within three months after expiry of the ordinary limitation period. Instead, it expressly refers to 'the period referred to in sub-section (1).'

The language employed by Parliament is deliberate and comprehensive. Since Section 112(1) itself recognises the notified date as an alternative limitation period, the expression 'period referred to in sub-section (1)' necessarily includes the limitation prescribed through the notification.

Consequently, for appeals governed by Notification No. S.O. 3502(E), the Tribunal's jurisdiction to condone delay commences only after 31 July 2026.

Delegated Legislation Cannot Curtail Statutory Power

Another important aspect is the legal status of the notification itself.

The power to condone delay is conferred upon the Appellate Tribunal by Parliament through Section 112(6). The notification merely prescribes the limitation contemplated under Section 112(1). It neither amends nor overrides Section 112(6).

It is a settled principle of administrative law that delegated legislation cannot curtail or nullify a substantive statutory provision unless the parent statute expressly authorises such exclusion. The notification dated 30 June 2026 contains no provision stating that appeals filed after 31 July 2026 shall be absolutely barred or that the Tribunal's power under Section 112(6) shall cease to operate.

Accordingly, the notification cannot be interpreted as extinguishing the statutory discretion vested in the Tribunal.

Harmonious Construction

A harmonious reading of Sections 112(1) and 112(6) also supports the above conclusion.

Section 112(1) prescribes the limitation period, while Section 112(6) provides a limited statutory discretion to condone delay where sufficient cause exists. Both provisions operate in distinct fields and are intended to complement each other.

If the notification is interpreted as excluding the applicability of Section 112(6), the statutory discretion expressly conferred by Parliament would stand impliedly repealed for an entire class of appeals. Such an interpretation would violate the settled principle that every provision of a statute must be given meaningful effect and that no part of the enactment should be rendered redundant.

Legislative Purpose

The notifications extending the limitation period were issued because the GST Appellate Tribunal remained non-functional for several years, making it impossible for taxpayers to exercise their statutory right of appeal.

It would be contrary to the legislative purpose if taxpayers were denied the benefit of the statutory condonation provision merely because the Tribunal was constituted belatedly. The object of the notification is to restore the appellate remedy, not to curtail the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 112(6).

A beneficial and purposive interpretation therefore favours continuation of the Tribunal's power to condone delay.

Practical Consequences

For appeals relating to orders communicated before 1 May 2026, the following position emerges:

It must, however, be remembered that condonation of delay is not automatic. The appellant must establish sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, and the Tribunal retains discretion to examine the adequacy of the explanation on the facts of each case.

Conclusion

The notification dated 30 June 2026 does not create an independent limitation regime outside the statute; rather, it operates within the framework of Section 112(1) itself. Consequently, for appeals covered by the notification, 31 July 2026 constitutes the 'period referred to in sub-section (1)' for the purposes of Section 112(6).

Since the notification neither expressly nor impliedly excludes the Tribunal's statutory power of condonation, the Appellate Tribunal continues to possess jurisdiction to admit appeals filed within three months after 31 July 2026, provided sufficient cause is demonstrated.

Although no judicial pronouncement has yet authoritatively settled this issue, the interpretation that preserves the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 112(6) is more consistent with the statutory language, the principles governing delegated legislation, and the legislative objective of ensuring an effective appellate remedy after the delayed constitution of the GST Appellate Tribunal. This construction also avoids depriving taxpayers of a valuable statutory safeguard without any express legislative mandate.

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By: CA. Chitresh Gupta