Rental of immovable property qualifies for exemption as a service to or by an educational institution only where the claimant proves the lessee's qualifying status and use for educational purposes. A lease to a registered society permitting mixed office, commercial, educational, counselling, research and hostel uses does not establish eligibility. Exemption notifications are strictly construed, and the claimant bears the burden of proof. Extended limitation requires a positive act showing intent to evade tax, not merely non-payment. Tax recovery remains restricted to the legally recoverable period of five years from the last date for filing the service-tax return, with the related penalty reduced proportionately.

Collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating State-regulated bus terminals under a concession arrangement does not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce where the fee is authorised as consideration for the contractor's investment and terminal operations. Service tax depends on the contractual nexus between the provider and recipient. In the absence of a direct contract between the contractor and individual bus operators, adda-fee collection is not consideration for business support provided to those operators; service tax is therefore not payable on that basis.

Before the service-tax definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax or licence fee for advertisement displays was not treated as providing the taxable service of selling advertising space. Amounts levied under municipal law pursuant to Article 243X were statutory advertisement tax rather than consideration for a taxable service, so no service-tax liability arose for the relevant pre-1 July 2012 period. Extended limitation was unavailable because the dispute involved interpretation of charging provisions and no suppression with intent to evade tax was attributable to the local body. Consequently, the demand, interest and penalties were unsustainable.

Statutory welfare boards that facilitate deployment of ex-servicemen as guards, collect remuneration for onward payment, and undertake no profit-making or commercial activity fall outside taxable security agency service. Fees received by a public authority while discharging statutory welfare functions are not liable to service tax in these circumstances. Extended limitation for service-tax recovery is unavailable where the assessee acted under a bona fide interpretative belief and Revenue cannot establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade tax. Consequently, service-tax demands fail on both taxability and limitation.

Interest on a refundable pre-deposit under Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 runs from the date of payment until the actual refund following an appellate order. The provision does not limit interest by reference to the cause of any delay in obtaining the refund. Consequently, an appellant's delay in furnishing a High Court judgment or applying for refund does not interrupt or reduce the statutory interest period; interest remains payable for the entire interval between pre-deposit and refund.

Review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 does not permit correction of an earlier judgment merely because it is alleged to be incorrect. Where the challenged observations are fact-specific and consistent with the judgment's overall findings, they do not establish a reviewable error. Rectification through review is therefore unavailable in the absence of a permissible ground for review.

Service-tax issues concerning clearing and forwarding services include the limitation period for recovery proceedings under section 73, penalties under section 73(4A), and whether an acknowledgement of debt can affect limitation under the Limitation Act. The subject matter also addresses remand orders and the principle that estoppel cannot operate against a statutory provision. These issues concern the scope of statutory time limits, debt acknowledgement, and limits on reliance upon estoppel in service-tax matters.

Continued freezing or retention of property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires specific evidence linking identified assets to proceeds of crime and a written, property-specific adjudicatory finding that the assets are involved in money laundering. Investigative necessity alone does not satisfy this requirement. Recorded reasons to believe for search and freezing need not be separately furnished where the statutory notice incorporates relevant reasons. A property holder's absence from the FIR, chargesheet or ECIR does not itself prevent action against assets connected with proceeds of crime. Filing a prosecution complaint does not remove appellate jurisdiction over continued freezing or retention.

Acceptance of possession, payment of demanded amounts, and registration of a sub-lease prevent an allottee from later seeking refund of a common-area charge. During CIRP, the resolution professional completed construction and offered possession; the allottee accepted it after payment and obtained registration. Objections to the charge needed to be raised before possession was accepted and the sub-lease registered. A later refund application was therefore rejected.

Limitation for a personal guarantor's insolvency application commences when the guarantee is invoked. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the applicable period is three years. A fresh period under the acknowledgment rule requires a written acknowledgment signed by the party against whom the right is asserted. One-time settlement proposals made by the guarantor are unilateral admissions and cannot be invoked by that guarantor to extend limitation in the guarantor's own favour. Consequently, an application filed more than three years after guarantee invocation is barred by limitation.

A liquidator may complete a sale process lawfully initiated before liquidation where the process is adopted during liquidation, receives relevant stakeholder approval, and no material illegality or irregularity is established. The liquidation framework permits the liquidator to take custody and control of corporate-debtor assets and sell them without prohibiting completion of an earlier valid sale process. Allegations of undervaluation, absence of fresh valuation, or irregularity require material evidence of an unlawful sale or diminution of the liquidation estate. Former employees' admitted dues remain payable according to the statutory liquidation waterfall, which protects their distribution rights without invalidating a completed sale.

Withdrawal of a CIRP admitted under Section 9 is governed by the amended Section 12A framework, which does not permit the Appellate Tribunal to close proceedings on a post-admission settlement before the Committee of Creditors is constituted. A settlement executed after CIRP commencement, even where it contemplates closure subject to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, cannot independently support closure in appeal. Authorities concerning settlements concluded before CIRP admission do not apply under the amended position. The IRP may instead seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A.

Post-CIRP transfers of a corporate debtor's bank funds during a subsisting moratorium breach the prohibition on disposing of corporate assets unless a legally established exception applies. Payment for work performed before CIRP does not validate a transfer made after commencement, and a trust claim fails without proof of a trust relationship or identifiable trust fund. Public announcement of CIRP may establish deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The former remedy under Section 74 did not preclude enforcement through the Tribunal's jurisdiction, particularly where it was not previously raised and did not negate the post-moratorium transactions. Recovery with interest remained sustainable.

Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules preserves inherent powers but does not permit reopening a final insolvency determination merely to reassess facts and alter interest already fixed through judicial discretion. In Section 7 insolvency proceedings, contractual terms generally bind parties, yet relief must advance resolution rather than transform completed proceedings into recovery of disputed enhanced default interest. Where principal and substantial interest have been repaid, a contractual default rate of 3% per month may be disproportionate to the balance claim. Liberty to seek modification does not independently establish entitlement, and the judicially fixed 9% annual interest remains applicable.

Corporate insolvency resolution process admission requires the financial debt in default to meet the statutory threshold on the date of admission. Repayment of principal debt before that date reduced the outstanding amount below the prescribed limit. Because the financial creditors had received the payments but did not disclose them to the Adjudicating Authority, the threshold default prerequisite was absent when the insolvency application was admitted. The admission was therefore legally unsustainable and was set aside.

Section 10 CIRP applications must represent a bona fide effort at insolvency resolution and may be rejected where surrounding conduct shows a malicious attempt to obstruct creditor recovery. Missing hypothecated plant and machinery, absence of supporting fixed-asset records, lack of meaningful receivables or immovable assets, and filing after recovery measures can demonstrate abuse of the moratorium process. Financial penalties for fraudulent conduct require recorded reasons addressing the nature and magnitude of misconduct and must satisfy proportionality. A penalty lacking such justification requires recalibration to a proportionate level.

Transfer of winding-up proceedings to the National Company Law Tribunal is permissible where liquidation has not reached an irreversible stage. Admission of a winding-up petition, appointment of a liquidator, asset possession, or asset sales by secured creditors outside the winding-up process do not alone establish that corporate revival is impossible. Where assets remain under the receiver's and official liquidator's custody and liquidation steps are limited, a financial creditor holding more than half of the financial debt may pursue the time-bound rehabilitative framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Transfer for possible revival is therefore valid.

Declared transaction value cannot be rejected for alleged customs undervaluation without reliable evidence displacing the accepted value. Unsigned, unauthenticated parallel invoices lack statutory presumption and evidentiary value. Electronic-device printouts are inadmissible where requirements for electronic-record admissibility are not met. Uncorroborated and inconsistent statements, without banking evidence, proof of additional payment, or evidence of contemporaneous imports, do not establish undervaluation. Earlier assessments accepting the declared value had attained finality, and materially identical investigation findings did not support Revenue. Consequently, redetermination of assessable value, differential duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine, and penalties were set aside.

Redemption fine and penalty for imported goods treated as e-waste were reduced after the entire consignment was re-exported and never entered domestic circulation. The e-waste classification rested solely on a Chartered Engineer's report, which was not conclusive evidence of the goods' classification. Re-export compliance and absence of home consumption supported reduced monetary consequences, with redemption fine and penalty each reduced to Rs. 50,000.

Provisional-release conditions require a reasoned adjudicatory determination that complies with natural justice. A pending re-test request must be considered because re-testing may affect classification and eventual adjudication. The applicant must receive an effective personal hearing, with an opportunity to present supporting evidence, before release conditions are imposed. Where the order neither records a hearing nor addresses the re-test request or explains the viability of its conditions, the provisional-release determination cannot be sustained and requires fresh consideration.