Clause (iv) of the first proviso to section 80G(5), effective from 1 October 2024, independently permits a trust that has commenced activities to seek regular approval after commencement. An application decided after the amendment took effect cannot be treated as non-maintainable solely because it missed the time limit under the former clause (iii) regime. Section 12AB registration may support the genuineness of the trust's activities. Rejection solely for delay was set aside, and the application was restored for consideration under clause (iv)(B) after a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Service permanent establishment requires proof that personnel furnished qualifying services in India beyond auxiliary functions and outside treaty exclusions for technical or consultancy services. Oversight, training, administrative support, news-gathering assistance and product-sales support did not establish such a presence where the activities were auxiliary or potentially excluded. A subsidiary was not a dependent agent permanent establishment because it independently contracted with customers, invoiced them and assumed contractual responsibilities on a principal-to-principal basis; parental controls and exclusive distribution did not alter that character. Arm's-length transfer-pricing acceptance further supported no additional profit attribution. No taxable profit was assessable in India on a permanent-establishment basis.

Reassessment for Assessment Year 2015-16 could not be initiated in August 2024 because the first proviso to Section 149 preserves the limitation available under the pre-amendment reassessment regime. Although the amended framework permits longer limitation periods in specified circumstances, it does not revive reassessment where the earlier limitation had already expired. The applicable six-year period expired on 31 March 2022, before proceedings under Section 148A(b) began. Consequently, the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were time-barred and without jurisdiction.

Section 119(2)(b) permits admission of belated applications to prevent genuine hardship and does not impose a specific limitation period for seeking condonation. This statutory discretion must be exercised liberally after considering the assessee's difficulties. Departmental circulars bind income-tax authorities but cannot restrict the discretion conferred by Section 119(2)(b), including in writ proceedings under Article 226. Rejection of delayed Form-10B condonation applications solely because they exceeded a circular-prescribed period was unsustainable. The delay was condoned, permitting Form-10B to be furnished with the returns for processing in accordance with law.

Penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars is not automatically attracted by disallowance of deduction or depreciation claims. Assessment and penalty proceedings are distinct, and the rebuttable presumption under Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) does not establish concealment merely because an addition is made. Where relevant particulars are disclosed and the taxpayer provides a plausible, bona fide explanation for the claims, penalty is not leviable. The deletion of penalty was upheld, particularly as the underlying quantum additions were not sustained.

Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 requires an assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. Revision is unsustainable where the Assessing Officer has investigated unaccounted expenditure, investments and petrol-pump income, and the related assessment and appellate findings have attained finality; a differing view by the Commissioner is insufficient. Tanker-related revision and the consequential addition also fail where concurrent factual findings establish no evidence of unaccounted tanker income in the assessee's books. The disputed undisclosed-income additions therefore cannot be sustained.

A draft assessment order under Section 144C cannot support a tax demand or penalty proceedings because it only proposes variations and does not determine the sum payable as required for a final assessment. Section 292B cannot cure an order expressly issued as a draft or retrospectively convert it into a final assessment. Where the Transfer Pricing Officer proposes no variation to international transactions because an advance pricing agreement covers the relevant year, the taxpayer is not an eligible assessee for the draft-assessment procedure. A draft order issued in those circumstances, and consequential demand and penalty actions, lack legal foundation and are annulled.

Reassessment disputes concern the validity of notices, sanction by the specified authority, and whether jurisdictional Assessing Officers may issue notices instead of the prescribed faceless mechanism or competent Faceless Assessment Officers. The issues also cover the effect of subsequent amending legislation on pending reassessment litigation, including the Finance Act 2021 changes to the reassessment framework and insertion of section 147A. The appeals were disposed of under an earlier Supreme Court order and remitted to the respective High Courts for decision in accordance with that order.

The Supreme Court criticised the Department for filing a special leave petition with an excessive delay after an earlier SLP challenging the same impugned order had already been dismissed for delay. The petition was characterised as frivolous and as unnecessarily burdening the Court. The Court urged the Department to exercise greater vigilance and avoid repeatedly filing matters with exorbitant delay. Although the material lists substantive tax issues concerning goodwill depreciation, CSR expenditure, related-unit valuation, captive power, steam transfers, additional claims and consistency, no determination of those issues is set out.

Rule 43's 2022 amendment excluding duty credit scrip values from exempt supplies is presented as prospective from 5 July 2022, not applicable to transactions during 2017-20. The amendment is characterised as creating a new benefit in calculating proportionate input tax credit reversal rather than clarifying an existing ambiguity; input tax credit is treated as concessional and not retrospectively vested. The monetary-limit circular is described as binding departmental officers but not the Tribunal, with aggregate tax involved in a composite order and recurring interpretive issues requiring consideration. Section 74(1) requires proof of fraud, wilful misstatement, or deliberate suppression intended to evade tax; absent such material, liability should be determined under Section 75(2) using the Section 73(1) mechanism.

Section 171 of the CGST Act requires additional input tax credit benefits to be passed to recipients through commensurate price reductions. Verified beneficiary-wise shortfalls remain payable where invoices and receipts do not establish full pass-through. Rule 133(3)(b) requires return of unpassed benefit with interest at 18% per annum from the commencement of GST until payment. Section 171(3A) applies a 10% penalty to profiteering attributable to the period after its commencement, subject to the exception where the amount is deposited within 30 days of the order. The residual input tax credit shortfall is therefore recoverable with applicable interest and penalty consequences.

Provisional attachment of a bank account under the CGST Act may continue during an ongoing investigation where the account was used for payout transactions connected with alleged online gaming and betting activities. Inadequate verification of the counterparty, including reliance on an undertaking without checking its business, invoices, or relevant particulars, supported the revenue-protection rationale. Because investigation of beneficiary accounts and underlying transactions remained incomplete, de-freezing the attached account was not warranted.

GST demand based on multiple e-way bills against a single invoice requires factual verification before treating them as evidence of under-declared GSTR-1 turnover or short payment of tax. Where a large quantity of teak wood is stated to have been transported in separate vehicles, the assessment must examine vehicle carrying capacity, whether multiple vehicles were necessary, and transactional records, including bank statements, supporting the sale consideration. Without these determinations, the demand is unsustainable.

GST registration under Rule 8(1) requires material establishing the applicant's prima facie legal possession of the business premises. Lease documents, co-lessees' authorisation, the managing partner's lessee status, and prior rent-control proceedings can establish that possession for registration purposes. Registration authorities need not decide disputes over the scope of tenancy rights or an alleged unauthorised sublease, as interpretation of lease terms falls within the competent civil or rent-control forum. An unresolved landlord-tenant dispute alone therefore does not justify refusing GST registration where legal possession is prima facie shown.

Works contractors seeking adjustment of the incremental tax burden arising from the VAT-to-GST transition must pursue contractual remedies against the concerned employer. Identification of pre-GST work and VAT-regime payments, calculation of post-1 July 2017 work, deduction of applicable VAT and service-tax components, and addition of GST support a comprehensive representation for time-bound employer consideration. GST levy, assessment, recovery, interest, penalty and return filing remain governed by the statutory framework; no direction can require tax authorities to alter statutory treatment or accept revised returns contrary to law. Challenges to assessment orders remain separately available in accordance with law.

Writ jurisdiction was not exercised to determine the objection that Central and State GST proceedings involved the same subject matter under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, because resolution required a factual comparison of the respective show-cause notices, periods, allegations, transactions, computations and supporting material. The petitioner had participated in adjudication, and the statutory appellate forum could examine the parallel-proceedings objection and challenges to the demand. The writ petition was disposed of with all contentions left open for the Appellate Authority.

Section 74 may be invoked only where a show cause notice discloses fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of material facts with intent to evade tax. Absence of these statutory ingredients deprives the notice of the jurisdictional basis required for proceedings under that provision. A notice that merely invokes Section 74 without setting out the relevant allegations is invalid and liable to be set aside, while leaving open the possibility of issuing a fresh notice in accordance with law.

Section 107 provides an effective first appellate remedy against an assessment under Section 63. Writ jurisdiction may still be invoked for an apparent illegality or jurisdictional error that requires no factual inquiry, but whether pre-registration transactions of an existing registered person fall within Section 63 requires fact-finding and adjudication. The assessment is therefore not facially without jurisdiction. The jurisdictional objection remains open for consideration in the statutory appeal, which may be pursued within six weeks; the appellate authority may also consider delay where sufficient cause is shown.

Bail in alleged fraudulent input tax credit cases should be assessed against investigation status, trial prospects, offence severity, evidentiary nature and risks to the proceedings. Where investigation is complete, a complaint has been filed, the trial is unlikely to conclude promptly, offences are Magistrate-triable, and evidence is mainly documentary, continued pre-trial custody is unwarranted absent material showing flight risk, evidence tampering, witness intimidation or trial obstruction. Criminal antecedents alone do not justify denial of bail without exceptional risk-based circumstances. Pre-trial detention must not become punitive and must respect the presumption of innocence, personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial.

Bail in alleged fraudulent input tax credit prosecutions must be assessed against personal liberty, the presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy trial. Pre-trial detention cannot be punitive where investigation is complete, the evidence is principally documentary, no charge has been framed, and timely completion of trial is unlikely. Criminal antecedents alone do not warrant refusal unless exceptional circumstances show a real risk of evidence tampering, witness intimidation, absconding or interference with justice. The absence of assessment proceedings under sections 73 and 74 may bear on the criminal prosecution, while those proceedings remain independent. Bail may be conditioned to secure attendance and protect proceedings.