Penalty under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act was not imposable on an authorised courier where prohibited Red Sander Logs were concealed in an export consignment declared as piano parts. The courier had obtained and processed the consignor's identity and accompanying documents, submitted the shipment for Customs examination, and met the due-diligence requirement under Regulation 12 of the Courier Imports and Exports Regulations, 2010. As Regulation 6 barred opening export packages in the Customs area without the proper officer's permission, failure to physically inspect the contents could not establish liability. In the absence of evidence of knowledge or abetment, the penalty was set aside.

Export Obligation Discharge Certificates (EODCs) and cancellation of EPCG bonds established fulfilment of conditions for imported capital goods covered by six EPCG authorisations. Although the EODCs were unavailable during adjudication because issuance by the licensing authority remained pending after submission of required material, Customs later accepted them and cancelled the corresponding bonds. Duty demand for non-production of documents was therefore inconsistent with the subsequent acceptance of the same documents. The duty demand, redemption fine and penalty for alleged EPCG notification non-compliance were legally unsustainable.

Deemed omission of Rule 96(10) from inception removed any legal obligation to repay additional customs duties where the rule had required reversal of an import-exemption or export-refund benefit. The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 contained no provision during the relevant period authorising interest on delayed repayment of those additional duties. Interest paid on such repayment was therefore not legally leviable and was refundable.

Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, which provides an inter-State dispute-resolution mechanism, does not displace Customs Authorities' statutory jurisdiction because it was not incorporated into Indian municipal law. The Rules of Origin, 2009 implement preferential-origin criteria but do not incorporate that treaty mechanism. Sections 28 and 46 of the Customs Act, 1962 independently permit recovery of duty short-levied or short-paid where import declarations or supporting origin documents suppress material facts. Section 28DA adds a verification mechanism for preferential-origin claims without creating or limiting the existing recovery power. Challenges to duty quantification, confiscation and penalties remain subject to statutory appellate review.

Unfiled customs claims arising from pre-CIRP imports constitute claims under the IBC because a right to payment need not be adjudicated, quantified, or crystallised before insolvency commencement. The Customs Department must submit such claims through the CIRP public-announcement process. Once a resolution plan is approved under section 31(1), it binds governmental authorities and may extinguish unfiled pre-CIRP claims. Customs authorities may determine liability during CIRP, but cannot adjudicate or enforce an extinguished claim after plan approval; the IBC prevails over inconsistent Customs Act provisions.

Article 226 writ jurisdiction was declined against a concluded customs adjudication order because an efficacious statutory appeal was available under the Customs Act. Challenges concerning service of notice, an alleged waiver, adjudication records and confiscation findings required appellate scrutiny rather than extraordinary writ review. Knowledge of seizure, failure to respond to the public notice, non-use of the statutory appeal, and prolonged unexplained inaction weighed against intervention. The governing principle is that alternative statutory remedies should ordinarily be exhausted, although they do not absolutely bar writ jurisdiction.

Section 124 of the Customs Act permits an oral show-cause notice and oral representation where requested by the person concerned. Absence of a separate written notice within the period under Section 110(2) does not by itself require unconditional release of detained gold bars. Statutory compliance depends on whether an oral notice was actually given, whether the grounds of concealment and non-declaration were communicated, and whether any waiver of notice and hearing was voluntary. These evidentiary questions, including contemporaneous statements and CCTV material, require determination by the competent adjudicating authority after a personal hearing.

Writ jurisdiction against a customs confiscation order should ordinarily not be exercised where an efficacious statutory appellate remedy is available and the challenge involves disputed facts. Questions concerning the recording and voluntariness of statements, service or waiver of notice and hearing, and compliance with confiscation procedures require appraisal of the adjudication record by the appellate authority. A bare allegation of breach of natural justice does not, on these facts, justify bypassing that remedy. The petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal.

Section 110(2) requires return of seized goods if the notice contemplated by Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. Section 124 permits oral notice and oral representation at the concerned person's request; waiver alone does not remove the statutory notice requirement. Unconditional return of seized gold does not follow merely because no written notice was served where Revenue asserts that an oral notice was issued and contemporaneous material raises disputes over the request, voluntariness, and content of oral proceedings. Such evidentiary disputes require determination by the competent Customs authority rather than writ review.

Section 110(2) of the Customs Act requires return of seized goods if notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed period, subject to statutory extension. Although Section 124 generally requires written notice, it permits oral notice at the concerned person's request. Where the Department asserts that an oral show cause notice was issued and the affected person disputes its issuance, voluntariness, and evidentiary basis, those factual issues require statutory adjudication. Unconditional release of seized gold is therefore not warranted at the writ stage before an Order-in-Original and a hearing by the adjudicating authority.

Section 110(2) of the Customs Act requires return of seized goods if notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. Although the first proviso to Section 124 permits oral notice and representation at the concerned person's request, a printed waiver or recital alone does not establish valid oral notice. Disputes over contemporaneous statements, their voluntariness, translation, execution circumstances and CCTV records require evidentiary determination by the competent adjudicating authority. Unconditional release of detained gold and jewellery was therefore declined, pending an independent determination after personal hearing and completion of adjudication within the stipulated period.

Availability of an efficacious statutory revision under the Customs Act is central to whether discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised against an appellate order of absolute confiscation. The revisional forum can examine factual and legal disputes concerning an alleged oral show-cause notice, a statement recorded under statutory powers, compliance with notice and seizure requirements, personal hearing, and confiscation. Alleged breaches of natural justice requiring review of the complete record do not, without more, justify bypassing that remedy, particularly where no vires challenge or jurisdictional defect is established.

Review jurisdiction was invoked against an earlier Supreme Court order. Examination of the petition and record disclosed no error apparent on the face of the record capable of warranting review. The review petition was therefore dismissed, with any pending applications disposed of. The operative standard applied was the presence of a manifest record-based error sufficient to justify review.

Explained loan credits in foreign companies' bank accounts, supported by lenders' tax returns and bank statements, constitute liabilities rather than undisclosed foreign assets or income under the Black Money Act. Gross commission credits must be assessed after corresponding operating debits are considered; where those debits produce a net loss, no taxable surplus arises. On these principles, additions for the loan credits and gross commission, and the related penalty, lack a basis.

Ad hoc disallowances of travel, conveyance, advertising, sales-promotion and miscellaneous-promotion expenditure require fresh verification where only sample supporting material was produced and the taxpayer undertakes to furnish complete evidence. The Assessing Officer must allow a reasonable opportunity before determining the expenditure's genuineness. Provision for bad and doubtful debts is allowable under the applicable statutory framework and is not restricted to banking businesses. Income enhancement based on an unavailable processing intimation cannot stand without disclosure of that intimation and an effective opportunity for the taxpayer to answer the proposed adjustments.

Enhanced compensation arising from the same compulsory acquisition of agricultural land qualifies for exemption where the original compensation had been accepted after verification of agricultural character, ownership and use, and land records support cultivation. The enhanced amount retains the character of the original compensation. Capital gains from sale of office premises may be assessed as long-term capital gains despite an erroneous short-term classification in the return and no revised return, where the transaction was disclosed and the record establishes legal and beneficial ownership, possession and the requisite holding period. Correcting the character of disclosed income is not a fresh claim for deduction, exemption or relief.

Before 1 April 2025, penalty jurisdiction for contraventions of Section 269SS under Section 271D lay with the Joint/Additional Commissioner, not the Assessing Officer. Section 271D neither requires recording of penalty satisfaction in the assessment order nor makes such satisfaction part of assessment proceedings, because penalty proceedings are independent. Accordingly, an Assessing Officer's failure to record satisfaction for Section 271D penalty could not render an assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue interests. Revisionary action under Section 263 on that basis was without jurisdiction, resulting in quashing of the revision orders and reinstatement of the assessments.

RBI monetary penalties for lending-related supervisory non-compliance are deductible under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) where the payment is not shown to relate to an offence or prohibited activity; regulatory power to levy the penalty is not conclusive. For banking companies, no section 14A and Rule 8D disallowance arises where securities are held as stock-in-trade and income is business income. Net depreciation on investments is allowable when computed under RBI guidelines and Part B of ICDS VIII, subject to the prescribed net-depreciation limitation. ESOP discount is deductible revenue expenditure because it is employee compensation, notwithstanding settlement through shares or no immediate cash outflow.

Section 205 prevents a direct tax demand against a deductee to the extent tax has actually been deducted from its income, even where the deductor fails to remit that tax to the Central Government. Tax withheld under the statutory withholding regime is retained on the Government's behalf, while recovery and other consequences of non-deposit apply to the deductor responsible for deduction and remittance. Accordingly, TDS credit on rental income cannot be denied solely because the tenant-deductor did not deposit the deducted amount, preventing the deductee from being taxed again on income already subjected to withholding.

Section 80P(2)(d) permits a co-operative society to deduct the full interest or dividend income earned from investments with another co-operative society. Eligibility does not depend on whether the interest constitutes operational business income or whether the invested funds were required for business purposes. Section 80P(4) prevents a co-operative bank from claiming the deduction on its own income but does not deprive it of its character as a co-operative society for an investing society's deduction claim. Interest from fixed deposits and savings-bank deposits with a co-operative bank falls within the deduction.