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Mining-right assignment date determines royalty service-tax liability, while revenue neutrality defeats suppression-based penalties under reverse charge.
Service-tax liability on royalties for mining rights depends on when the Government service of assigning the right to use a natural resource was provided or agreed to be provided, rather than when periodic royalties are paid. Where a mining lease was executed before 1 April 2016, subsequent expansion of the tax net for Government services does not apply merely because royalties became payable thereafter; the Point of Taxation Rules govern timing of payment, not taxability. Revenue neutrality, where any tax payable is available as CENVAT credit for the recipient's manufacturing activity, undermines allegations of suppression or intent to evade and supports absence of penalty.
Reasonable cause for service-tax defaults supports penalty waiver where valuation uncertainty is later clarified and tax liabilities are discharged.
Reasonable cause for service-tax defaults may arise where the applicability of the post-2007 Composition Scheme to ongoing construction projects remained subject to bona fide interpretational uncertainty. Discharge of differential tax, interest and CENVAT credit reversal before adjudication supports waiver of penalties under the Finance Act, 1994. Service-tax computation and appropriation may remain undisturbed where reconciled CENVAT records, payment challans, credit-reversal details and Chartered Accountant certificates substantiate the liability. Differences between tax-payment figures and ST-3 returns may be explained by reversal of CENVAT credit on sale of capital goods, provided project-wise reconciliation and non-construction income are adequately addressed.
Statutory appeal limitation cannot be enlarged by interim proceedings, merits hearings, hardship, or rectification jurisdiction.
Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) within two months and permits condonation only for one further month. An appeal filed beyond that outer limit cannot be validated by an interim Tribunal order, hardship, sufficient cause, time spent obtaining departmental documents, a merits hearing, or reservation of orders, because none creates jurisdiction to extend the statutory period. Rectification is confined to patent, self-evident mistakes apparent from the record and cannot be used to review or reopen a concluded merits determination. Accordingly, rectification is unavailable where no such apparent error exists.
Intellectual property right service excludes deferred consideration for an outright know-how transfer without a recognised Indian right.
Intellectual Property Right Service applies only where a right is recognised as intellectual property under Indian law and is temporarily transferred or licensed. Know-how not established as a distinct recognised intellectual property right, when transferred with title, property and risk absolutely, falls outside that levy. Royalty payable over five years may constitute deferred sale consideration where it forms part of an outright transfer, even if linked to future sales, rather than consideration for a continuing licence. Customs valuation does not determine service-tax treatment. Where the underlying service-tax demand fails, related registration-based penalties, interest and penalties do not survive; bona fide legal interpretation and prior departmental correspondence may also establish reasonable cause.
Extended service-tax limitation requires proof of deliberate evasion; unsupported allegations leave recovery demands time-barred and penalties unsustainable.
Extended limitation for service-tax recovery under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies only where non-payment arises from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. Revenue bears the burden of producing positive evidence of those conditions; unsupported allegations or absence of material establishing the service relationship do not justify the extended period. Where the demand is time-barred, its merits need not be examined, and consequential interest and penalty cannot survive.
DTH distributor commission cannot face duplicate service tax when tax is already paid on the voucher's inclusive retail price.
Service tax cannot be levied again on a DTH recharge-voucher distributor's commission where the DTH operator has already paid tax on the predetermined maximum retail price inclusive of that commission. Treating the commission as taxable Business Auxiliary Service in the distributor's hands would cause double taxation. The arrangement is also revenue-neutral because any tax paid by the distributor would be available to the operator as Cenvat credit. Consequently, the service tax demand, related interest and equivalent penalty on the distribution commission are unsustainable.
Educational institution rental exemption requires proof of qualifying tenant and use; recoverable service tax remains limited by limitation.
Rental of immovable property qualifies for exemption as a service to or by an educational institution only where the claimant proves the lessee's qualifying status and use for educational purposes. A lease to a registered society permitting mixed office, commercial, educational, counselling, research and hostel uses does not establish eligibility. Exemption notifications are strictly construed, and the claimant bears the burden of proof. Extended limitation requires a positive act showing intent to evade tax, not merely non-payment. Tax recovery remains restricted to the legally recoverable period of five years from the last date for filing the service-tax return, with the related penalty reduced proportionately.
Contractual nexus determines whether State-authorised adda-fee collection for bus terminals attracts service tax as business support.
Collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating State-regulated bus terminals under a concession arrangement does not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce where the fee is authorised as consideration for the contractor's investment and terminal operations. Service tax depends on the contractual nexus between the provider and recipient. In the absence of a direct contract between the contractor and individual bus operators, adda-fee collection is not consideration for business support provided to those operators; service tax is therefore not payable on that basis.
Municipal advertisement tax remained outside service tax where statutory levy was not consideration for advertising-space services.
Before the service-tax definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax or licence fee for advertisement displays was not treated as providing the taxable service of selling advertising space. Amounts levied under municipal law pursuant to Article 243X were statutory advertisement tax rather than consideration for a taxable service, so no service-tax liability arose for the relevant pre-1 July 2012 period. Extended limitation was unavailable because the dispute involved interpretation of charging provisions and no suppression with intent to evade tax was attributable to the local body. Consequently, the demand, interest and penalties were unsustainable.
Security agency taxation excludes non-commercial statutory welfare boards facilitating guard deployment, while bona fide belief bars extended limitation.
Statutory welfare boards that facilitate deployment of ex-servicemen as guards, collect remuneration for onward payment, and undertake no profit-making or commercial activity fall outside taxable security agency service. Fees received by a public authority while discharging statutory welfare functions are not liable to service tax in these circumstances. Extended limitation for service-tax recovery is unavailable where the assessee acted under a bona fide interpretative belief and Revenue cannot establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade tax. Consequently, service-tax demands fail on both taxability and limitation.
Interest on refundable pre-deposits runs until actual refund despite an appellant's delay in seeking repayment.
Interest on a refundable pre-deposit under Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 runs from the date of payment until the actual refund following an appellate order. The provision does not limit interest by reference to the cause of any delay in obtaining the refund. Consequently, an appellant's delay in furnishing a High Court judgment or applying for refund does not interrupt or reduce the statutory interest period; interest remains payable for the entire interval between pre-deposit and refund.
Review jurisdiction cannot correct an allegedly incorrect judgment where challenged observations are fact-specific and consistent with the original findings.
Review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 does not permit correction of an earlier judgment merely because it is alleged to be incorrect. Where the challenged observations are fact-specific and consistent with the judgment's overall findings, they do not establish a reviewable error. Rectification through review is therefore unavailable in the absence of a permissible ground for review.
Service-tax limitation in clearing and forwarding disputes turns on debt acknowledgement, statutory penalties, remand, and no estoppel against law.
Service-tax issues concerning clearing and forwarding services include the limitation period for recovery proceedings under section 73, penalties under section 73(4A), and whether an acknowledgement of debt can affect limitation under the Limitation Act. The subject matter also addresses remand orders and the principle that estoppel cannot operate against a statutory provision. These issues concern the scope of statutory time limits, debt acknowledgement, and limits on reliance upon estoppel in service-tax matters.
Property-specific money-laundering findings are required before continued freezing; investigative necessity alone cannot justify retaining assets.
Continued freezing or retention of property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires specific evidence linking identified assets to proceeds of crime and a written, property-specific adjudicatory finding that the assets are involved in money laundering. Investigative necessity alone does not satisfy this requirement. Recorded reasons to believe for search and freezing need not be separately furnished where the statutory notice incorporates relevant reasons. A property holder's absence from the FIR, chargesheet or ECIR does not itself prevent action against assets connected with proceeds of crime. Filing a prosecution complaint does not remove appellate jurisdiction over continued freezing or retention.
Post-possession refund claims for common-area charges fail when payment and unit registration were accepted without timely objection.
Acceptance of possession, payment of demanded amounts, and registration of a sub-lease prevent an allottee from later seeking refund of a common-area charge. During CIRP, the resolution professional completed construction and offered possession; the allottee accepted it after payment and obtained registration. Objections to the charge needed to be raised before possession was accepted and the sub-lease registered. A later refund application was therefore rejected.
Limitation for Section 94 personal-guarantor applications runs from guarantee invocation; the guarantor's own OTS proposals cannot extend it.
Limitation for a personal guarantor's insolvency application commences when the guarantee is invoked. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the applicable period is three years. A fresh period under the acknowledgment rule requires a written acknowledgment signed by the party against whom the right is asserted. One-time settlement proposals made by the guarantor are unilateral admissions and cannot be invoked by that guarantor to extend limitation in the guarantor's own favour. Consequently, an application filed more than three years after guarantee invocation is barred by limitation.
Pre-liquidation asset sales may be completed by liquidators when adopted in liquidation and free from material irregularity.
A liquidator may complete a sale process lawfully initiated before liquidation where the process is adopted during liquidation, receives relevant stakeholder approval, and no material illegality or irregularity is established. The liquidation framework permits the liquidator to take custody and control of corporate-debtor assets and sell them without prohibiting completion of an earlier valid sale process. Allegations of undervaluation, absence of fresh valuation, or irregularity require material evidence of an unlawful sale or diminution of the liquidation estate. Former employees' admitted dues remain payable according to the statutory liquidation waterfall, which protects their distribution rights without invalidating a completed sale.
Post-admission CIRP settlements cannot close proceedings in appeal; withdrawal must follow the statutory Section 12A process before the Adjudicating Authority.
Withdrawal of a CIRP admitted under Section 9 is governed by the amended Section 12A framework, which does not permit the Appellate Tribunal to close proceedings on a post-admission settlement before the Committee of Creditors is constituted. A settlement executed after CIRP commencement, even where it contemplates closure subject to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, cannot independently support closure in appeal. Authorities concerning settlements concluded before CIRP admission do not apply under the amended position. The IRP may instead seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A.
Post-CIRP asset transfers during moratorium remain prohibited despite pre-CIRP work claims or unproved trust assertions.
Post-CIRP transfers of a corporate debtor's bank funds during a subsisting moratorium breach the prohibition on disposing of corporate assets unless a legally established exception applies. Payment for work performed before CIRP does not validate a transfer made after commencement, and a trust claim fails without proof of a trust relationship or identifiable trust fund. Public announcement of CIRP may establish deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The former remedy under Section 74 did not preclude enforcement through the Tribunal's jurisdiction, particularly where it was not previously raised and did not negate the post-moratorium transactions. Recovery with interest remained sustainable.
Inherent powers cannot reopen final insolvency rulings to replace judicial interest with disproportionate contractual default interest.
Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules preserves inherent powers but does not permit reopening a final insolvency determination merely to reassess facts and alter interest already fixed through judicial discretion. In Section 7 insolvency proceedings, contractual terms generally bind parties, yet relief must advance resolution rather than transform completed proceedings into recovery of disputed enhanced default interest. Where principal and substantial interest have been repaid, a contractual default rate of 3% per month may be disproportionate to the balance claim. Liberty to seek modification does not independently establish entitlement, and the judicially fixed 9% annual interest remains applicable.