An arbitration clause does not displace the statutory insolvency remedy where the requirements of debt and default are met. A settlement claim arising from disputes over the supply of raw cotton remains operational debt, and the creditor need not have directly supplied goods or services to qualify as an operational creditor. An alleged contractual damages claim bars a Section 9 application only if it constitutes a genuine, pre-existing dispute supported by material. A belated and unpursued damages assertion raised in response to a demand notice does not meet that standard. Insolvency resolution therefore remains available for settled operational debt connected with the supply of goods.

Financial debt under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code requires reliable material showing an independent, legally enforceable liability of the corporate debtor. Where payment was made to another entity, no banking trail linked funds to the corporate debtor, and ledger and balance-sheet entries reflected reversible internal adjustments among commonly managed entities, the claim does not establish such debt. A memorandum contemplating further payment and a definitive agreement does not by itself create a concluded commercial arrangement. The resolution professional must verify and update claims, and may revisit provisional admission during verification without adjudicating disputed rights. Rejection of the claim is justified where no independent financial debt is proved.

Correction of the record was confined to entering counsel's appearance for Respondent No. 2. Reliance on a cited decision concerning photocopies was not material because the earlier dismissal rested on an undisputed default and the default record filed with the Information Utility under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The appearance entry was directed to be corrected, while the request for further speaking-to-the-minutes changes was disposed of without costs.

Insolvency moratorium under the IBC bars recovery-oriented provident fund inquiries against a corporate debtor during CIRP, even where statutory dues may otherwise be assessed. Once a provident fund claim has been dealt with under an approved and unchallenged resolution plan, pre-approval liabilities not preserved by that plan are extinguished and cannot be reassessed or recovered. Following a resolution plan involving a change in management or control, statutory immunity protects the restructured corporate debtor and its assets from recovery, damages, interest and prosecution relating to pre-CIRP defaults attributable to the former management. Consequently, assessed provident fund liabilities and coercive measures for such defaults cannot be enforced against the restructured entity.

Under the applicable F&O regulatory framework, a professional clearing member's constituent was the trading member, and client-margin restrictions did not require the clearing member to verify each trading member client's debit or credit position before collateral liquidation. Real-time client-level reporting and segregation were introduced only later. Stock exchange, clearing corporation and committee powers did not extend to monetary restitution through restoration or value-blocking of lawfully liquidated securities; disgorgement authority lay separately with SEBI. Clients whose losses arose from a trading member's default or unauthorised assured-return arrangements could not recover from the clearing member absent privity or breach of a regulatory duty. Remedies remained against the relevant trading member, subject to lawful exceptions.

Forensic audit in foreign-award enforcement may be necessary where substantial reductions in promoter shareholding, inconsistent explanations of pledges and share sales, regulatory disclosures, and interconnected corporate transactions indicate possible dissipation of assets. Separate corporate personality does not preclude inquiry where judgment debtors control the promoter-holding structure and listed company and a prima facie nexus exists with frustration of execution. The audit scope includes tracing shares and sale proceeds, reviewing bank security and fund flows, and testing compliance with securities-law requirements and judicial directions. Investigative expert evidence does not itself determine civil, contempt, or restitutionary liability.

Contempt jurisdiction arises only from a clear, solemn, unambiguous and firm undertaking intended to be acted upon by the court; a statement that an entity had then decided not to proceed with an acquisition is merely clarificatory and does not support contempt. A foreign money decree from a superior court in a reciprocating territory is prima facie executable, and protective security may be required where corporate restructuring and related transactions create a genuine apprehension of asset dissipation. Such interim protection preserves effective execution without determining whether the corporate veil may be lifted or assets of related entities reached, which remains for the executing commercial courts.

Penalty under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act was not imposable on an authorised courier where prohibited Red Sander Logs were concealed in an export consignment declared as piano parts. The courier had obtained and processed the consignor's identity and accompanying documents, submitted the shipment for Customs examination, and met the due-diligence requirement under Regulation 12 of the Courier Imports and Exports Regulations, 2010. As Regulation 6 barred opening export packages in the Customs area without the proper officer's permission, failure to physically inspect the contents could not establish liability. In the absence of evidence of knowledge or abetment, the penalty was set aside.

Export Obligation Discharge Certificates (EODCs) and cancellation of EPCG bonds established fulfilment of conditions for imported capital goods covered by six EPCG authorisations. Although the EODCs were unavailable during adjudication because issuance by the licensing authority remained pending after submission of required material, Customs later accepted them and cancelled the corresponding bonds. Duty demand for non-production of documents was therefore inconsistent with the subsequent acceptance of the same documents. The duty demand, redemption fine and penalty for alleged EPCG notification non-compliance were legally unsustainable.

Deemed omission of Rule 96(10) from inception removed any legal obligation to repay additional customs duties where the rule had required reversal of an import-exemption or export-refund benefit. The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 contained no provision during the relevant period authorising interest on delayed repayment of those additional duties. Interest paid on such repayment was therefore not legally leviable and was refundable.

Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, which provides an inter-State dispute-resolution mechanism, does not displace Customs Authorities' statutory jurisdiction because it was not incorporated into Indian municipal law. The Rules of Origin, 2009 implement preferential-origin criteria but do not incorporate that treaty mechanism. Sections 28 and 46 of the Customs Act, 1962 independently permit recovery of duty short-levied or short-paid where import declarations or supporting origin documents suppress material facts. Section 28DA adds a verification mechanism for preferential-origin claims without creating or limiting the existing recovery power. Challenges to duty quantification, confiscation and penalties remain subject to statutory appellate review.

Unfiled customs claims arising from pre-CIRP imports constitute claims under the IBC because a right to payment need not be adjudicated, quantified, or crystallised before insolvency commencement. The Customs Department must submit such claims through the CIRP public-announcement process. Once a resolution plan is approved under section 31(1), it binds governmental authorities and may extinguish unfiled pre-CIRP claims. Customs authorities may determine liability during CIRP, but cannot adjudicate or enforce an extinguished claim after plan approval; the IBC prevails over inconsistent Customs Act provisions.

Article 226 writ jurisdiction was declined against a concluded customs adjudication order because an efficacious statutory appeal was available under the Customs Act. Challenges concerning service of notice, an alleged waiver, adjudication records and confiscation findings required appellate scrutiny rather than extraordinary writ review. Knowledge of seizure, failure to respond to the public notice, non-use of the statutory appeal, and prolonged unexplained inaction weighed against intervention. The governing principle is that alternative statutory remedies should ordinarily be exhausted, although they do not absolutely bar writ jurisdiction.

Section 124 of the Customs Act permits an oral show-cause notice and oral representation where requested by the person concerned. Absence of a separate written notice within the period under Section 110(2) does not by itself require unconditional release of detained gold bars. Statutory compliance depends on whether an oral notice was actually given, whether the grounds of concealment and non-declaration were communicated, and whether any waiver of notice and hearing was voluntary. These evidentiary questions, including contemporaneous statements and CCTV material, require determination by the competent adjudicating authority after a personal hearing.

Writ jurisdiction against a customs confiscation order should ordinarily not be exercised where an efficacious statutory appellate remedy is available and the challenge involves disputed facts. Questions concerning the recording and voluntariness of statements, service or waiver of notice and hearing, and compliance with confiscation procedures require appraisal of the adjudication record by the appellate authority. A bare allegation of breach of natural justice does not, on these facts, justify bypassing that remedy. The petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal.

Section 110(2) requires return of seized goods if the notice contemplated by Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. Section 124 permits oral notice and oral representation at the concerned person's request; waiver alone does not remove the statutory notice requirement. Unconditional return of seized gold does not follow merely because no written notice was served where Revenue asserts that an oral notice was issued and contemporaneous material raises disputes over the request, voluntariness, and content of oral proceedings. Such evidentiary disputes require determination by the competent Customs authority rather than writ review.

Section 110(2) of the Customs Act requires return of seized goods if notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed period, subject to statutory extension. Although Section 124 generally requires written notice, it permits oral notice at the concerned person's request. Where the Department asserts that an oral show cause notice was issued and the affected person disputes its issuance, voluntariness, and evidentiary basis, those factual issues require statutory adjudication. Unconditional release of seized gold is therefore not warranted at the writ stage before an Order-in-Original and a hearing by the adjudicating authority.

Section 110(2) of the Customs Act requires return of seized goods if notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. Although the first proviso to Section 124 permits oral notice and representation at the concerned person's request, a printed waiver or recital alone does not establish valid oral notice. Disputes over contemporaneous statements, their voluntariness, translation, execution circumstances and CCTV records require evidentiary determination by the competent adjudicating authority. Unconditional release of detained gold and jewellery was therefore declined, pending an independent determination after personal hearing and completion of adjudication within the stipulated period.

Availability of an efficacious statutory revision under the Customs Act is central to whether discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised against an appellate order of absolute confiscation. The revisional forum can examine factual and legal disputes concerning an alleged oral show-cause notice, a statement recorded under statutory powers, compliance with notice and seizure requirements, personal hearing, and confiscation. Alleged breaches of natural justice requiring review of the complete record do not, without more, justify bypassing that remedy, particularly where no vires challenge or jurisdictional defect is established.

Review jurisdiction was invoked against an earlier Supreme Court order. Examination of the petition and record disclosed no error apparent on the face of the record capable of warranting review. The review petition was therefore dismissed, with any pending applications disposed of. The operative standard applied was the presence of a manifest record-based error sufficient to justify review.