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2026 (4) TMI 1817
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....y, Advocates for R-5 Mr. Shivendra Dwivedi and Ms. Onmichon Ramrar, Advocates for R-6 and R-10 Mr. Dhruv Gupta and Mr. Anubhav Garg, Advocates for R-7 Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vivek Jain, Mohd. Irshad, Mr. Sadiq Noor, Mr. Ankit Tiwari and Mr. Angad Pathak, Advocates for R-8. Mr. Adit S. Pujari, Mr. Shashwat Sarin, Mr. Shaurya Mittal and Ms. Dhanya Visweswaran, Advocates for R-9. Mr Abhishek Singh, Mr Vishvendra Singh, Mr Talib Mustafa, Mr Ketan Kumar Roy and Mr Shubh Mathur, Advocates for R-11. Mr. Rajat Bhardwaj, Mr. Dushyant Chaudhary and Mr. Tushar Garg, Advocates for R-12 Ms. Baani Khanna, Mr. Robin Singh, Mr. Kapil Balwani and Ms. Komal Thakkar, Advocates for R-16 Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ramesh Allanki, Ms. Aruna Gupta and Mr. Sahil Sood, Advocates for R-17. R-18 in person (through VC). Mr. Chanchal K. Singla, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rohit Kaliyar and Mr. Akshay Malhotra, Advocates for R-19 Mr. Prabhav Ralli, Mrs. Stuti Gupta, Mr. Dev Vrat Arya, Mr. Samraat Saxena and Ms. Deeya Mittal, Advocates for R-20 Ms. Tusharika Mattoo, Advocate for R-21 Mr. Harsh Bora and Mr. Sahil Ghai, Advocates for R-22 Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate with M....
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....MENTS OF RELATIVES & THE ALLEGED 'CONFLICT OF INTEREST' 79 H. CONSIDERATION OF TODAY'S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS AND CONTRADICTORY STAND OF THE APPLICANT SH. ARVIND KEJRIWAL 93 I. JUSTICE SHOULD NOT ONLY BE DONE, BUT SEEN TO BE DONE 96 (i) Mere Unease or Anxiety of a Litigant Cannot Be a Ground for Recusal 96 CONCLUSION 100 (i) Test of Bias Cannot Be Manufactured by a Litigant 100 (ii) The Catch-22 of Recusal: A Litigant's Win Regardless of the Outcome 102 (iii) Whether this Court must give an 'Agni Pariksha'? 104 (iv) Judicial Integrity Cannot Be Put to Trial by a Litigant 105 (v) If I were to withdraw readily 106 THE END... 108 CRL. M.A. 11377/2026 (by R-18), CRL. M.A. 11303/2026 (by R-19), CRL. M.A. 11300/2026 (by R-12), CRL. M.A. 11302/2026 (by R-3) and CRL. M.A. 11301/2026 (by R-8) WHEN I WAS ASKED TO RECUSE... 1. While I began to pen this judgment in the quiet aftermath of end of arguments, the Courtroom had fallen silent, the voices of arguments had faded, the echoes of accusations no longer filled the courtroom or my ears, what remained was the quiet weight of responsibility of being a Judge, who has taken oa....
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...., for that is what I have been trained to do as a Judge and what I have lived in the last 34 years of my judicial career. 7. During arguments, the applicants repeatedly submitted before the Court that they do not doubt my integrity on any account and they are seeking recusal not because they doubt my integrity, but because of apprehension in their own minds that I may be biased. 8. What is also important is the fact that today I am dealing with the apprehension in the mind of the litigant and not actual bias in myself, which needed a thorough examination. 9. What made the task more challenging was that, during arguments, contrary stands were taken. All the applicants, at the beginning of arguments on recusal and some in the pleadings as well, submitted before this Court that they have complete respect for this Court as an individual judge and they do not doubt integrity of any kind or fairness of this Court. However, the applicants still want the case to be transferred, not because I am biased, but because they have apprehension in their mind that I may be biased. 10. I am fully conscious of the fact that today, I am not to judge the litigant, but the litigant has put m....
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....hension in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court. 4. In this regard, he also draws the attention of this Court to the judgment in Satyendra Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement: CRL.M.C. 4916/2022, and submits that the facts of that case and the present case are similar; rather, according to him, his apprehension is on a stronger footing than the apprehension expressed by the Directorate of Enforcement [hereafter 'DoE'] in that case. 5. The Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also relies upon the decision in Kanaklata v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2015) 6 SCC 617, to argue that if the same Court has earlier recorded 'strong observations' in a case, it may create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a litigant. He submits that this Court had given strong and rather conclusive findings while dealing with his earlier petition, wherein his arrest was challenged. In this regard, he draws the attention of this Court to the decision Arvind Kejriwal v. Enforcement Directorate: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2685. He states that since this Court had recorded conclusive findings and strong observations, such as those relating to non-recovery of the alleged money, value of statements....
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....f the approvers, and that this Court has already recorded an observation in paragraph 8 of the order dated 09.03.2026 in this regard; therefore, he apprehends that he will not get justice from this Court. He also submits that even the Trial Court Record had not been summoned by this Court at that stage, and without having the same before it, the Court had prima facie recorded conclusions regarding the evidentiary value of the approvers' statements. 9. He next draws the attention of this Court to certain data which he has filed along with the recusal application, and submits that in some other revision petitions filed in the year 2026, this Court had granted three to six months' time for filing replies, whereas in the present case, little time was granted for filing replies, which, according to him, stands in stark contrast to the manner in which other cases are being dealt with. He submits that undue haste was shown on that day while passing the said order, which, according to him, also gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court. 10. He also states that this Court was very generous to the DoE since, without any prayer bein....
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....the same shall stand closed." He submits that he apprehends bias against him even on this ground. 14. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also states that he has noticed a trend in the orders passed by this Court that while deciding matters against him, this Court has almost "endorsed" the arguments advanced on behalf of the CBI or the ED and has granted all the prayers sought by them. He submits that his pleas, or those of the other accused persons in this case, were always rejected, except in the case of one of the respondents, i.e., Arun Ramachandran Pillai. 15. He also states that the impugned order was passed by the learned Trial Court on 27.02.2026 and within four hours of the passing of that order, the CBI chose to file a revision petition, without specifically countering the observations made by the learned Trial Court qua each and every charge against each accused, and that a general petition was filed. However, this Court was pleased to pass a sweeping order on the basis of such a general petition filed before it, which, according to him, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court. 16. He further states that on ....
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....h Sisodia, submits at the outset that he holds the highest regard for the institution of the judiciary and for this Court. He, however, contends that the applicant harbours a reasonable apprehension that the matter may not be heard with complete impartiality by this Court, and that such apprehension is based on objective circumstances. 21. The learned senior counsel submits that bias is a concept with many shades and colours, and in the present case, he is using the expression in a limited sense - i.e., subject-matter bias. According to him, the apprehension is not of any personal prejudice, but of a pre-conceived judicial view arising from this Court having already dealt extensively with the same subject matter and having formed strong prima facie opinions on several aspects of the case. 22. It is argued that this Court already possesses deep domain knowledge of the present matter, having dealt with multiple petitions arising out of the same case. According to the learned senior counsel, when a judicial mind has expressed itself in considerable detail on the issues involved, and has recorded strong prima facie findings, there arises a genuine concern in the mind of the litig....
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.... required to demonstrate that justice will not only be done, but will also be seen to be done. The learned senior counsel also states that the public perception in such kind of cases should also be taken into consideration, which has larger ramification. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 3 Vijay Nair 26. The learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3 submits that the present case is one where the entire case of the prosecution has been discarded at the stage of charge, and it is not a case where only a few accused have been discharged. He submits that both advocates and judges are legally trained minds, accustomed to analysing facts and law through a judicial lens. However, according to him, while considering an application for recusal, the Court must step outside the box of normal judicial thinking and also examine the issue from the perspective of an ordinary litigant. What may appear to the Court as only another matter on the board may, for the litigant, be his entire life, liberty, and reputation. 27. He submits that when this Court has already taken a particular prima facie view in earlier proceedings arising out of the same case, and the learned Tria....
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....e mind of an accused deserves greater sensitivity and caution while considering whether the Judge should continue to hear the matter. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment in Satyendra Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement (supra). 32. The learned senior counsel further submits that once there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the applicant that the matter may not be considered with a completely open mind, and that the conclusions drawn in the earlier proceedings may influence the outcome of the present case, it would be appropriate that, in order to dispel such apprehension, the matter be placed before another Bench. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 19 Durgesh Pathak 33. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submits that the present applicant has no role in the alleged conspiracy, and that his name has surfaced only in the fourth supplementary charge-sheet. He submits that justice should not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. 34. It is further submitted that, while considering recusal, the Court must keep in mind the reasonable apprehension in the mind of a well-informed litigant, as well as that of the....
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....ances which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the applicant Rajesh Joshi. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 5 Arun Ramchandran Pillai 40. The learned counsel further states that an amended application will be filed within two days. During the course of arguments, this Court's attention was drawn to the report of Registry informing this Court that Respondent No. 5 had not re-filed the recusal application. At that stage, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 5 appeared and stated at the Bar that an amended application will be filed within two days, but same grounds and submissions as advanced on behalf of Respondent No. 8 Sh. Manish Sisodia by Sh. Hegde are being adopted. 41. Without commenting on the failure to remove objections and re-file the application, which had been returned vide Diary No. 150763/2026, this Court takes note of the aforesaid submission, and accordingly, the oral request for recusal on behalf of Respondent No. 5 is being considered. Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner-CBI 42. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the CBI, at the outset submits that the CBI, per se, has no issue with any Bench of ....
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....ainst the Investigating Officer, the learned Solicitor General submits that this Court had only stayed the scathing remarks made against the I.O., whereby the impugned order had concluded that the I.O. had falsely implicated accused No. 1, Kuldeep Singh, and had directed initiation of departmental proceedings against him. He submits that there is nothing unusual or contrary to law in staying such consequential directions when the impugned order itself is under challenge before a superior court. According to him, the applicants are virtually seeking a rule that once a Bench grants an ex-parte stay, it must not proceed to hear the matter further and should necessarily recuse, which is wholly untenable. 47. He further submits that the present case falls under the MP/MLA category, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that such cases must be taken up on priority and decided expeditiously. Therefore, the allegation of undue haste is wholly misplaced. 48. As regards the alleged ideological association with Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, the learned Solicitor General submits that making such sweeping allegations merely because a Judge attended legal seminars, ....
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....l, while addressing the Court in person, repeatedly referred to the said order and stated that upon seeing the order dated 09.03.2026, it gave rise to an apprehension in his mind that he would not get justice from this Court. 54. At the outset, this Court is of the view that an order passed in a petition, on the very first date of hearing, cannot by itself become a ground for seeking recusal of the Court on the premise that such order, merely because it records certain prima facie observations, creates an apprehension of bias in the mind of the opposite party. In Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar: (2021) 3 SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that merely because an earlier order of the Court may not have been in favour of the applicant cannot be a ground for seeking recusal, and that a litigant cannot be permitted to browbeat the Court by seeking a Bench of his choice. 55. The remedy for a litigant, who is aggrieved by an order, lies in challenging the same before the higher court. It is also noteworthy that applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal herein has already challenged the order dated 09.03.2026 by way of a Special Leave Petition, bearing Diary No. 15911/2026, ....
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....the party, though there is no specific rule on the criminal side to that effect. 61. The Court as well as the Registry is required to rely upon the proof of advance service annexed by a petitioner along with the petition. It is presumed that since advance service is mandatory before permitting e-filing of a petition, the Registry would have ensured that proof of such service is placed on record. If, on the very first day of hearing, the Court were to start presuming that the proof of service filed along with the petition may not be correct, the functioning of the Court itself would become extremely difficult. In such a situation, the Registry would be compelled to spend considerable time verifying the correctness of proof of service rather than facilitating e-filing and listing of matters. 62. Even otherwise, this Court is of the opinion that no prejudice has been caused to the recusal applicants or the other respondents on account of the order dated 09.03.2026. This is for the reason that the impugned discharge order, which directly concerned the accused persons, was never stayed by this Court. In fact, the CBI itself had not made any prayer seeking stay of the discharge ord....
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....ied and that departmental action is warranted, the process of law would naturally follow in accordance with the final decision of the Court. 67. What the litigant forgets is that he is not the only party before this Court; a Judge always has two parties before her. On one hand, he questions how the CBI can even file a response to his application seeking recusal, contending that it is only a matter between him and the Judge. On the other hand, he alleges bias on the ground that this Court merely stayed certain observations made against the Investigating Officer, though that issue too was between this Court and the affected party, namely, the Investigating Officer of the case. 68. This Court has, however, acted fairly by giving the litigant an opportunity to file a reply even with respect to the stay granted by this Court qua the observations made against the CBI. This is despite the fact that this Court had not even stayed the extensive observations made against the CBI and ED in another case in which the present litigant had been discharged, regarding their functioning in general and the broader pattern noticed during his tenure as a learned Trial Court Judge. Fair justice ha....
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....date after making certain prima facie observations. However, such relief is only interim, meaning thereby that it operates only during the pendency of the proceedings. It is also ex-parte, meaning that it has been granted without hearing the other side. The opinion expressed by the court in such circumstances is necessarily prima facie, i.e., based only on the material presently available before the court. It can never mean that the final outcome of the case has already been decided. More often than not, such interim orders are subsequently modified or vacated upon an application being moved by the other side, or even at the time of final adjudication when the entire matter is heard in detail. In such cases, the prima facie observations remain only prima facie and do not culminate into the final outcome. 75. However, it has been projected before this Court as if the prima facie observations made by this Court at the time of first hearing of the case are to be treated as conclusive findings. In the opinion of this Court, such an interpretation can only be termed as an imagination of the part of applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and the other recusal applicants. 76. If the argument....
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....allenge such orders before the higher court. The remedy is not to seek recusal of the Judge. If such requests for recusal were to be entertained, every litigant against whom an interim order is passed by a Judge of a High Court would start seeking recusal of that Judge from hearing the matter. Courts would then be flooded with such frivolous applications. 81. Let us explain this to the recusal applicants by way of a judicial precedent which was decided by one of the judges of this Court in similar facts and circumstances. Some years ago, a case came before this High Court where one of the parties asked a brother Judge, who later adorned the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to step aside from hearing the matter. The reason was familiar: an earlier interim order had been passed by a Bench of which he was also a member, and the party felt that by making certain prima facie observations and disturbing the existing status quo, the Judge had already "prejudged" and "predetermined" the issues involved. Their concern was simple. They believed that once such observations had been recorded, it would be difficult to expect justice from the same Judge hearing the matter again. According to them, the ....
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....g the matters. The Court recorded this contention as follows: "It is stated by Sh. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C) 4228/2014 and W.P.(C) 4245/2014 that this Bench should not hear the matter since one of us (HMJ S. Ravindra Bhat) has prejudged the case on account of the interim orders made. Learned senior counsel states that an affidavit to this effect would be filed in Court. He requests for some time. List on 16.03.2015." *** 6. Sh. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel urges firstly that the order of 03.12.2014 - to the extent it disturbed the existing status quo, amounted to a determination on the merits of the case....... *** 9. Sh. C. Harishankar, learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents, urged that this Court should reject the recusal request. He submitted that accepting the recusal request would mean that in every case, the party unsuccessful in securing interim relief can potentially claim to have an apprehension that the Presiding Judge or the Judge concerned is biased. Every such apprehension cannot be granted unless the conduct of the proceeding or the tenor of the concerned order fro....
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....sbelives than on settled principles of law. Such an attempt appears to be only to portray a routine judicial exercise as something extraordinary so as to build a ground for seeking recusal. 84. It will be appropriate to set out some instances, where either the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal herein or other leaders belonging to his political party were granted interim reliefs/stay by this Court - on the first date itself, without hearing the other side or calling for their reply, and such interim orders continue to operate till now. 85. In the case of Arvind Kejriwal & Anr. v. State & Anr.: CRL.M.C. 6508/2019, the petitioners therein - who are applicants/ respondents Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and Sh. Manish Sisodia before this Court in the present proceedings - had challenged a summoning order passed against them in a complaint case for defamation filed by a leader of another political party. In that matter, a Coordinate Bench had stayed the operation of the impugned summoning order on the very first date of hearing itself, when neither the complainant nor his counsel was present before the Court, and thus without hearing the other side. The said interim order continues to operate ti....
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.... have been discussed above, only to show that passing interim orders or recording prima facie observations at the initial stage, even in the absence of the opposite side, is neither unusual nor indicative of bias. It is a settled law that when urgency exists and the Court finds that the matter requires consideration, interim relief may be granted after recording the submissions made and forming a prima facie view, subject always to further hearing in the case and its final adjudication. A judicial practice which is accepted without objection when it operates in one's favour, cannot suddenly become a ground of bias when the same course is adopted in another case by a court of law. 89. Therefore, the grievance now raised by the recusal applicants, that an interim order was passed or prima facie observations were recorded by this Court on the first date of hearing in the present case, without hearing the respondents, cannot be accepted as a ground for recusal. (v) Argument that CBI was heard only for 'Five Minutes' on the first date of hearing 90. Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also argued that this Court had heard the petitioner-CBI only for "five minutes" on the first date o....
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...., on an earlier date i.e. 16.03.2026, learned counsels had appeared on his behalf. Even the petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court had been filed through a counsel, yet the objections were not removed. 95. Thereafter, on 06.04.2026, when applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal appeared in person before this Court and submitted that he had filed a recusal application before this Court, he did not inform this Court that the writ petition seeking transfer of this case from this Bench had already been withdrawn from the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was only when this Court made a query in this regard, and the same was also pointed out by the CBI, that the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, and learned senior counsel who was appearing for Respondent No. 3, informed this Court that the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal had withdrawn the said writ petition seeking transfer of the case from this Bench to another Bench. 96. Needless to say, equity demands that when parties appear before a court, nothing material should be withheld from the Court. Those who insist that the Judge must demonstrate fairness and transparency must themselves come before the Court with complete transparency. Legal strategy c....
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....ld also seek a quick disposal of these cases. However, the problem lies elsewhere. It seems systemic, perhaps institutional, and takes within its sweep many factors including the method of adversarial litigation that we have adopted. Yet, at every stage of the practice and procedure that we adopt, there is scope for reform. It is in this context that we have earnestly conducted and monitored this case for the last seven years." (emphasis added) 101. In compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra), the Division Bench-I of this Court had passed an order dated 21.12.2023, in Court on its Own Motion v. Union of India & Ors.: W.P.(CRL) 1542/2020, and inter alia directed as under: "2. Having considered the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its letter and spirit, the following directions are issued for expeditious and effective disposal of criminal cases pending in the designated Courts against the members of Parliament and Legislative Assemblies:- *** (iv) In case any revision petitions regarding such matters are pending before the designated Sessions Court(s), every endeavour shall be made to dispose of t....
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....all within the MP/MLA category. 107. If a litigant chooses to rely upon examples of dates given in some cases, particularly ignoring those falling within the MP/MLA category, then such comparison must be fair and complete. The litigant cannot selectively refer only to those matters where longer dates have been granted, while ignoring cases where proceedings have been conducted on short dates or on a day-to-day basis. By way of illustration, in an appeal against conviction preferred by a sitting MLA (CRL.A. 328/2026) recently, the matter was listed before this Court on 04.04.2026, 07.04.2026, 08.04.2026, and 15.04.2026, and the respondent therein was granted only one week's time to file a reply to the appeal. 108. In this background, suffice it to say, the attempt made by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal who appeared in person, as well as the other recusal applicants, to compare the dates granted in cases not pertaining to the MP/MLA category, with the present case which falls within that category, is wholly misplaced inasmuch as such a comparison ignores the legal framework governing these matters and the directions binding upon this Court. The attempt to draw such a compari....
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....accused dictate how a Court is to be run by the Judge holding the Court. These matters fall squarely within the domain of the Court and are guided by established principles, statutory requirements, and binding directions of the Higher courts. Such aspects are not open to scrutiny on the basis of political considerations or personal perceptions, as the independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of powers require that courts be allowed to function without such external interference. C. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING FROM EARLIER DETAILED JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT 113. One of the grounds on which the recusal applicants, particularly applicants Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and Sh. Manish Sisodia, have sought recusal of this Court is that while dealing with matters arising out of the Delhi Excise Policy case in the past, this Court had passed detailed judgments and recorded findings on several aspects. 114. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, during the course of arguments, described those findings as 'conclusive findings of this Court' and 'almost holding him guilty' and declaring him 'super corrupt' ("maha corrupt"). He also argued that there was no need for this....
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.... deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in detail. Thus, the findings were given by this Court for the benefit of the accused himself, that he knows as to why his petition was being rejected. 118. This Court wonders that had it not dealt with those elaborate arguments, in detail in its judgment, the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal may then have raised a grievance that the submissions advanced on his behalf had been overlooked or ignored by the Court. (ii) Earlier Findings of this Court in respect of Bail under Section 45 of PMLA 119. Similarly, in other matters wherein this Court had dealt with bail applications filed by Respondent No. 8, Respondent No. 9 and Respondent No. 17, and one Sanjay Singh, the Court was dealing with bail applications under the provisions of the PMLA. Section 45 of the PMLA lays down twin conditions for the grant of bail and inter alia mandates that before granting bail, the Court must record a finding that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence of money laundering. In order to comply with this statutory mandate, it becomes necessary for the Court to examine the material collect....
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....gal principle, or provisions. The previous decisions and practice of this court have clearly shown that there can be and is no bar as the respondents' senior counsel argue. Accepting the plea of recusal would sound a death knell to the independent system of justice delivery where litigants would dictate participation of judges of their liking in particular cases or causes. 44. Recusal is not to be forced by any litigant to choose a Bench. It is for the Judge to decide to recuse. The embarrassment of hearing the lengthy arguments for recusal should not be a compelling reason to recuse. The law laid down in various decisions has compelled me not to recuse from the case and to perform the duty irrespective of the consequences, as nothing should come in the way of dispensation of justice or discharge of duty as a Judge and judicial decision-making. There is no room for prejudice or bias. Justice has to be pure, untainted, uninfluenced by any factor, and even decision for recusal cannot be influenced by outside forces. However, if I recuse, it will be a dereliction of duty, injustice to the system, and to other Judges who are or to adorn the Bench/es in the future. I have taken....
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....sion of the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal that this Court had delivered detailed judgments without any necessity is clearly without merit. The contention that this Court might have pre-judged the present case, merely because it had given detailed findings while deciding these earlier petitions and application, is also devoid of merit. (iii) Relief denied by Other Benches too 126. Another aspect which cannot be ignored is that the attempt of recusal applicants to portray as if all adverse orders in matters arising out of the Delhi Excise Policy case were passed only by this Court is factually incorrect. Notably, several orders, including orders relating to arrest and bail were also passed by different Benches of this Court, much before this Court was even assigned the MP/MLA roster and even after that. Some of these instances are: ● Arvind Kejriwal - Validity of Arrest in CBI Case: The order upholding the arrest of the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, in the CBI case, was not passed by this Court, but by another Bench. ● Arvind Kejriwal - Stay of Bail in DoE Case: The bail granted to the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal by the learned Trial Court in th....
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....er stage, it becomes incapable of examining a subsequent order with an open mind. That is neither the position in law nor the manner in which judicial functioning operates. While deciding earlier petitions arising out of the Delhi Excise Policy case, this Court was dealing with matters such as challenge to arrest and applications for bail under the provisions of the PMLA. Those proceedings required examination on entirely different legal parameters and at a stage where arguments on charge had not even been addressed. The observations made therein were necessarily confined to that limited stage and were specifically recorded to be only prima facie in nature, without expressing any final opinion on the merits of the case. As noted above, detailed observations were recorded in those judgments since detailed arguments were addressed before this Court. 131. The present proceedings however arise from a revision petition challenging the discharge order passed by the learned Trial Court. The scope, the stage, and the legal questions involved are entirely different. This Court is now required to examine the impugned order independently, on the basis of the material on record, the reasoni....
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.... and arguing and referring to in his arguments that in 'Delhi Liquor Policy cases' and this is not a term coined by this Court. 137. Even applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal himself admitted during the course of arguments that this Court had granted interim bail on medical grounds to one of the accused, Arun Ramachandra Pillai (Respondent No. 5 in the present case), who has also filed a recusal application before this Court. Therefore, the broad submission that this Court has uniformly denied relief to all accused persons in these matters is plainly incorrect. 138. Similarly, in the case of accused Amandeep Singh Dhall (Respondent No. 9 in the present case), pursuant to orders passed by this Court, he was provided hospitalization and medical treatment of his choice in hospitals including AIIMS, ILBS, Safdarjung Hospital, and Indian Spinal Injuries Centre. In fact, out of the total custody period of about fifteen months, he was permitted to remain in judicial custody while being hospitalised for surgery and thereafter for a substantial period for post-surgery physiotherapy and post-epidural care. For more than 06 months, he continued to remain under medical care outside the jail pre....
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.... and the Hon'ble Supreme Court had specifically recorded in the order dated 02.04.2024 that 'no comments' were made on merits of the case [Ref: Sanjay Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement: SLP(Crl.) No. 2558 of 2024]. 143. Similarly, in the case of Sh. Manish Sisodia (Respondent No. 8 herein), the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted bail to the said accused on the ground of delay in trial vide judgment dated 09.08.2024 [Ref: Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement: 2024 INSC 595]. However, no observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the merits of the case or on the findings recorded by this Court qua the merits of the case while deciding his bail applications on 21.05.2024. It is also relevant to note that at an earlier stage, the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself had rejected the bail application of Respondent No. 8 - on merits - after considering the allegations and the material placed against him [Ref: Manish Sisodia v. Central Bureau of Investigation: 2023 INSC 956] 144. As far as applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal is concerned, it is pertinent to note that when he had challenged the judgment of this Bench, upholding the validity of his arrest, the Hon'ble Supreme Court....
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....N OF BIAS EMERGING FROM A STATEMENT ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE UNION HOME MINISTER 147. This Court also notes that the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal stated at the Bar that the Union Minister of Home Affairs had made a statement in a television programme to the effect that when the judgment of this Court comes, Sh. Kejriwal will have to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has created reasonable apprehension in his mind regarding bias. 148. However, this Court finds that neither has this ground been mentioned in the recusal application nor were any details provided during the course of arguments as to what exactly was said, in which television programme, or on what occasion such a statement was made. 149. Seeking recusal of a Court on such a ground, that a Union Minister, or for that matter any politician appearing in a television programme, has expressed an opinion that a Court may pass an order adverse to a particular party, would amount to proceeding purely on imaginations and misbeliefs of the litigant. Clearly, this Court has no control over what any politician or the litigant, such as the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, who himself is a politician, may choose to state ....
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....scussions were conducted, and speakers were invited to interact with members of the legal fraternity. The CBI has also placed on record, along with its reply and annexures, copies of some flyers of the programmes organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad. A bare perusal of the same would reveal that several judges of this Court, and even judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have attended such events. 154. In my opinion, merely because in my capacity as a Judge, I was invited to deliver a lecture or interact with younger members of the Bar or other members of the legal fraternity, the same cannot be used to insinuate political association or ideological bias. For the last several decades, judges of various High Courts and even the Hon'ble Supreme Court have attended such events - not as members of any political party or as persons associated with them - but purely in their capacity as judges interacting with the members of the Bar. It is not the case of the litigant, who appeared and argued in person, that the said Adhivakta Parishad is not a body of advocates. 155. Such an argument has to give way to the right and duty of a Judge to attend legal functions organised by m....
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.... organise events such as seminars, lectures, farewell functions on the retirement of judges, or gatherings on festivals or occasions like New Year, where members of the Bar and the Bench interact with each other. Even friendly sports matches are played between the Bar and the Bench. 159. Whenever the members of the Bar and the Bench meet in such settings, they do not meet with the tinted glasses of their political affiliations. The relationship between the Bar and the Bench stands above such considerations. How such participation, in any manner, can become a matter of concern for an accused person appearing before the Court is difficult to comprehend. 160. This Court is of the considered and firm opinion that no litigant can be permitted to sever or weaken the relationship between the Bar and the Bench, which is sacred and stands above the politics of any level. The Bar and the Bench share a relationship which may perhaps be beyond the understanding of many, but the Bar and the Bench themselves understand it in the manner in which it has been understood historically. 161. Furthermore, some members of the Bar may, at times, be representing a particular political party in a ....
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....ices Authority (DSLSA), engaging with students in schools and colleges. 166. Accepting recusal on a ground as frivolous as attending a professional legal event, which in the perception of the litigant is allegedly linked to an ideology that he, as a politician belonging to a rival political party, opposes, would therefore lead to consequences far beyond the present individual case. This Court cannot, through this judgment, pass an order which projects that it is normal to intimidate judges merely because they attended professional legal events organised by a group of lawyers. It would send a message to society that the judiciary can be pressurised through insinuation, and not by evidence which goes to the root of the alleged perception of bias in the mind of the litigant. Such a perception of bias in the mind of a litigant, who happens to be a political figure, cannot be used as a weapon to intimidate a judge. 167. Thus, can a Judge attending a legal event and interacting with the legal fraternity in, say, a women empowerment programme, where only a speech is delivered on women empowerment or new laws, be treated as evidence of bias? If such participation is used against a ju....
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....ng appearances for the Government or any other party. In this regard, a reference can be made to the decision in Trishala v. M.V. Sundar Raj: (2010) 15 SCC 714, where an objection was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that one of the appellants before the High Court was a municipal corporator, and the learned Judge who had passed the impugned order had, while practising at the Bar, served as Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation. On that basis, it was argued that the learned Judge ought to have recused himself from hearing the appeal. It was also pointed out that in another matter, the same learned Judge had recused himself. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the plea and held that merely because the learned Judge had earlier served as Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, he was not precluded from hearing a case where a corporator was a party in his personal capacity. It was observed that past professional association, by itself, does not create a ground for recusal unless there is a direct nexus with the lis in question, and the fact that the learned Judge had recused in another matter was held to be irrelevant. 172. The real test of absence of bias is....
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....ot mean a separate case. Once a matter is assigned to a panel lawyer, a fresh docket is generated each time that matter is listed before the Court. Thus, if one single matter is listed 20 times, 20 dockets may be issued for the same matter. Even on occasions where the Court may not hold sitting but the matter remains on board, dockets are issued as part of listing and communication. 176. Thus, it was pointed out by the CBI that the figures mentioned by applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal in his additional affidavit, and which are being circulated on social media at his behest, as the "number of cases assigned," were factually incorrect and mischievously projected, since they only reflected the number of dockets and not the number of separate matters marked to a counsel. The CBI also specifically stated that neither of the relatives of this Court had dealt with, assisted in, or appeared in any matter connected with the present case pertaining to the Delhi Excise Policy at any stage before any Court, nor had they been involved in the present proceedings in any capacity whatsoever. 177. In the opinion of this Court, even if relatives of this Court are empanelled on Government panels, ....
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.... Government whether at the centre or the State. This has been the case in the past, continues in the present, and will continue in the future. Similarly, the children of judges may assist the Government on their own strength, because they too possess their own fundamental rights. If others can be empanelled, why should the family members of judges be excluded from such empanelment, unless it is proved that they were not entitled to it? 181. In the absence of any bias or doubt regarding their integrity or ability, how can anyone question this? If the sons or wives of politicians can become politicians, there have also been instances at the Bar which have produced stellar judges who were themselves the children of politicians, yet not a single finger has been raised regarding their bias. This Court wonders that if the test of 'apprehension bias' relates to whether the children or spouses of judges are empanelled by the Central Government, the Judge should not hear such cases, then a large part of the judiciary, from the District Courts to the highest Court, would have to recuse from hearing such matters. 182. Therefore, if the wife of a politician can be a politician without ha....
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....Let us explain this to the recusal applicants by way of a judicial precedent which was decided by one of the judges of this Court in similar facts and circumstances. A case came before a brother Judge of this Court, now retired, a few years back. It began with a concern raised by the petitioners therein, including a former Chief Minister of a state, who pointed out that the Judge shared a relationship with the then Attorney General of the country, against whom they had their own grievances. To them, this was enough to raise a doubt - would the Judge remain completely impartial? The Bench in question did not brush aside this concern. Instead, it paused and examined it carefully. It acknowledged the relationship openly, without any denial or hesitation. But then came the real question: does knowing someone, even closely, mean that one cannot decide fairly? The answer was clear. A judge does not carry personal equations into the courtroom. The Bench noted that it had no stake in the outcome of the case, no interest to protect, and nothing to gain. The relationship, by itself, did not create any real danger of bias. The Bench went a step further too. It reflected upon the innuendos the....
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....neral and the political Party in power at the Centre are true, it does not follow that I, on account of my relationship with Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, should also carry or exhibit a sense of bias in my functioning as a Judge of this Court. Mr. Justice Joseph in the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (supra) observed in paragraph 75 as follows: "75. Ultimately, the question is whether a fair-minded and reasonably informed person, on correct facts, would reasonably entertain a doubt on the impartiality of the Judge. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office he has taken as a Judge to administer justice without fear or favour, affection or ill will and his ability to carry out the oath by reason of his training and experience whereby he is in a position to disabuse his mind of any irrelevant personal belief or predisposition or unwarranted apprehensions of his image in public or difficulty in deciding a controversial issue particularly when the same is highly sensitive." 31. In my view, if the aforesaid test were to be applied, it cannot be said that the petitioners have any basis to have any reasonable apprehensio....
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....would not be able to decide the cause freely or independently, or that it would be improper for me to judge a cause, even though, I find myself in no way incapable of judging the cause independently and fairly..." 187. In the present case too, the expression of apprehension of bias raised by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal on this ground carries certain aspects: (a) that since allocation of certain Government matters is undertaken by the learned Solicitor General of India, who is presently appearing before this Court on behalf of the CBI, the independent professional engagements of the relatives of this Court would create a channel of influence in the present proceedings; (b) that such professional work undertaken by the relatives of this Court, would mean that the Solicitor General, or the Government, could directly or indirectly influence the judicial decision-making of this Court; (c) that this Court would permit or entertain any such influence in relation to a matter being adjudicated by it; and (d) that this Court would, on account of such perceived association, compromise the constitutional trust reposed in it, betray the oath of offic....
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....sal of a court of law. 191. The argument also raises a larger question as to what exactly is being insinuated by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal. Is it being suggested that the relatives of this Court survive only on income earned from the cases marked to them as part of these empanelments; or that this Court itself is dependent upon, or influenced by, the earnings of its family members? Is it being suggested that a Judge of this High Court, who draws salary, status, and constitutional responsibility from judicial office, would compromise judicial independence because of the professional engagements of family members pursuing their own careers? Such an insinuation is not only unfounded, but the same also overlooks the very nature of judicial office and the independence attached to it. 192. To summarise, in this Court's view, there is a clear distinction between a genuine conflict of interest and an attempt by a litigant to create an impression of one. A litigant, instead of seeking justice, cannot be permitted to create a situation that lowers the judicial process itself by raising unfounded allegations. A "conflict of interest" arises only where there exists a real, direct....
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.... call on the matter. The decision to remain a member of the reconstituted Bench was mine, and mine alone. The choice that I made, was not of the heart, but that of the head. The choice was made by posing two questions to myself. Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath of my office, if I recused from hearing the matters? 57. ...In my considered view, the prayer for my recusal is not well founded. If I were to accede to the prayer for my recusal, I would be initiating a wrong practice, and laying down a wrong precedent. A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. For that would give the impression, that the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless just....
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....or all panel lawyers. It is not the case that such allocation is made only to the relatives of this Court and to no other panel counsel. 199. This Court notes that in the written submissions filed today, at one stage, the applicant asserts that mere empanelment is not sufficient to warrant recusal, and at another stage, he contends that recusal is required in this case precisely because work is allocated to the relatives of this Court, who are on Government panels, by the learned Solicitor General. These two positions cannot stand together, being inherently inconsistent. The question, therefore, arises as to why this Court is being selectively targeted on that basis and why the applicant is taking a stand contrary to his own earlier pleadings and submissions in support of the recusal application. 200. The applicant has further stated that the CBI, by arguing that such a standard would disqualify learned Judges across the country, has falsely widened the controversy, mischievously dragged the entire judiciary into the present lis, and that such a stand borders on contempt. He has even reserved liberty to initiate appropriate contempt proceedings against the CBI officer who sig....
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....of a judgment passed by a learned Trial Court. It is equally not uncommon for a Trial Court judgment to be set aside by the High Court, or for a High Court judgment to be set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That is the very structure of judicial hierarchy and appellate scrutiny. It is only the higher Court which can determine whether a judgment is one-sided, contrary to law, or against the principles of natural justice. To argue before a High Court, for instance, that the learned Trial Court's opinion regarding the evidentiary value of approvers is necessarily better than the prima facie view expressed by this Court, only shows that the argument is not based on settled legal principles or judicial precedents. 206. Even while dictating judgments, a Court does not build its inclination towards any party. Our adversarial system of adjudication requires a Court to hear both sides with an open mind and without any predetermined opinion of its own. It is this system which ensures that judicial decisions are governed only by law, the record, and judicial conscience, and not by any other factor. Thus, such fear of a litigant cannot be sufficient to conclude that the Judge, who is ye....
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....rend noted by them, then this Court sees little reason for such anxiety. 211. To conclude, mere unease is wholly insufficient for a Judge to recuse. Allegations of even perceived bias must have some connection with reality. Suspicion without substance, and apprehension without foundation, cannot become grounds to seek recusal of a Judge CONCLUSION 212. I, today, for nearly thirty-four years, have sat on this side of the Bench - listening more than speaking, deciding more than reacting. Faces have changed, causes have changed, times have changed, but the oath has remained constant. It has asked for little, and demanded everything: patience in provocation, silence in criticism, and faith in the process even when it is questioned. (i) Test of Bias Cannot Be Manufactured by a Litigant 213. This Court has already undergone every test that the law and the constitutional framework requires before assuming judicial office - first as a Judicial officer, and eventually being elevated to the Delhi High Court. The Judicial Career expanding over 34 years has tested me on touchstone of not only legal issues but also on ethical parameters expected of a judge, as any other judge on ....
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....llegations have some basis. However, judicial duty cannot be guided by such pressures. The matter must be dealt with in accordance with law, so that there remains no room for any genuine doubt, and the integrity of the process is preserved. (ii) The Catch-22 of Recusal: A Litigant's Win Regardless of the Outcome 219. The self represented litigant by his arguments has also invited this Court to a catch-22 situation in the present case, which appears to create a win-win situation for the self-represented litigant. If this Court were to recuse on account of the accusations, the litigant would be in a position to claim before the country that his allegations had substance and proof and therefore, the judge has recused. 220. At the same time, if this Court does not recuse and the litigant ultimately fails to obtain relief on merits, he may say that he had already predicted such an outcome. On the other hand, if he succeeds in obtaining relief, he may again claim that the Court had acted under pressure or fear. Thus, whichever way the matter proceeds, the litigant may attempt to portray the situation in a manner that suits his narrative. 221. Judges are bound by the disciplin....
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....t only delay the delivery of justice but would also place the other side, which may not have similar resources, at a serious disadvantage. (iii) Whether this Court must give an 'Agni Pariksha'? 226. The learned senior counsel Sh. Hegde, appearing for applicant Sh. Manish Sisodia, addressed a very enlightening argument, by referring to the example of 'Agni Pariksha', which as per him, Mata Sita had to give not once but twice, through which he sought to convey that there are situations in life where, despite one's integrity and purity being intact, one is still called upon to prove it again and again. 227. This Court is thankful for this enlightening and novel argument. However, today, if this Court is being asked to undergo an Agni Pariksha by an accused who stands discharged - which means he has not been acquitted, but has only been let off at this stage by the first Court of jurisdiction on the ground of insufficiency of evidence - this Court must counter-question as to why a Judge should be asked to undergo such an Agni Pariksha at the mere asking of an accused who harbours apprehensions or misbeliefs about the Judge being biased, merely because he fears that the Judge m....
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.... it as per its roster, so as to ensure that justice is not evaded or delayed by mere insinuations of perceived bias raised by a litigant. 231. This Court would certainly withdraw where it is convinced that there exists a real conflict of interest and where recusal is genuinely warranted. It has done so in multiple cases in the recent past as well as earlier, sometimes even without any party raising an objection, and at times despite parties themselves stating that they had no objection to this Court adjudicating the matter. In such situations, to ensure that justice is not only done but is also seen to be done, this Court has directed transfer of such matters to other Benches, including cases falling within the MP/MLA category. 232. However, a judicial function cannot be surrendered by a Judge, nor can a Judge surrender her reputation to the mere perception of a litigant. This Court understands that, being a Judge, it is not required to respond to criticism, including criticism in the public domain that may at times be unjustified or baseless. At the same time, it is equally aware that it is not expected to submit to unfounded allegations on its integrity, to permit aspersion....
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....ing weight to allegations which carry none. The judicial office and Judges cannot be left vulnerable, since the reputation of a Judge and of the system is not a personal asset or shield of one Judge who is part of the system, but an institutional asset. 238. On a closer examination, the narrative constructed in the applications for recusal was found to be based on conjectures, urging this Court to withdraw from adjudication of the present case solely on the basis of perceived inclinations attributed to me and contradictory arguments. If I were to accept these applications, it would set a troubling precedent, since the competence of Judges to decide cases would then become dependent on the subjective comfort or discomfort of a litigant. 239. When the question shifts from what is decided to who decides it, it becomes my bounden duty to answer it as fearlessly as I have, all my life, decided every other question and issue between two litigants. Unfortunately, today, it is not a dispute between two litigants that I have been called upon to decide; it is between a litigant who is a discharged accused and myself, the Judge. 240. The robe that this Court wears will not be allowed....
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.... 249. Recusal has to stem from law and not narrative. 250. I understand that it is a defining moment in my judicial life and that this order would decide, as to whether I will stand my ground in performing my duty, or allow myself to be moved or unsettled by the ground beneath my feet being sought to be shaken by accusations thrown at me. 251. If the grounds raised in these applications were to be accepted as valid grounds for disqualification of a Judge from hearing a case, the qualifications for judicial office itself would have to be redrawn, suggesting absence of a family, absence of past associations, and complete absence of social or official engagement with the Bar. The Constitution, fortunately, does not prescribe such solitude as a qualification to be a Judge. 252. As curtains are drawn on the arguments in these applications seeking recusal, I must add that, in this case, the file seeking recusal did not arrive with evidence. It arrived on my table with aspersions, insinuations, and doubts cast on my fairness and impartiality - though quietly worded and couched in legally assembled sentences, yet carrying much beyond the phrases. The applications were not question....
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.... not be prudence, but abdication of duty, and would amount to lending legitimacy to aspersions, insinuations, and doubts when no ground for the same exists. 259. It would be an act of surrender - quiet and convenient, yet not without consequences. The signal that an institution can be bent and shaken by unverified assertions would travel far beyond this case. 260. Far more profound would be the effect if such insinuations were allowed to be closed merely in the file by this Court recusing, as they would continue to linger - in Courtrooms, in public discourse, in law schools, and in the general understanding of what real justice means and what it does not. It would also mean that the judiciary can be compelled to yield not to reason, but to narrative, diminishing the trust that justice must continue to command even when tested. This Court will not permit that faith to be eroded or allow damage to be caused to the judicial system. 261. The applications seeking recusal are, therefore, rejected, and in this rejection, this Court affirms its fidelity to the Constitution, on behalf of myself and every Judge who stands by it. 262. Justice lies not in yielding under pressure, b....