AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (4) TMI 1
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.... Sri G. Shivadass, Senior Advocate For Sri Prashanth S. Shivadass, Advocate C.A.V. JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri. Aditya Vikram Bhat, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the petitioners, Sri. G. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S. Shivadass, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in RP No. 447/2024, Smt. Tanmaye Rajkumar, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025 and 165/2025, Sri. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S. Shivadass, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos. 175/2025 and 186/2025, and Sri. M. Thirumalesh, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos. 122/2025 and 148/2025. 2. Revision Petition No. 447/2024 has been filed by the State seeking review of the order passed in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 88/2014 and 196/2014 by the Division Bench of this Court on 19.06.2023. 2.1 Civil Revision Petition Nos. 116/2025 and 114/2025 have been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No. 502/2015 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru. Civil Revision Petition No. 122/2025 has been filed by the State challenging th....
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....ed appropriate to file a review petition instead of an appeal, and the said recommendation again had to pass through the hierarchical process, which received approval on 13.12.2023. Subsequently, the matter was processed, and approval was granted by Government Order dated 31.01.2024. Learned AGA further submits that thereafter necessary correspondence ensued, and the review petition ultimately came to be filed on 07.08.2024. It is submitted that the delay of 374 days has been satisfactorily explained. 5.1 Learned AGA submits that the Tribunal has recorded concurrent findings of the fact and that no question of law arose for consideration. Hence, the appeal filed by the respondent-Oil Corporations was not maintainable. Learned AGA further submits that the findings recorded in the order under review are purely factual and are without any basis. Referring to the Indian Standard 'Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in Automotive Fuel - Specification,' learned AGA contends that ethyl alcohol and ethanol (denatured spirit) are classified as anhydrous ethanol and, therefore, are one and the same. In this regard, he also relies upon the tender document issued by Bharat Petroleum Corporati....
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....antial questions of law were permitted by way of amendment and on additional grounds. 6.2 Learned Senior Counsel submits that Entry Tax is paid when blended petrol is sold and, therefore, levying Entry Tax at the point of entry would amount to double taxation, which is impermissible. He further submits that the tax on sale already includes Entry Tax, and this position has not been disputed by the Revenue. Learned Senior Counsel contends that in earlier years the Department had accepted and approved the procedure of paying Entry Tax at the point of sale of blended petrol, and the present change in stand is without any basis. In support of the limited scope of review, learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through Legal representatives and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others [(2021) 13 SCC 1]. 7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 3 imposes a levy of tax on the entry of goods specified in the First Schedule into a local area for the purpose of consumption. 8. The First Schedule, at Entry 86 under the heading `Spirits and Alcohols,' includes (i) denatured spirit, (ii) rectified spirit, a....
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.... merits consideration? (iii) Whether delay in filing civil revision petitions are explained? 11. The above points are independent of the questions of law that have been raised and admitted in the Civil Revision Petitions. ANALYSIS Reg. Point No. 1: 12. The order under review is dated 19.06.2023. According to the list of dates forming part of the affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner initially considered filing a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The list of dates indicates the movement of the file within the hierarchy of the petitioner from 20.07.2023, when the order was downloaded, until 22.11.2023, when the recommendation to file a review petition before this Court was considered. Thereafter, a series of procedural steps culminating in the filing of the review petition on 07.08.2024 have been set out. 12.1 However, there is no explanation for the period between 31.01.2024 and 17.05.2024, and between 21.05.2024 and 09.07.2024, which together constitute a delay of more than six months. When a grievance is raised against the order under review, and the process of considering an SLP has ....
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.... in the way the State apparatus functions. The argument is that due to the inherent bureaucracy and involvement of various departments of different hierarchy which are endemic to the functioning of the State and its instrumentalities, unavoidable delays tend to crop up even without any deliberate intention, and thus, the courts ought to be pragmatic and liberal where the State or any of its instrumentalities is seeking condonation of delay in the filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142. 177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this Court observed that public interest suffers if appeals brought by the Government are thrown out due to the lapse of the limitation period. Accordingly, it held that a certain amount of latitude towards the Government is, therefore, not impermissible, for the purpose of condonation of delay. The relevant observations made therein read as under: - "15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brou....
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....d a private individual, on the other, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court simultaneously observed that such differential treatment cannot continue for all times to come. We say so, because this Court, in the latter parts of the aforesaid decisions, conveyed an emphatic message to all the States and its instrumentalities to constitute legal cells for the timely scrutiny of its cases, to explore the possibility of settlement instead of pursuing belated claims, wherever possible and to ensure that filing of appeals or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and the officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable for lapses, if any. 249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of in....
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....the State to escape the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lies with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigor of limitation statutes and defeating their very object. Such an approach would not only unjustly privilege the State over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration. 14. We are constrained to observe, upon examining the list of dates annexed to the application, that the authorities concerned have not acted responsibly in the discharge of their duties. It appears that the petitioner has proceeded in a leisurely manner, seemingly under the expectation that differential treatment would be extended merely because the petitioner is the State. The reasons assigned, presented only in the form of a list of dates, do not explain the delay, they merely chronicle events. The recurring nature of the issue involved cannot serve as a ground to overlook the unreasonable delay. 15. In light of the above discussion, the delay of 374 days in filing the review petition cannot be condoned. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1/2024 is rejected. Reg. Point No. 3: 16. The order in the STA....
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....13.12.2023 and 16.01.2025. 16.4 The overall conduct of the petitioner leaves the unmistakable impression that neither the State nor its authorities exercised due diligence. On the contrary, the record reveals clear administrative lethargy and laxity. Administrative lethargy can never constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. When the bona fides expected in litigation involving public interest are absent, the State cannot claim any differential treatment. The conduct demonstrated amounts to a failure in the discharge of public duties. 16.5 It is also surprising that after the impugned order, this Court rendered a decision in another matter involving the same issue, against which a review petition-albeit belated was filed. Despite this, the present petitions were filed nearly six months after the filing of the review petition. Acceptance of the petitioner's plea for a lenient approach would amount to granting differential treatment to the State, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) has categorically held to be impermissible. 16.6 In the present case, the conduct of the authorities is undeniably lethargic. Condonation of such delay would onl....
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.... (iii) ethyl alcohol." 20. Sl.No.66 of Notification dated 30.04.1992 reads as under: Sl. No. Description of Scheduled goods 1st Schedule Item No. Rate of Tax 66 Spirits and alcohol, that is to say :- [86] 2% (i) Denatured spirit; [86(i)] 2% (ii) Rectified spirit; [86(ii)] 2% (ii) Ethyl alcohol; [86(iii)] 2% 21. The notification dated 30.04.1992 came to be cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994. Fresh notification came to be issued on 30.03.2002 in exercise of powers under subsection (1) of Section 3 of KTEG Act. Entry 1 (vii) of Notification dated 30.03.2002 reads as under: Sl. No. Commodity Rate of Tax (viii) Rectified Spirit, Neutral Spirit, Ethyl Alcohol 4% 22. From the above, it is evident that denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol are treated as distinct products in the First Schedule. A similar distinction is maintained in the Notification dated 30.04.1992, which prescribes a rate of tax at 2%. In view of the cancellation of the said Notification by the subsequent Notification dated 30.03.1994, there was no levy until the Notification dated 30.03.2002 came into force. The Notification d....
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....ew. The scope of review jurisdiction is exceedingly narrow. A review may be entertained only when a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record is clearly demonstrated. An error that requires a process of reasoning to be discerned cannot be regarded as an "error apparent on the face of the record" so as to attract the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Under the guise of review, the Court may correct an apparent mistake, but it cannot revisit or substitute the view earlier taken. 29.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, [(2009) 14 SCC 663] has laid down the scope of review petition. Relevant paras extracted are as under: "8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai [AIR 2003 SC 2095] this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) '6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error ....
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....s not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated." 29.4 In Shri Ram Sahu (supra), the following conclusions were noted: "35. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under ....
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.... apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as "for any other sufficient reason". The said phrase has been explained to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule" 29.6 Similarly, in the case of M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214], the Hon'ble Supreme Court examining the grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC reiterated the following conclusions: "19. This Court has laid down the following principles on the exercise of review jurisdiction: a. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC; and b. Error on the face of record must be an error which must strike one on a mere perusal and must not on a long drawn process; c. The power of review must not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits; d. The phrase "any other sufficient reason" means a reason that is analogous to ....