TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2000 (12) TMI 934
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....ect area for a project purpose. (2) The acquisition shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) (hereinafter in this section referred as the said Act), subject to the following modifications : (i) For Section 11 of the said Act, the following Section shall be substituted, namely: 11. Enquiry and award by Collector :-- On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections, if any, which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under Section 9 to the measurements made under Section 8, into the market value of the land on the 1st July, 1953 and the value of any improvements to the land effected after that date and before the date of the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under subsection (1) of Section 4, and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of-- (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compe....
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....gonda and Khammam". 2. The constitutionality of the said Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in V. Lakshmi Narayana v. State, AIR 1972 AP 19. The Division Bench held that the said Act is intra vires Articles 14, 19, 31 and 31(2) of the Constitution of India as acquisitions were being made for public purpose. 3. Subsequently again in K. Rangaiah v. State, AIR 1980 AP 165, the matter came up for consideration and Kuppu Swamy, J., speaking for the Division Bench, on the basis of a decision of the Apex Court in D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCR 790, held thus: "In D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCR 790, it was observed by the Supreme Court that Art. 31-A carves out an exception to the applicability of Articles 31, 14 and 19 and immunizes certain categories of agrarian reform legislation from attack on the ground that they violate any of these three articles. Then follows the second proviso which says that even where a law falls within Article 31A it would not qualify for immunity if it seeks to acquire any portion of the land held by a person under his personal cultivation which is within the ceiling limit ....
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....ernment, the question of publication of notification afresh would in no way alter the position. In that view of the matter, we must accept the submission of the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition". 6. In another writ petition being marked as WP No. 24365 of 1999 (between Challa Narsaiah v. Govt. of A.P., disposed of on 1st August, 2000), a Division Bench of this Court, which was presided over by one of us, namely B. Subhashan Reddy, J., following the aforementioned decisions held: "No order is placed by the learned Government Pleader reversing or suspending the above Judgment. Hence, following the said judgment, the award passed in the instant case is set aside and there shall be a direction that the compensation be paid with reference to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The entire process of passing of the award and payment of compensation shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order". 7. The State filed an application under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgment of this Court in WP Nos.4712 and 4725 of 1997, which is marked as SLP (C) No. 1....
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.... been placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in K. Yellareddy v. Registrar, APAT, 1996( 3) ALT 1047. The learned Counsel would contend that in any event the learned single Judge as also this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction having regard to the fact that the petitioners had approached this Court after a long time and without filing any application before the Collector for making a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The learned Additional Advocate-General urged that an invalid order, although void, need not be set aside by this Court. Reliance in this connection has been placed on State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445 and D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (supra). 10. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents, on the other hand urges, that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Rangaiah (supra) having been rendered following the Supreme Court decision in D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the same holds the field. It is contended that the Land Acquisition Collector, upon consideration of the factual matrix of each case, has arrived at a finding of fact that the....
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....e Court. Though we do not agree with the statement of law and feel the principle to have been very widely stated yet ordinarily the matter to have been placed before a Larger Bench in giving the judgment has not taken into consideration the decision of Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1978] 2 SCR 405." 13, A bare perusal of the aforementioned decision would clearly show that in Indira Gandhi (supra); the operation of the judgment and order of the High Court was suspended. In that case, the election of Smt. Indira Gandhi was set aside. The Apex Court suspended the operation of the said Judgment; as a result whereof, the status of the appellant as an elected Member of Parliament and consequently her right to hold the office of the Prime Minister of India stood revived. But, when a question of law is decided, as indicated hereinbefore, its ratio thereof cannot be said to be wiped out only because the operation of the said order is stayed. This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in K. Venkata Reddy v. LAO, [1988] 170 ITR 15 (AP) holding: "We are of the view that when a judgment of the High Court is the subject-matter of an appeal and the....
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....order, the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 12, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the Appellate Authority". 15. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court is binding upon another Division Bench. The decision of this Court in Rangaiah (supra), as indicated hereinbefore, has been followed by this Court in many cases. 16. It may be that at one point of time, the Apex Court expressed its disinclination to enter in....
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.... sovereign State by exercising its power of eminent domain to expropriate private property without owner's consent. Prima facie, State would be the Judge to decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But it is not the sole Judge. This will be subject to judicial review and it is the duty of the Court to determine whether a particular purpose is a public purpose or not. Public interest has always been considered to be an essential ingredient of public purpose. But every public purpose does not fall under Article 300-A nor exercise of eminent domain an acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. Generally speaking preservation of public health or prevention of damage to life and property are considered to be public purposes. Yet deprivation of property for any such purpose would not amount to acquisition or possession taken under Article 300-A. It would be by exercise of the police power of the State, In other words, Article 300-A only limits the power of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under A....