Just a moment...

Report
ReportReport
Welcome to TaxTMI

We're migrating from taxmanagementindia.com to taxtmi.com and wish to make this transition convenient for you. We welcome your feedback and suggestions. Please report any errors you encounter so we can address them promptly.

Bars
Logo TaxTMI
>
×

By creating an account you can:

Report an Error
Type of Error :
Please tell us about the error :
Min 15 characters0/2000
TMI Blog
Home /

2006 (7) TMI 206

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

.... Agarwal under Rule 209A were set aside. 2.The back ground facts in a nutshell are as follows : M/s. RE is a proprietary concern of Shri Atul Agarwal and is engaged in the manufacture of Electronic Fan Regulators, Dimmers and Remote Control Switches under the brand name 'REIZ' since 1988. In the year 1993, M/s. REPL was constituted with Shri Atul Agarwal and his two brothers Shri Siddarth Agarwal and Shri Ravindra Agarwal as its Directors. M/s. REPL was engaged in the manufacture of Electronic transformers. Both the units manufacture their goods under a common brand name of 'REIZ'. The Commissioner, Central Excise-I, New Delhi by his order dated 31-10-2001 held that since the brand name 'REIZ' belonged to M/s. RE till its transfer to REPL in 2000, the Electronic transformers manufactured under brand name 'REIZ' by REPL till the transfer were ineligible for small scale exemption, inasmuch as under the Notification no. 1/93 a manufacturer affixing the brand name of another person was ineligible for the exemption. Similarly, it was held that M/s. RE became ineligible for exemption once the brand name REIZ was transferred on 30-3-2000 to REPL. Appeals were preferred before the Tribun....

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

....nt and therefore, the facts of the cases were known to the Central Excise authorities and a change of suppression of facts is not maintainable. 5.The respondents pointed out that in view of the specific prescriptions in the Notification the demands have been rightly raised. 6.As noted above the contentions did not find acceptance by Tribunal and, therefore, the impugned order was passed. 7.Stands before the Tribunal were reiterated by learned counsel for the appellant. Additionally, it was submitted that the appellant had in the meantime obtained a certificate under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (in short the 'Trade Marks Act') and the certificate of registration of trade mark covered the period in question. Therefore, even if it is conceded that the Tribunal's view is correct no duty, penalty or interest can be levied. 8.So far as the views regarding non-eligibility are concerned view expressed by this Court in several cases needs to be noted. 9.In Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I v. Mahaan Dairies [2004 (166) E.L.T. 23 (S.C.)] it was noted (in para 6) as follows : "We have today delivered a judgment in Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy v. Rukmani Pakkwell Tra....

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

...., religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud [354 US 457 (1957)] where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style : 'In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liabil....

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

Full Text of the Document

X X   X X   Extracts   X X   X X

....rcel of the enactment and is supposed to be employed to further the objects of enactment - subject, of course, to the condition that the notification is not ultra vires the Act, and/or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See P.J. Irani v. State of Madras [(1962) 2 SCR 169]". 11.In Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi [2005 (189) E.L.T. 257 (S.C.)] it was held as follows at para 3 : "Paragraph 4 and Explanation IX of Notification have been construed by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Rukhmani Pakkwell Traders, 2004 (165) E.L.T. 481; as also in Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. Mahaan Dairies, 2004 (166) E.L.T. 23. In both these decisions this Court held that Paragraph 4 read with Explanation IX of the notification could not be construed in the manner as contended by the assessees, namely, to make it necessary for the owner of the trade mark/trade name to use the goods in respect of the specified goods manufactured by the assessee. We see no reason to differ with the reasoning of this Court in the aforesaid decisions. Clause 4 of the Notification read with Explanation IX clearly debars those persons from the bene....