TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (11) TMI 74
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....explained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award upon its validity? (ii) Is an arbitral award that is unworkable, in terms of not settling the disputes between the parties finally while altering their positions irrevocably thereby leaving them no choice but to initiate further litigation, liable to be set aside on grounds of perversity, patent illegality and being opposed to the public policy of India? If so, would it be a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution? In this case, the learned Arbitrator reserved his arbitral award on 28.07.2012 but pronounced it only on 16.03.2016, i.e., nearly three years and 28.07.2012 but pronounced it only on 16.03.2016, i.e., nearly three years and eight months later, with no definite resolution of the matter. Significantly, no explanation worth the name was offered by him for the delay. 2. The issue of delay in the delivery of an arbitral award is relevant now only in the context of the period prior to insertion of Section 29A in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'the Act of 1996'), which put in place stringent timelines for passing of an arbitral award. During that ....
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....ned Judge held that a party must be satisfied that the arbitrator was conscious of and had taken into consideration all contentions and pleas before rejecting or partly rejecting a claim. This was held to be the right of the party which should not be denied. The learned Judge observed that the Court has limited power to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 but held that the award which was passed three years after the date of the last effective hearing, without satisfactory explanation for that delay, was contrary to justice as it defeated the very purpose and fundamental basis for alternative dispute redressal. Further, having found that the arbitrator had not even concluded the hearings in the arbitration proceedings, the learned Judge held that the award was contrary to principles of fair play, as justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. On these grounds, the learned Judge set aside the arbitral award. 4. Thereafter, in Peak Chemical Corporation Inc. vs. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. (2012) 188 DLT 680 = 2012 Supp (1) Arb LR 184, another learned Judge of the Delhi High Court dealt with an arbitral award delivered with ....
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....ach the arbitral tribunal itself with a prayer to expedite the award. The learned Judge opined that, if after being approached by either party with a prayer to expedite the pronouncement of the award, the arbitrator failed to do so, the Court could be approached in terms of Section 14(2) of the Act of 1996. The learned Judge concluded that, given the scheme of the Act of 1996, it would be appropriate to exhaust the remedy under Section 14(2) before challenging the award under Section 34 thereof. Reiterating his earlier view that delay, per se, was not one of the grounds under Section 34, the learned Judge observed that it would have to be shown that the award suffered from patent illegality on account of such delay. The learned Judge added that the Court should also weigh as to what would be the cost incurred and the time spent in the arbitral proceedings before interfering on the sole ground of delay. In effect, the learned Judge held that it would be the facts and circumstances of a given case which would determine whether the delay was so unconscionable as to vitiate the award. On facts, the learned Judge found that the majority award did not inspire confidence as it failed to d....
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....f the Delhi High Court dealt with an award which was reserved on 27.11.2007 and pronounced on 20.12.2013. There was, thus, a delay of more than six years in the delivery of the award. The learned Judge observed that exhaustion of the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1996 should not be read as a mandatory recourse in order to mount a challenge on that ground under Section 34 thereof. The learned Judge noted that the decision of the Division Bench in BWL Limited (supra) was challenged unsuccessfully before this Court in SLP (C) No. 4299 of 2013. He further noted that whether an arbitral award would be vitiated by delay or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and, in that case, the learned Judge found that there was little explanation for the delay of six years. The learned Judge, accordingly, set aside the award on the ground that it was contrary to the principles of fair play and justice. 9. Again, in Director General, Central Reserve Police Force vs. Fibroplast Marine Private Limited (2022) 3 High Court Cases (Del) 304, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court dealt with an arbitral award that was pronounced with a delay of nearly one and a half ye....
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.... the context of judicial proceedings, the learned Judge observed that the same principle would apply with equal force to arbitral proceedings as the very objective of the Act of 1996 is to provide an efficacious and speedy mechanism for dispute resolution. On facts, the learned Judge found that the parties were constrained to request the arbitrator to deliver the award on three separate occasions but despite the same, the delay of over one and a half years ensued. Opining that arbitrators are human beings whose ability to recollect oral submissions and evaluate evidence would diminish over a period of time, the learned Judge held that such delay would not be a mere procedural lapse but would cause substantive prejudice to the parties as it would strike at the heart of fairness in adjudication. The learned Judge opined that when an arbitrator pronounces an award after a long gap, the very faith of the parties in arbitration proceedings being an efficacious remedy would stand diminished. The learned Judge further opined that there was a real and substantial risk when an award is rendered after a long gap that it is based on selective recollection of submissions, thereby effecting the....
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....e consent of the parties and stated that any provision in the arbitration agreement, whereby the arbitrator was empowered to enlarge the time for making the award without the consent of the parties, would be void and of no effect. However, no such time stipulations found mention in the Act of 1996 till the insertion of Section 29A therein, vide Amendment Act No. 3 of 2016, with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. Thereby, time for the making of domestic arbitral awards was mandatorily fixed by requiring the same to be pronounced within 12 months from the date of completion of the pleadings under Section 23(4) of the Act of 1996. Power to extend that time was conferred upon the parties, under Section 29A(3) of the Act of 1996, subject to a maximum period of 6 months. Section 29A(4) of the Act of 1996, however, empowered the Court to grant further extension of time if sufficient cause was shown therefor. 15. Prior to insertion of Section 29A in the statute book, in the event of failure of an arbitrator to act without undue delay, recourse was provided under Section 14 of the Act of 1996 to dual remedies - by approaching the arbitrator first and, then, the Court. Section 14(1)(a)....
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....endment Act No.3 of 2016 sets out that the Act of 1996 was enacted to provide for speedy disposal of cases relating to arbitration with least amount of intervention by the Courts but, with passage of time, some difficulties in the applicability of the Act of 1996 were noticed. Therefore, amendments were proposed to be made in the Act of 1996 to facilitate and encourage alternative dispute mechanisms, especially arbitration, 'for settlement of disputes in a more user-friendly, cost effective and expeditious disposal of cases, as India was committed to improve its legal framework to obviate delay in disposal of cases'. In this regard, an amendment was proposed that an arbitral tribunal should make its award within a period of 12 months from the date it enters upon the reference, giving liberty to the parties to extend such period up to 6 months, beyond which extension could only be granted by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. 17. Notably, on the issue of a 'dilatory arbitrator', Russel on Arbitration [Russel on Arbitration 24th Edition. Chapter 7 (Para 7-127).] states that an arbitral tribunal is required to conduct proceedings and adopt procedures that would avoid unnece....
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....ncreasing delays in the conduct of arbitrations, major institutions revised their rules to improve the speed and efficiency of arbitrations. Though the above observations were made in the context of international arbitrations, the same principle would hold good for domestic arbitrations also. Therefore, when the Arbitrator presently took years together to deliver the Award, the least that the parties would expect is a quietus being given to their disputes instead of being relegated to another round of arbitration/ litigation. The Arbitrator, therefore, failed to live up to that minimal expectation reposed in him by law and by the parties themselves. 19. However, the undeniable fact remains that Section 34 of the Act of 1996 does not postulate delay in the delivery of an arbitral award as a ground, in itself, to set it aside. There is no gainsaying the fact that inordinate delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award has several deleterious effects. Passage of time invariably debilitates frail human memory and it would be well-nigh impossible for an arbitrator to have total recall of the oral evidence, if any, adduced by witnesses; and the submissions and arguments advanced by....
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....so, if it remains unexplained, can be construed to be a factor to set aside that award. Once all the requirements, referred to supra, are fulfilled in a given case and the arbitral award therein is clearly riddled with the damaging effects of the delay, it can be construed to be in conflict with the public policy of India, thereby attracting Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1996, or Section 34(2A) thereof as it may also be vitiated by patent illegality. Further, it would not be necessary for an aggrieved party to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1996 as a condition precedent to laying a challenge to a delayed and tainted award under Section 34 thereof. Both provisions would operate independently as the latter is not dependent on the former. This being the legal position, we would have to examine whether the present arbitral award suffers from any such malady owing to the delay, whereby its very validity would stand vitiated. Further, we would also have to see whether the award is liable to be set aside for falling short, as it did not resolve the disputes between the parties but their positions stood altered irreversibly owing to the interim orders passed durin....
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....on thereof had been taken by the landowners, and the security deposits would be due and payable to them on such date, i.e.,15 days after the Handover Date. It was expressly agreed between the parties that the developer was not required to handover physical possession of the landowners' constructed area to them until the security deposits together with interest, if any, in terms of the agreement had been returned by the landowners to the developer. The interest that was contemplated was payable at the rate of 12% per annum in the event the landowners did not refund the deposits within 15 days from the Handover Date. In addition to the two security deposits referred to above, the developer made another refundable interest-free deposit of Rs. 1,25,00,000/-. This deposit was to be returned by the landowners to the developer within 30 days from the Handover Date. The parties were to decide whether the land should be developed into a commercial or a residential complex within 120 days. 23. Under Clause 25 of the JDA, the developer was required to appoint the Architect for the development after obtaining the consent of the landowners. Under Clauses 36 and 37, two powers-of-attorney wer....
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....eed upon appointment of M/s. Natraj & Venkat, Architects, as the Project Architect for the development of the property in terms of the JDA. This agreement recorded that the parties had agreed upon construction of a multi-storied software technology park on the land. In terms of this supplemental agreement, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th floors were allotted to the share of the developer, while the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th floors fell to the share of the landowners. The 10th floor was to be shared by both parties, along with the terrace and common areas. The building was to be named 'Menon Eternity'. An additional sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- was also deposited by the developer under this agreement towards security deposit. The agreement also recorded that the second power-of-attorney had been executed by the landowners and was kept in escrow with the HDFCL. A third supplemental agreement was executed on 22.02.2007. Thereunder, the developer agreed to pay to the landowners an additional interest-free refundable deposit of Rs. 3,00,00,000/-. Meanwhile, Lancor Gesco Properties Limited was renamed as Lancor G. Corp. Properties Limited on 10.05.2005. Thereafter, Lancor G. Corp. Properties Limited wa....
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....ware technology park. 28. However, the respondents were not satisfied that the construction of the building was complete in terms of the JDA. Correspondence ensued between the parties on this account and the Company accepted that certain minor works were still outstanding which required attention, i.e., with regard to the staircase, the basement and the construction of a canopy. On 20.10.2008, the Company took the stand that it had fulfilled its obligations under the JDA and, therefore, the said date should be reckoned as the Handover Date. The Company, accordingly, called upon the respondents to refund the security deposits. The respondents, however, contested this claim stating that the conditions in Clauses 6(a) and (b) of the JDA were not fulfilled and, therefore, the Handover Date had not come as yet. 29. Surprisingly, on 28.07.2008, the respondents chose to refund to the Company a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- from out of the security deposits held by them. Further, another sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- was refunded by them on 01.12.2008 during the course of their correspondence. Therefore, out of the security deposits, totalling Rs. 6.82 crores, a sum of Rs. 2 crores stood refun....
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.... annum on the sum of Rs.1,09,76,830/- from this date till date of realization. c) directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 28,63,093/- being the statutory charges together with interest @ 12% per annum and future interest @ 12% per annum on the sum of Rs. 25,82,870/- from this date till date of realization. d) directing the respondents to jointly and severally to pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 37,87,641/- towards maintenance charges together with interest thereon @ 12% per annum, and future interest @ 12% per annum on the sum of Rs. 35,82,464/- from this date till date of realization. e) directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay future maintenance charges @ Rs. 3.50 per sq. ft. per month from this date. f) directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 4,86,906/- towards electricity consumption charges for common areas, together with interest thereon @ 12% per annum and future interest @ 12% per annum on the sum of Rs.4,65,345/- from this date till date of realization. g) directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay the future electricity cons....
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.... Mylapore, Chennai, allegedly executed by Lancor Holdings Ltd., in favour of BNP Paribas Global Securities Market Operations Ltd., is illegal, void ab initio and non-est and not binding on the respondents and directing the claimant to deliver up the said lease deed and directing the cancellation of the said lease deed by executing a cancellation deed and registering the same in the Office of the jurisdictional Sub Registrar. 2(a). Declaring and adjudging that the lease deed dated 11.01.2010, which is registered as Document No. 928 of 2010 of Book I in the office of the Sub Registrar, Mylapore, Chennai, allegedly executed by Lancor Holdings Ltd., in favour of BNP Paribas Sundaram Global Securities Operations Pvt. Ltd. allegedly leasing the 4th floor in the building 'Menon Eternity' situated at No. 165, St. Mary's Road, Alwarpet, Chennai - 600018, is illegal, void ab initio and non-est and not binding on the respondents and directing the claimant to deliver up the said lease deed and directing the claimant to deliver up the said lease deed and directing the cancellation of the said lease deed by executing a cancellation deed and registering the same in the office of the juri....
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....y" is illegal, void ab initio and non-est. 5. Grant an order of permanent injunction restraining the claimant from relying upon the said certificate dated 10.10.2008 of the said Project Architect. 6. Appoint an independent Architect for joint inspection of the building in the subject property sand for certifying the measurement and quality of the constructed areas of the claimant and the respondents and the building including the common areas and common amenities at the cost and expense of the claimant. 7. Direct the claimant to complete the building and the respondents' constructed area as per the agreed specifications in the JDA and obtain a Completion Certificate from the said Independent Architect in respect of the said building and obtain an Area Statement for the total super-built-up area duly certified by the said Architect and furnish the same to the respondents. 8. Direct the claimant to deliver to the respondents their 50% constructed area in the building "Menon Eternity" in the subject property, upon the respondents paying to the claimant such sum of monies as this Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased to determine as being due and ....
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....0.11.2017 along with future interest thereon at 12% p.a. calculated from this day till the date of its payment as per the calculations given in the annexure referred in paragraph 116 above. 18. Direct the claimant to pay to the respondents a sum of Rs. 5 Crore or such sum of money, as may be determined by this Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal, as damages for slandering the title of the respondents to their share of constructed area in the subject property along with interest thereon at 12% p.a. calculated from 17.07.2009 (the date of publication of the Public Notice in the Newspaper) till the date of its payment. 19. Direct the claimant to pay to each of the three respondents a sum of Rs.3 Crore each (in all Rupees Nine Crores) or such sum of money, as may be determined by this Hon'ble Arbitral Tribunal as damages for the claimant having defamed the fair name and reputation of the respondents. 20. Direct the claimant to tender an unconditional apology to the respondents and to withdraw the public notice published in the Hindu daily on 17.7.2009 and prominently publish the unconditional apology and withdraw the said Notice in the same News Paper. 21. Dir....
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....edings? 12. Whether the claimant was entitled to premature return of the deposits from the respondents? 13. To what other reliefs the parties are entitled to? 35. The Award dated 16.03.2016 reflects that one witness each was examined by the Company and the respondents. Two Engineers from an independent agency, M/s Velu Associates, Engineers, were examined. The Company marked 58 exhibits in evidence while the respondents marked 81 exhibits. The Report of M/s Velu Associates, Engineers, was Ex. A/1. 36. On the crucial issue pertaining to the Handover Date, the Arbitrator noted that Clauses 6(a), (b) and (c) of the JDA were of relevance and, in terms thereof, the requirements were summed up thus: (i) Construction to be completed and fit for occupation; (ii) The Project Architect was to certify to the landowners that the building was complete and fit for occupation; (iii) The Company should have applied for the Completion Certificate from the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority; and (iv) The Company should, in writing, offer to handover the landowners' constructed area after fulfilling the three conditions. 37. The A....
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....the self-serving and incorrect assumption that the escrow agent had colluded with the respondents or failed to act neutrally. The Arbitrator, therefore, concluded that the conduct of the Company reflected utter lack of bona fides and held in favour of the respondents. 39. The relief to be granted as a consequence of such findings was also discussed by the Arbitrator. According to him, 'the situation created by the Company, leading to the finding which was inevitable, was very complex and unusual which required to be carefully dealt with and had, in fact, resulted in some delay in devising a proper relief/Award which would be equitable to both parties'. Having stated so in para 126 of the Award, we may note at this stage, that the Arbitrator completely failed in finding a solution that was 'equitable to both parties' and, instead, tilted wholly in favour of the respondents. The Arbitrator observed that there was no clause in the agreement which specifically governed the peculiar scenario of the unsustainable sales effected by the Company in its own favour. He observed that there was no stipulation for either liquidated damages or a process for assessing damages to fix fair and ju....
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....cond alternative would mean that the Company, in order to retain its share in the property, should pay proper compensation to the respondents for obtaining void conveyances. The Arbitrator repeated himself by again stating that the sales by the Company were illegal and unsustainable leading to a very uncertain scenario in the matter of providing further relief but the respondents had satisfied themselves by assailing the sales by the Company in its own favour and had not suggested any solution/relief to fulfil the requirements to which the Company would be entitled to under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. He pointed out that the respondents had not pleaded for any relief for themselves in the event of the sales being set aside. He further noted that there was no provision in the JDA for liquidated damages which would cover the situation of the sale deeds executed by the Company being set aside on the ground of illegality. Further, he noted that neither party had come forward with any pleading, much less proof, of the actual compensation that would be payable to the Company on the sales being held invalid or even if the entire contract became voidable, entitling the res....
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....ated 19.12.2008 registered as Nos. 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893 and 2894 of 2008 in the office of the Sub Registrar, Mylapore, Chennai, are declared as 'illegal' and not binding on the Respondents and Respondents are entitled to execute appropriate cancellation deeds. II. No declaration is necessary in respect of the Lease Deeds mentioned under para 2 of the counter claim in view of the Arbitrator having been informed that the lease period under the said leases are already over and fresh leases have to be executed only after April, 2016. It is declared that in view of the findings that the sale deeds in favour of the Claimants are illegal and not binding on the Respondent, the Claimant shall not have any right to lease any portion allotted towards their 50% share in the property. Ill. All the acts done and deeds executed on the basis of 5 sale deeds dated 19.12.2008 are declared as non-est and illegal and the Respondent shall be entitled to receive all the consequential benefits acquired by the Claimant thereon. IV. The Project Architect certificate dated 10.10.2008 of M/s. Natraj and Venkat is declared as illegal, non-est, violative of the terms of agr....
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.... short of firming up the final relief with regard to compensation to be paid either way, that is, if, the sales were to be set aside, as was finally done or, in the alternative, if, the sale transactions were to be regularised. Noting that these observations were set out in paras 126 to 136 of the Award, the learned Judge opined that what compounded the problem was the observation of the Arbitrator that the parties could seek their remedies by taking recourse to a Civil Court or by accessing the Act of 1996 again with the caveat that they could not avail of his services. The learned Judge observed that by doing so, the Arbitrator shut the door on exercise of power under Section 34(4) of the Act of 1996, whereby the Arbitrator could have been called upon to rule on undecided issues. Further, as the parties were not agreeable to treating the Award as an Interim Award, leaving other issues to be addressed in a fresh round of litigation, the learned Judge eschewed that option. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the Arbitrator could have called upon the parties to lead evidence for the purpose of determining compensation, consequent to his finding that the sale deeds were illegal....
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....the cross-objection was as to whether setting aside of the Award in part by the learned Judge was sustainable. Considering the scope of Section 37 of the Act of 1996, the Bench observed that it did not find any perversity in the Award as the Arbitrator did not have the power to grant relief that went beyond what was claimed by the parties. Referring to case law, the Bench observed that relief not founded on pleadings could not be sustained and opined that the learned Judge was not correct in finding fault with the Arbitrator for not finally deciding the dispute between the parties. The Bench opined that, as the Company had not sought any alternative relief, the Arbitrator was not at fault for failing to grant relief to it after declaring the sale deeds illegal. The observation of the learned Judge that the Arbitrator ought to have called upon the parties to lead evidence, if necessary, and to amend their pleadings was, therefore, held to be unsustainable. The order of the learned Judge to the extent it partly set aside the Award was, therefore, set aside. In the result, the appeal filed by the respondents was allowed and the Company's cross-objection was dismissed. Hence, these app....
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....itrator's award can be set aside. Unless the limited grounds stipulated in the provision are made out, an arbitral award cannot be invalidated. However, the very objective of the exercise would be lost if, after the entire process, an arbitrator fails to resolve the disputes between the parties and leaves them high and dry with advice to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation once again. In his article, 'Arbitrators and Accuracy' (supra), Professor William W Park says as follows: 'An arbitrator's primary duty remains the delivery of an accurate award, resting on a reasonably ascertainable picture of reality. Litigants wanting only quick or cheap solutions can roll dice, and have no need of lawyers. Evidentiary tools in arbitration should balance sensitivity toward cost and delay against the parties' interest in due process and correct decisions. If arbitration loses its moorings as a truth-seeking process, nostalgia for a golden age of simplicity will yield to calls for reinvention of an adjudicatory process aimed at discovering the facts, finding the law, and correctly construing contract language....Much of the criticism of arbitration's cost and delay thus tel....
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.... of 1996 or of the fundamental policy of Indian law and conflict with the most basic notions of justice and morality. Further, Section 34(2A) of the Act of 1996 provides that in domestic arbitrations, patent illegality appearing on the face of an award is a ground to set it aside. 50. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited vs. National Highway Authority of India (2019) 15 SCC 131, this Court observed that a domestic award would be liable to be set aside if it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, as understood in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49, or if it is against the basic notions of justice or morality, as set out in paras 36 to 39 thereof. It was noted that Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Explanation 2 to Section 48(2)(b)(ii) were added by Amendment Act No.3 of 2016 only to ensure that the law laid down in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Western Geco Internation Limited (2014) 9 SCC 263, as understood in paras 28 and 29 of Associate Builders (supra), was done away with. Further, it was noted that an additional ground was made available under Section 34(2A), brought i....
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....dents on 20.10.2008, stating that it was ready to handover their 50 % share of the constructed area to them and that it should be treated as the 'Handover Date'. These acts on the part of the Company confirmed that the three conditions stipulated in Clauses 6(a), (b) and (c) of the JDA stood duly complied with. 53. In this context, the review and exercise undertaken by the Arbitrator to assess the 'validity' of the Project Architect's Certificate dated 10.10.2008 is open to question. As already noted hereinbefore, Clause 6(a) of the JDA reads as follows: 'a. LG completes the construction of the building in all respects, including the LAND-OWNERS CONSTRUCTED AREA fit for occupation and the Architects for the project certify to the LAND OWNERS that the building has been put up and completed according to the sanctioned plan and is fit for occupation.' It is clear from a bare reading of the above clause that the certification by the Project Architect was only to confirm that the building had been put up and completed according to the sanctioned plan and was fit for occupation. The phrase had to be read in its entirety and with continuity. By reading it so, it reflects th....
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....(c) of the JDA. 54. In any event, as already noted, the Company secured all the necessary certificates and clearances in October/November 2008 itself. Admittedly, certain shortcomings were still there in the building, that is, with regard to the slipshod tiling of the staircase; water seepage in the basement area and, in particular, the electrical room; and the erection of a canopy. However, these shortcomings were not sufficient to infer violation of Clause 6(a), whereby the respondents could have said that the building was not fit for occupation. It may be noted that after the passing of the interim order dated 20.10.2010 by the Arbitrator, the respondents themselves executed a registered lease deed on 14.02.2011 renting out the 8th floor in the building to Cognizant Technology Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. for a monthly rental of Rs. 13,44,070/-. The lease was to commence from 15.12.2010 and was for a period of nine years, with rental escalation every three years. This lease deed demonstrates that the building was ready for occupation and use at least by December, 2010. 55. The Arbitrator, therefore, clearly fell into error in reading more into Clause 6(a), (b) and (c) than wa....
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....onstitution is concerned, this power is to be exercised by this Court with great care and caution. Article 142 enables the Court to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The exercise of this power has to be in consonance with the fundamental principles and objectives behind the 1996 Act and not in derogation or in suppression thereof. 86. While exercising power under Article 142, this Court must be conscious of the aforesaid dictum. In our opinion, the power should not be exercised where the effect of the order passed by the Court would be to rewrite the award or modify the award on merits. However, the power can be exercised where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end. Not only would this end protracted litigation, but it would also save parties' money and time.' (emphasis is ours) 58. Reference was made in Gayatri Balasamy (supra) to the earlier Constitution Bench decision in Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan (2023)14 SCC 231, which summarized the scope of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution and, in particular, para 19 thereof, which reads as under: "19. Given the aforesaid backgro....
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....n of the sale deeds by the Company in its own favour is valid and sustainable. However, having held so, after altering the parties' positions irrevocably with his interim direction, the Arbitrator left them hanging by directing them to separately seek resolution of Issues 9 and 10 framed by him, with regard to the relief to be granted, through a fresh resolution process all over again. 60. Given these circumstances, we are of the firm opinion that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution is the only viable alternative in this case as the other alternative would be to set aside the Award, thereby relegating the parties to another round of arbitration/litigation after 16 years! Doing so would be a travesty of justice and nothing short of making a mockery of the process to the extent of shaking the very faith and trust that parties necessarily have to repose when they resort to arbitration to settle their disputes. As observed in Gayatri Balasamy (supra), the power under Article 142 can be exercised where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end as it would not only end protracted litigation, but would also save parties' mo....
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....head, so as to bring the amount payable by the Company to a round figure of Rs. 10 crores. This amount shall be paid by the Company to the respondents within three months from today, be it in lump sum or in instalments. Upon making the full payment of this amount, the Company would be entitled to take possession of its 50% share in the building, in keeping with the terms of the JDA with regard to the apportionment and sharing of the built-up areas and the common areas, apart from the share in the land itself. The parties would then be at liberty to deal with and enjoy their respective shares in the building. This arrangement, in our considered opinion, would bring the curtains down and end this litigation while doing justice to both parties, who would otherwise be required to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation, involving more time and money. 63. To conclude, the questions framed for consideration in these appeals are answered as under: (i) What is the effect of undue and unexplained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award upon its validity? - Delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by itself, is not sufficient to set aside that award. ....