TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (8) TMI 325
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....(NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is a Cooperative Bank engaged in banking activities. Complainant advanced a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the accused on 29.05.2014. The accused defaulted on the repayment of the loan, and issued a cheque of Rs. 60,000/- to discharge his legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque to its bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement "funds insufficient". The notice was served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined K.C. Sharma (CW1) to prove its case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had taken a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- from the complainant and he had issued a cheque. However, he claimed that he....
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....s filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant misused the blank cheque issued by the accused. The amount of Rs. 2,30,662/- was outstanding as per the statement of account (Ex-CW1/L). A cheque of Rs. 60,000/- was not issued in discharge of the legal liability. The bank had not taken any action against the surety. Complainant misused the security cheque; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Ms. Meenakshi Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. 10. Mr. Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statement of account (Ex-CW1/L) shows that an amount of Rs. 2,30,662/- was due, and the cheque of Rs. 60,000/- was not issued for discharging of the legal liability. The cheque was not dishonoured with an endorsement "funds insufficient". The loan account number mentioned in the notice (Ex-CW1/H) was wrong. The l....
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....bject of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no co....
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....82 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient ....
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.... a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls withi....
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....at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but it is an opinion formed prima facie." 17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the ....
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....rate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial disc....
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....n held as under: "The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when, upon the material before it, the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted " 9. S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 20. Similar is the judgment in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa 2019 (5) SCC 418, wherein it was held: "26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge o....
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....inant was paid. 9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a leg....
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....sed, negotiated or transferred for consideration." 14. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 516-17, para 9) "9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The trial court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW 1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld [Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan v. K. Bhaskaran, Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1995, order dated 23-10- 1998 (Ker)] by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused....
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....sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs 4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs 4,50,000 being admitted in the year 2010, and further payment of the loan of Rs 50,000 with regard to which Complaint No. 119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, a copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there was a burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made a payment of Rs 18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the financial capacity to pay Rs 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts." 16. In that light, it is contended that the very materials produced by the appellant and the answers relating to lack of knowledge of property details by PW 1 in his cross- examination would indicate that the transaction is doubtful, and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for the responde....
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....o discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist..." 25. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131, wherein it was observed: "As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or oth....
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....was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, the mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption. 37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for the discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further. 38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: "The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invok....
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.... accused did not appear in the witness box to support his version that he had issued a security cheque in favour of the complainant. He relied upon his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC to establish this fact. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 700: "20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the ....
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....e view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is for "discharge of debt or liability" depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise. 11. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word "security" is used in clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being used towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability. 12. Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under Section 138, which arises on account ....
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....ed or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I.. Act would flow. 18. When a cheque is issued and is treated as 'security' towards repayment of an amount with a time period being stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such cheque which is issued as 'security cannot be presented prior to the loan or the instalment maturing for repayment towards which such cheque is issued as security. Further, the borrower would have the option of repaying the loan amount or such financial liability ....
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.... payments made by him, and his plea was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 37. K.C. Sharma (CW1) admitted in his cross-examination that two guarantors were taken from the accused. It was submitted that the bank had not proceeded against the guarantor and only proceeded against the petitioner, which is impermissible. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd., (2025) 1 SCC 456: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1767 that the liability of the guarantor and the principal is co- extensive and the creditor can sue both or either of them. It was observed at page 471: "Liability of guarantor/surety 16. As far as the guarantee is concerned, the law is very well-settled. The liability of the surety and the principal debtor is coextensive. The creditor has remedies available to recover the amount payable by the principal borrower by proceeding against both or any of them. The creditor can proceed against the guarantor first without exhausting its remedies against the principal borrower." 38. Therefore, it was not necessary to take action against the guarantor and the....
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.... was not received by him. It was observed: "It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act . In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran's case (supra), if the giving of....