TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2025 (7) TMI 405
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....Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, the "NI Act"). It was asserted that the complainant No.2 is the sole proprietor of the complainant No.1 and is engaged in the business of trading in junk. The accused is running a business of the sale of Kariyana Products, daily confectionery items, etc. He used to sell scrap to the complainant, and the complainant used to pay the amount in advance. The complainant was maintaining an open and running account in the name of the accused, and as per the Books of Account, a sum of Rs.28,400/- was payable by the accused to the complainant. The complainant contacted the accused in September 2007 and asked him to pay the amount. The accused issued a cheque for Rs. 15,000/- drawn on Kangra Central Cooperative Bank in discharge of his legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque before his Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement 'payment stopped by the drawer'. The complainant contacted the accused and requested him to pay the amount. The accused requested the complainant to present the cheque again. The complainant presented the cheque, and it was dishonoured w....
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.... (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. The burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption contained in Section 118 (a) and Section 139 of the NI Act. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement 'insufficient funds'. The notice was served upon the accused, and the accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand; hence, he was rightly convicted. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not excessive, and no interference was required with the order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The learned Courts below wrongly concluded that the cheque was dishonoured with the remarks 'insufficient funds' when the cheque was dishonoured with the remarks 'stopped paymen....
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....evision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed : "13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any ....
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....e to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169: "12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclus....
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....atray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205 : "16. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re- analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the fi....
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....is answered accordingly. The appeals shall now be listed before the regular Bench for hearing and disposal in light of the observations made above." 19. This position was reiterated in Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 2 SCC 424, and it was held that the complainant could present the cheque repeatedly and issue the notices successively. It was observed: "8. In the present case, the complainant had not filed the complaint on the dishonour of the cheque in the first instance but presented the said cheque again for encashment. This right of the complainant in presenting the same very cheque for the second time is available to him under the aforesaid provision." 20. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, wherein it was observed at page 203: "7. Having regard to the object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment of the cheque amount is not impermissible simply because no statutory notice had been issued after the first default and no proceeding for prosecution had been initiate....
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....as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability." 24. This position was reiterated in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 wherein it was held at page 289: "14. Once the 2nd appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the deed, the trial court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial court fell into error when it called upon the respondent complainant to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such an approach of the trial court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law." 25. Similar is the judgment in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, wherein it was observed: - "7.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that the issuance of a cheque by the accused an....
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.... second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence." 26. The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde v. Sripad, (2022) 1 SCC 742: (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 512: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 788 as under at page 747: "12. From the facts arising in this c....
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.... interested testimony of DW 1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld [Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan v. K. Bhaskaran, Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1995, order dated 23- 10-1998 (Ker)] by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect." 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudi basappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 25-26) "25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in the following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption, and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumptio....
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....of knowledge of property details by PW 1 in his cross-examination would indicate that the transaction is doubtful, and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for the respondent to tender rebuttal evidence, but the case put forth would be sufficient to indicate that the respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption. 17. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court, need no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. In Basalingappav. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption, the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the transaction between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in view the various transactions and extent of amount involved. However, the legal position relating to the presum....
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....y that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary." 29. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275, wherein it was observed at page 161: 33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that "unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability". It will be seen that the "presumed fact" directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both the presumptions under Section ....
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....g further. 38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: "The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule'." 39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of "preponderance of probabilities", similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]] 30. In the present case, the accused has not provided any explanation ....
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....esumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. 34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. 35. It is not the case that the respondent accused him of either signing the cheque or parted with it under any threat or coercion. Nor is it the case that the respondent accused that the unfilled signed cheque had been stolen. The existence of a fiduciary relationship between the payee of a cheque and its drawer would not disentitle the payee to the benefit of the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion. The second question is also answe....
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....ormer law and subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails." 36. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 2016(10) SCC 458 that issuing a cheque toward security will also attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: - "10. We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression "for the discharge of any debt or other liability" occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is for "discharge of debt or liability" depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise. 11. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word "security" is used in c....
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....he views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the underlying principle as can be discerned from the discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this Court." (Emphasis supplied) 37. This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732, and it was held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed: "17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the state of being safe, and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement betw....
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....e record, learned Courts below erred in holding that the existence of legal liability was proved on record. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Versus State of U.P, 2025 SCC Online SC 706 that the complainant is not to prove the advancement of the loan because it is a matter of presumption. It was observed: 22. The High Court while allowing the criminal revision has primarily proceeded on the presumption that it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal of the said amount which was given to the accused and also the date and time of the payment made to the accused, including the date and time of receiving of the cheque, which has not been done in the present case. Pausing here, such presumption on the complainant, by the High Court, appears to be erroneous. The onus is not on the complainant at the threshold to prove his capacity/financial wherewithal to make the payment in discharge of which the cheque is alleged to have been issued in his favour. Only if an objection is raise....
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.... been led to show that the respondent lacked capacity to provide the amount(s) in question. In this regard, we may make profitable reference to the decision in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735 : ' 10. The trial court and the first appellate court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent, the courts in our view were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable, which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to him to establish the very same aspect by poin....
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....96) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] and K.K. Sidharthan v. T.P. Praveena Chandran [(1996) 6 SCC 369: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1340], it was contended by the drawer of the cheque that if the payment was stopped by the drawer, the dishonour of the cheque could not constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act. That contention was specifically rejected by this Court. Not only that, the decision in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] to the extent the same held that dishonour of the cheque by the bank after the drawer had issued a notice to the holder not to present the same would not constitute an offence, was overruled. This Court observed: (Modi Cements Ltd. case [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252], SCC pp. 257-58, paras 18 & 20) "18. The aforesaid propositions in both these reported judgments, in our considered view, with great respect, are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and 139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it will make Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the drawer can ....
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....e holder for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, this is a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show that the 'stop-payment' instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his account there were sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of other valid reasons, including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of a cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus, a court cannot quash a complaint on this ground." 14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza [(2003) 3 SCC 232: 2003 SCC (Cri) 603: 2003 Cri LJ 1723] where this Court held that "stop-payment instructions" and consequent dishonour of a post-dated cheque attract the provision of Section 138. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 232g-233c) "Chapter XVII, containing Sections 13....
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.... an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 44. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The legislature had introduced the offence of dishonour of cheques to instil confidence in the public about the transactions carried out with cheques. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of Section 138 of the NI Act is a deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203 : "6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same." 45. It was submitted that the sentence of six months is excessive because the amount of the cheque was only Rs.1....
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....eme Court in K.A. Abbas v. Sabu Joseph, (2010) 6 SCC 230: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 744: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 127: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 612, that the Courts can impose a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of compensation. It was observed at page 237: "20. Moving over to the question, whether a default sentence can be imposed on default of payment of compensation, this Court in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984: AIR 1988 SC 2127] and in Balraj v. State of U.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 29: 1994 SCC (Cri) 823: AIR 1995 SC 1935], has held that it was open to all the courts in India to impose a sentence on default of payment of compensation under sub-section (3) of Section 357. In Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984: AIR 1988 SC 2127], this Court has noticed certain factors which are required to be taken into consideration while passing an order under the section: (SCC p. 558, para 11) "11. The payment by way of compensation must, however, be reasonable. What is reasonable may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of the cr....
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....ed to pay on equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending on the acts of each accused. A reasonable period for payment of compensation, if necessary, by instalments, may also be given. The court may enforce the order by imposing a sentence in default.' (emphasis in original) *** 10. That apart, Section 431 of the Code has only prescribed that any money (other than fine) payable by an order made under the Code shall be recoverable 'as if it were a fine'. Two modes of recovery of the fine have been indicated in Section 421(1) of the Code. The proviso to the sub-section says that if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no court shall issue such warrant for the levy of the amount." The Court further held: (Jagdeeshan case [(2002) 2 SCC 420: 2002 SCC (Cri) 344], SCC p. 425, para 11) "11. When this Court pronounced in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984: AIR 1988 SC 2127] that a court may enforce an order to pay compensation 'by....
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....tions made by this Court in Hari Singh case [(1988) 4 SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984 : AIR 1988 SC 2127] are as important today as they were when they were made and if, as submitted by Dr. Pillay, recourse can only be had to Section 421 CrPC for enforcing the same, the very object of sub-section (3) of Section 357 would be frustrated and the relief contemplated therein would be rendered somewhat illusory." 24. In Shantilal v. State of M.P. [(2007) 11 SCC 243: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 1], it is stated that the sentence of imprisonment for default in payment of a fine or compensation is different from a normal sentence of imprisonment. The Court also delved into the factors to be taken into consideration while passing an order under Section 357(3) CrPC. This Court stated: (SCC pp. 255-56, para 31) "31. ... The term of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine is not a sentence. It is a penalty which a person incurs on account of non-payment of a fine. The sentence is something which an offender must undergo unless it is set aside or remitted in part or in whole, either in appeal or in revision or other appropriate judicial proceedings, or 'otherwise'. A term of imprisonme....
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....interests of the victims in the criminal justice system. Sometimes the situation becomes such that there is no purpose served by keeping a person behind bars. Instead, directing the accused to pay an amount of compensation to the victim or affected party can ensure the delivery of total justice. Therefore, this grant of compensation is sometimes in lieu of sending a person behind bars or in addition to a very light sentence of imprisonment. Hence, in default of payment of this compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not imposing a sentence of imprisonment would mean allowing the accused to get away without paying the compensation, and imposing another fine would be impractical, as it would mean imposing a fine upon another fine and therefore would not ensure proper enforcement of the order of compensation. While passing an order under Section 357(3), it is imperative for the courts to look at the ability and the capacity of the accused to pay the same amount as has been laid down by the cases above; otherwise, the very purpose of granting an order of compensation would stand defeated. 49. This position was reiterated in R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721: (2012....