Cheque dishonour liability: successive presentation is valid, presumptions stand unless rebutted, and revision will not disturb sentence lightly.

Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, repeated presentation of the same cheque and issuance of a later notice are permissible, and a prosecution remains maintainable if the Section 138 requirements are met. Admitted issuance and signature on the cheque raise presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt or liability, and those presumptions are not displaced merely by a security-cheque plea or by the complainant filling in the particulars without supporting evidence. Revisional interference with conviction, compensation and default sentence is limited to patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error; the sentence and compensation were therefore left undisturbed.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether successive presentation of a cheque and issuance of notice after an earlier dishonour are permissible under the Negotiable Instruments Act; (ii) whether the statutory presumptions under Section 118(a) and Section 139 stood rebutted by the defence that the cheque was a security cheque and the amount was filled by the complainant; and (iii) whether the sentence of imprisonment, compensation and default sentence called for interference in revision.

Issue (i): whether successive presentation of a cheque and issuance of notice after an earlier dishonour are permissible under the Negotiable Instruments Act

Analysis: The legal position is that the Act does not bar repeated presentation of the cheque or successive notices. A prosecution based on a later dishonour remains maintainable so long as the requirements of Section 138 are satisfied. Dishonour on the ground of stop-payment also attracts the penal provision, and the drawer cannot avoid liability merely because an earlier presentation had been followed by notice.

Conclusion: The successive presentation and the later notice were valid, and the complaint was not barred on that ground.

Issue (ii): whether the statutory presumptions under Section 118(a) and Section 139 stood rebutted by the defence that the cheque was a security cheque and the amount was filled by the complainant

Analysis: Once issuance and signature on the cheque are admitted, a presumption arises that the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The burden shifts to the accused to rebut that presumption by a probable defence. Mere denial, a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the plea that the cheque was given as security is not enough without evidence. Filling in particulars by someone other than the drawer does not invalidate the cheque, and even a security cheque may attract Section 138 when liability exists on the date of presentation.

Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted, and the conviction under Section 138 was sustained.

Issue (iii): whether the sentence of imprisonment, compensation and default sentence called for interference in revision

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is narrow and does not permit reappreciation of evidence in the absence of perversity or jurisdictional error. The sentence of six months' simple imprisonment was treated as not excessive in view of the object of the provision. Compensation under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is compensatory as well as restitutive, and a default sentence is legally permissible to secure compliance.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the sentence, compensation or default sentence.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were upheld in revision, and the petitioner obtained no relief.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, admitted issuance and signature on the cheque trigger a rebuttable presumption of legally enforceable liability, successive presentation and notice are permissible, and the accused must rebut the presumption by evidence on a preponderance of probabilities; revisional interference is limited to patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error.

---