TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2024 (6) TMI 496
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....aid tax appeal, as such it was dismissed for default and when the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of said Tax Appeal No. 19 of 2016, which stood dismissed for default for non-compliance of peremptory order dated 14.07.2017 passed in CMP No. 54 of 2017, the petitioner preferred the present Civil Misc. Petition being CMP No. 83 of 2020. 4. It has further been submitted so far delay in preferring CMP No. 83 of 2020 is concerned, upon receipt of memo in CMP No. 54 of 2017, the relevant documents along with case file was forwarded to the legal Section of Company for taking decision regarding further recourse available to the petitioner. Thereafter, the legal section of the petitioner company contacted its empaneled lawyer for taking their advice in the present matter. 5. It has been submitted that the petitioner being a Public Sector Undertaking is bound to follow its internal procedure which involves movement of files in different section as well as concurrence at different levels, hence some delay has caused. Furthermore, the petitioner has good grounds for the present appeal, as such the instant Interlocution Application may be allowed after condoning the delay. 6. Lea....
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....t paragraph-6 as under "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 12. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at paragraph-17, it has been held that "Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant." 13. In the....
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....held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder: "1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020. 2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11- 2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., [2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department. 3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary ....
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.... naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appell....
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....g his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157]. 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause" 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case a....
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....ation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing....
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....lanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect ....
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....and since petitioner being a Public Sector Undertaking is bound to follow its internal procedure which involves movement of files in different section as well as concurrence at different levels, hence some delay has caused. 25. This Court, taking into consideration the reason as assigned by learned counsel for the petitioner and judgments referred hereinabove, is of the view that the explanation which has been furnished by the petitioner in the delay condonation application, cannot be said to be a sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay. 26. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order in L.P.A. No. 86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay condonation application since the appeal was filed after delay of about 687 days without any sufficient cause to condone the delay 27. The reference of another case is required to be made herein of an order passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568 days was under consideration. 28. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the reason furnished by the State appellants therein to be sufficient cause on the ground of movement of file from....