TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (2) TMI 1404
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....ned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, against the petitioner and others, for the following reliefs: (1) To pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- each, towards medical expenses and clothing, under Section 20(1)(d) of the Act, (2) To pay Rs. 20,00,000/- for educational expenses, under Section 20(2) of the Act, which includes Rs. 5,00,000/- already spent by the Wife, (3) To pay Rs. 10,00,000/- under Section 20 of the Act, (4) For an order to protect the right to reside in the share household, under Section 17 of the Act, (5) For protection order, under Section 17(e) of the Act, not to alienate or encumber the property. 2. Before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, Wife has contended that marriage between herself and the petitioner was solemnized on 22.08.1993. Son was born on 13.03.1995. At the time of filing of DVA No. 34 of 2010, Son was in Standard 11th in Vithya Vikash School, Thiruchengode. From 9th Standard, Wife was incurring educational expenses. At the time of marriage, the petitioner, his parents, brother and sister, demanded 60 sovereigns of gold jewels and Rs. 1,00,000/- Cash, as dowry. It was agreed....
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.... made for reunion. With great difficulty, the said amount was arranged and given to the petitioner. With that amount, he put up first floor, in the building at Edayarpalayam. While Wife and Son continued to live in the first floor, Husband stayed at Trichy. Now and then, he visited them at Coimbatore. Without any reason, the petitioner used harsh words against his Wife. Her parents were also not spared. Though the respondent-Wife initially was not able to understand the behavior of Husband gradually, from experience, she found that the activities of her Husband, such as, walk, speech, conduct, showed increase in feminine activities. He was more interested in being like a girl and not showing any interest in consortium. Gradually, Wife came to understand the actual reason, for his indifferent attitude and behavior, as to why, he had avoided consortium and others have supported him. Husband and in-laws threatened her that if she does not seek for divorce, on her own accord, properties, which stood in the name of the petitioner, would be settled, in favour of others, and without a penny, Wife and Son, would have to suffer. Considering dignity of the family and also future of the Son, ....
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....e, at her instance, and one such alleged transfer was made after the complaint given to Thudiyalur Police Station. There are many properties in the name of the Husband. Thus, citing various instances, Wife has alleged domestic violence, against the Husband and in-laws and prayed for the reliefs, stated supra, in the application filed under Section 12 of the Act, numbered as D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore. 11. Pending disposal of D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, respondents have filed C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, under Section 23(1) of the Act, praying for an interim maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- each, and a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- towards educational expenses. Respondents have further contended that till the date of filing of the Miscellaneous Petition No. 2112 of 2012, on the advice of his relatives, petitioner has paid only the 1st term fees for Standard 8th. Despite her request, the petitioner refused to bear the educational expenses. In the School, he shouted at the Wife, threatened her to vacate the shared household. Subsequently, a Police Complaint was lodged and on the advice....
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.... respondent is directed to advance an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the 2nd petitioner towards his educational expense and to get admission in the Engineering College. Compliance report and for filing counter in other respect call on 25.06.2013." 14. From the material on record, it could be seen that on 25.06.2012, the Husband was not present and no counter affidavit has been filed. Subsequently, a counter affidavit is stated to have been filed in the main application in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 on 08.03.2012. The learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, directed the petitioner-Husband to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- towards the educational expenses. 15. Being aggrieved by the interim directions to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, to the Son, towards the educational expenses, for admission in the Engineering College, the petitioner has filed an appeal, in Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 2012, on the file of the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore. After hearing both the parties, vide judgment, dated 21.08.2012, the appellate Court has ordered as follows: "In the result, the 1st respondent is required to furnish the proof of admission in VLB College or any....
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....18. He further submitted that the very purpose of considering the grant of interim ex-parte order, is to mitigate the circumstances, warranting any protection or other orders, to be considered, under Sections 18 to 23 of the Act, and when the respondents have not chosen to seek for any interim ex-parte order, in 2010, when they filed DVA. No. 34 of 2010, under Section 12 of the Act, directions to pay lumpsum payment of 50% of the capitation fees, upon filing the proof of fees structure, before the trial Court and also to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the son, are wholly untenable and erroneous. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner-Husband, lumpsum payment can be ordered only under Section 12 of the Act. 19. It is his further contention that the interim order granted in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012, dated 15.06.2012, would have the effect of granting the main relief, sought for, under Section 12 of the Act. He further submitted that it is the Wife, who had caused all the matrimonial problems. The petitioner had incurred educational expenses for the Son and that the Wife was also collecting rent from the dwelling place. Besides, she was also earni....
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....he statute contemplates a procedure to be done in a particular manner, the same ought to have been followed. In the absence of an affidavit, petition in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012, ought to have been rejected. It is also his submission that when the petitioner has filed a counter affidavit to D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012, as early as on 08.03.2012, the learned Judicial Magistrate could have very well taken D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, for final disposal, instead of entertaining C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, and passing orders thereon. For the reasons, stated supra, he prayed to set aside the impugned order. 24. Responding to the submissions and referring to the definitions, "Domestic Violence", "Monetary Relief, "Economic Abuse", as defined under Sections 2(g) and (k) and 3(d)(iv), respectively and Sections 12, 18, 19, 22 and 23 and also explaining the scope of the Protection of Women from Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, need to pass interim orders, directing monetary reliefs, to meet the expenses incurred, loss suffered, as a result of domestic violence and further contending that such monetary relief can be claimed at any stag....
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.... "Economic Abuse" under Section 3(d)(iv) and the power of the learned Judicial Magistrate, under Section 23, learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the learned Judicial Magistrate is empowered to pass suitable ex parte interim order, as he deems, just and proper, depending upon the necessity, and that there is no embargo to pass a direction, to pay the lumpsum amount to meet the educational expenses. He also invited the attention of this Court to the expression, "lumpsum payment" in Section 20(2) of the Act. 30. As regards filing of an affidavit, referring to Section 28(2) of the Act, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that statute empowers the Court to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under sub-Section (2) of Section 23. He also submitted that the plea of not filing an affidavit, has not been specifically raised in the memorandum of grounds of revision and therefore, prayed to reject the same. 31. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, at the time of filing C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, a prayer to treat the averments in DVA. No. 34 of 2010, as part and parcel of the Miscellaneous Petition ....
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.... nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. 37. Monetary relief is defined under Section 2(k), which means, the compensation which the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence. 38. Section 3(d)(iv) of the Act, defines, "economic abuse", as follows: "(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance; (b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the ag....
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....of its first hearing." 40. Section 17 deals with the right to reside in a shared household, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 41. Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, deal with protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders and compensation orders, respectively and the said sections are extracted hereunder: "18. Protection Orders: The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from- (a) committing any act of domestic violence; (b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence; (c....
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....The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties. (7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the protection order. (8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridha....
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.... or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent: Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. 22. Compensation orders: In addition to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent." 42. As per Section 23 of the Act, the Magistrate has got powers to grant interim ex parte orders, as he deems just and proper, if he is satisfied that the application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order, on the basis of an affidavit in s....
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............ since......... to.............. 5. That the details provided in the present application for the grant of relief under section (s).........have been entered into by me/at my instructions. 6. That the contents of the application have been read over, explained to me in English/Hindi/any other local language (Please specify............................) 7. That the contents to the said application may be read as part of this, affidavit and are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. 8. That the applicant apprehends repetition of the acts of domestic violence by the Respondent(s) against which relief is sought in the accompanying application. 9. That the Respondent has threatened the Applicant that ............................................ ...................................................... 10. That the reliefs claimed in the accompanying application are urgent in as much as the applicant would face great financial hardship and would be forced to live under threat of repetition/escalation of acts of domestic violence complained of in the accompanying application by the Respondent(s) if the said reliefs are not gran....
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....of law, to be followed in judicial proceedings. But there is no hard and fast rule that in given circumstances, no interim order, which has the effect of granting the main relief, cannot be granted at all. For instance, in a suit for injunction, not to demolish a building or not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment, removal of an alleged encroachment, without due process of law and in such other cases, where protective interim orders are prayed for, Courts cannot simply postpone the hearing of the interim applications, till the disposal of the suits and allow demolition of the building or interference with possessory rights, and depending upon the nature of relief, sought for, interim orders can be granted. The above instances are only illustrative. In any event, interim orders granted in the proceedings are subject to the outcome of the trial. Even the interim order of injunction granted can be vacated at the time of final disposal of the proceedings. For the abovesaid reasons, both the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not lend any support to the facts of this case. 47. In Rajesh Kurre v. Safurabai AIR 2009 (NOC) 813 (CHH.) : 2009 (1....
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....to the persons aggrieved of domestic violence and it observed as follows: "Section 26 of the Act says that relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in addition to and along with any other relief which the aggrieved person may seek in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or a criminal court. Relief of maintenance to Wife and children is available to the effected party under his entitlement and liability of the person against whom relief is claimed under Section 125 of the Code, when such person is unable to maintain herself and the person against whom relief is claimed is under obligation to maintain and having sufficient means to maintain, but fails to maintain the applicants. But in case of domestic violence, the Court is empowered to grant such relief if the person is aggrieved as a result of the domestic violence and may grant monetary relief in terms of maintenance which would be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved party is accustomed and also empowered to grant lump sum or monthly maintenance or to direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent to directly....
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....of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Family Courts Act, 1984 and any other Act, relating to award of maintenance. 50. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat AIR 1986 SC 984 : (1985) 4 SCC 337 : LNIND 1985 SC 328 : (1986) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 12, the question considered by the Apex Court, was whether a magistrate before whom an application is made under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can pass an interim order directing the person against whom the application is made under that section to pay reasonable maintenance to the applicant concerned pending disposal of the application. In the abovesaid judgment, Wife, filed an application under Section 125 of the Code, for maintenance. Pending disposal of the main application, she filed an interim application, for a direction to the Husband to pay some reasonable amount, by way of maintenance. The learned Judicial Magistrate, declined to make an interim order, on the grounds that there was no express provision in the Code, enabling the Magistrate to pass such an order. Being aggrieved by the same, Wife filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. While answering the issue, in favour of the Wife, the Supreme Court, held a....
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....half of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the person against whom such an order is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a magistrate under section 125 of the Code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way o....
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....the respondents that there is no specific ground in the present Memorandum of Grounds of revision filed by the husband. On the aspect, as to whether, any separate application is required for appropriate orders, under Section 23 of the Act, for granting interim orders, in P. Chandrasekara Pillai v. Valsala Chandran 2007 Crl.L.J. 2328 : LNIND 2007 KER 153, at Paragraph 11, the Kerala High Court, held as follows: "11. I am unable to understand the provisions of Section 23 as compulsorily insisting on any separate application for interim order under Section 23. An application referred to in Section 23(2) is obviously an application under Section 12 claiming relief under Sections 18 to 22. It is impossible to understand the expression "an application" in Section 23(2) as importing a requirement that a separate application must be filed to claim the relief of an interim order under Section 23. Doubts, if any, on this aspect pale into insignificance when we consider that Section 23 only insists on an affidavit in such form as may be prescribed to justify the claim for an interim order and ad interim order under Section 23. Rules prescribe the form of affidavit also. From the plai....
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....a separate application for grant of interim relief under section 23 of the said Act. However, while considering the question of granting the ex-parte ad-interim or interim relief the learned Magistrate will have to consider the nature of the reliefs sought in the main application under section 12(1) of the said Act in as much as an interim relief under section 23 of the said Act can be granted in aid of the final relief sought in the main application. On the basis of an affidavit in Form III prescribed by the Rules, in a given case, learned magistrate can grant ex-parte ad-interim relief. However, before granting an interim relief, an opportunity of being heard has to be afforded to the respondent. The respondent can always file a reply to the affidavit." 55. "Affidavit" in Latin "Affidare" means to pledge one's faith and a written statement sworn before a person having authority to administer an oath. 56. As per Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, "Affidavit" is a voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declaration before an officer author zed to administer oaths of great deal of evidence is submitted by affidavit. 57. "Affidavit" is defin....
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....is morally right and fair and sometimes that which is right and fair according to positive law. It can-notes reasonableness and something conforming to rectitude and justice, something equitable and fair. (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 50, p. 1100). Words and Phrases, West Publishing Co, Vol. 23, p. 438, the true meaning of the word 'just' states in these terms: 'the word 'just' is derived from the Lain 'Justus' which is from the Latin jus, which means a right and more technically, a legal right-a law. Thus 'jus dicere' was to pronounce the judgment to give the legal decision. The word 'just' is defined by the Century Dictionary as 'right in law or ethics', and in Standard Dictionary as 'conforming to the requirements of right or of positive law', and in Anderson's Law Dictionary as 'probable, reasonable'. Kinneys's Law Dictionary defines the word 'just' as 'fair, adequate, probable, reasonable', and justa causa as 'a just cause; lawful ground.' (Bergman v. Kress 81 NYS 1072 (1073), 83 App. Div. 1). Proper. Natural; suitably; correct; just; right; becoming. The word is also us....
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....red household, residence order could be passed. 64. In a given case, at the time of filing of application, under Section 12 of the Act, the aggrieved person may reside in the shared household. There would not be any apprehension of sending her out of the shared household. Lateron, if the conduct of the respondents, give rise to a reasonable likelihood or genuine apprehension in the mind of the aggrieved person of restricting or prohibiting her from residing at the shared household, and at that stage, she may prefer to seek for an interim ex-parte order, under Section 23 of the Act. 65. Likewise, at the time of filing of the application, under Section 12 of the Act, the aggrieved person or the child may be hale and healthy and may not require any medical expenses. After the filing of application under Section 12, if anyone of them falls sick or if there is any accident, wife or the child, may require medical expenses and it cannot be said that she has to wait till the fins 1 disposal of the application, filed under Section 12 of the Act. 66. In yet another instance, Wife may have some earnings, at the time of filing of the petition, under Section 12 of the Act, which may or....
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....as the case may be, is sought for, by way of an interim order, under Section 23 of the Act and if the Court has to decline such prayers, holding that it can be granted only at the time of final disposal of the application filed under Section 12 of the Act, then the aggrieved person and her child/children, would be left without any financial support and there would be a deprivation of her right to live with dignity and that would amount to violation of human rights. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to reproduce the words of the Apex Court in Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (supra), as follows: In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim 'ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which t....
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....147, it is held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice." (iii) In Samrao v. District Magistrate, Thana AIR 1952 SC 324, the Apex Court held that, "It is the duty of the Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act, when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act, must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided." (iv) In Poppatlal S....
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....und those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declare the intention of the Legislature. It is equally well settled principle of construction that where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system." (ix) In State of W.B. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 : LNIND 1962 SC 438, the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. (x) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Mangal Sen Shyamlal AIR 1975 SC 1106 : (1975) 4 SCC 35, the Apex Court held that, "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, "ut res magis valiat quam pereat", lest the in....
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....e the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, a Division Bench of this Court observed: 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It i....
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....tal Association, Kerala v. Union of India 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that, "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be add....
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....t the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors." (xxiii) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh AIR 2005 SC 294 : (2005) 10 SCC 437 : LNIND 2004 SC 1208, the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as ....
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....) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 3517 : (2006) 2 SCC 670 LNIND 2006 SC 92, the Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous." (xxv) In A.N. Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh AIR 2006 SC 2677 : (2006) 5 SCC 745 : LNIND 2006 SC 464, the Apex Court held that, "It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the ....
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....provision of law, when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or susceptible of meanings more than one. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubtful interpretation, the Supreme Court cannot, by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand the meaning of an expression employed by the legislature and therein include such category of persons as the legislature has not chosen to do." (xxx) In Visitor Amu v. K.S. Misra (2007) 8 SCC 594 : LNIND 2007 SC 1039, the Supreme Court held that, "It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction....
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....it, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature." (xxxiv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653 : LNIND 2010 SC 277 : (2010) 2 MLJ (Crl.) 779, the Supreme Court held that, "179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 553. 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the sam....
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.... intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be." (xxxvii) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 573 : (2011) 9 SCC 354 : LNIND 2011 SC 788, the Supreme Court held that, "55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the du....
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.... is used, generally the definition is exhaustive. (iii) In the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610, it was observed that "it is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense" (iv) In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad AIR 1972 SC 168 : (1971) 3 SCC 550 : LNIND 1971 SC 375 : (1973) 1 MLJ 4, at Paragraph 4, the Supreme Court, considered as to how, the word "include" in the statute, should be interpreted. It is held that the word "includes" is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute." When it is so used, these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. (v) In P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395 : LNIND 1995 SC 418, the Apex Court observed that: "It has been urged that in Rule 2(b) the expression "means and includes" has been us....
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....stive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other." (vii) In Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat AIR 2008 SC 1246 : (2008) 5 SCC 449 : LNIND 2008 SC 254 : (2008) 2 MLJ 1043, the Apex Court has observed that in such a case, the use of word 'includes' indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the word used in the Statute. (viii) In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. v. Ashok Iron Works (P) Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 1905 : (2009) 3 SCC 240 : LNIND 2009 SC 270 : (2009) 3 MLJ 504, at Paragraphs 16 and 17, held as follows: "16. Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (supra) and few other decisions came up for consideration in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and this Court summarized the legal position that inclusive definition by the Legislature is used; (one) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it; (two) to include meaning about which there might be some dispute; (three) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain similar fea....
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.... v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2957 : (2000) 7 SCC 357 : (2001) 1 MLJ 100, in regard to purposive interpretation, the Supreme Court extracted, what Justice Frankfurter observed, which is as follows: "Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose ("Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes) 47 Columbia LR 527 at 538) (1947)." (iii) In Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh AIR 2004 SC 2303 : (2004) 6 SCC 626 : LNIND 2004 SC 569, the Supreme Court, dealt with, as to how, an act should be interpreted, to advert to the purpose, for which, it is enacted. At Paragraphs 55 to 57 and 64 to 67, the Supreme Court, held as follows: "55. It is trite that for the purpose of interpretation a statute is to be read in its entirety and all efforts must be made to give effect to the statutory scheme. (See High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others ....
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....more effective and workable must be adopted and to see if it is possible to be done without doing too much violence of the language used. 66. Every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 67. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurdity or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou 1966 1 QB 878 "is not to be imputed to a statute if there some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result: we must "do some violence to the words "and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction." (iv) In Padma Ben Banushali v. Yogendra Rathore AIR 2006 SC 2167 : (2006) 12 SCC 138 : LNIND 2006 SC 298 : (2006) 3 MLJ 57, at Paragraphs 10 and 11, the Supreme Court held as follows: "10. In Canada ....
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....ocieties v. T.A. Kuttappan (2000) 6 SCC 127, Associated Timber Industries v. Central Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 73, Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank (2000) 4 SCC 406, K. Duraiswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 2 SCC 538, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424, Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu AIR 1979 SC 193, Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883 and Indian Handicrafts v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 589, this court applied the principle of purposive construction. 30. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (supra) this Court observed: "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context, They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute i....
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....her. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We took at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences ". A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of those who make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the L....
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....ults in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that, "legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose"." (vi) In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and Another, 2007 (14) SCALE 556 : AIR 2008 SC 876 : (2008) 3 SCC 279 : LNIND 2007 SC 1487, the Supreme, at Paragraph 51, held as follows: "51. Barak in his exhaustive work on 'Purposive Construction' explains various meanings attributed to the term "purpose". It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak's words: 15. "Hart and Sachs also appear to treat "purpose" as a subjective concept. I say "appear" because, ....
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....g an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. 79. Monetary relief that can be granted, under Section 20 of the Act, should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. Reverting to the case on hand, at the time of filing of an application, under Section 12 of the Act, Son was studying in Standard 11th in Vithya Vikash School, Thiruchengode. Due to deprivation of economic and financial resources, the aggrieved person, Wife, not in a position to meet the expenses, has sought for suitable orders. For continuation of the child's education, certainly there is a necessity to seek for suitable orders, under Section 23 of the Act. 80. Child is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, as any person, below the age of eighteen years and includes any adopted, step or foster child. One of the contentions raised is that son has attained majority and therefore, cannot be any order of maintenance. 81. Obligations of the parents to provide basic amenities, health and education, cannot be said to be....
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....widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a woman is subjected to cruelty by her Husband or its relatives, it is an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The Civil law does not however address this phenomenon in its entirety. 3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from bring victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society. 4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following: (i) It covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a shared household and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption. In addition, relationships with family members living together as a joint family are also included. Even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single women, or living with abuser are entitled to legal protection under the proposed legislatio....
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....tion. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction." 86. In R.S. Pillai v. M.L. Peratchi 2000 (4) CTC 543 : LNIND 2000 MAD 657 : (2000) 3 MLJ 61, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, at Paragraphs 23 held as follows: "23. Before we take up such an exercise, the settled legal position in interpreting the statutes has to be borne in mind. It is settled law that the statute must be read as a whole and this principle equally applies to different parts of the same Section. The Balasinor Nagrik Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai, AIR 1987 SC 849. No provision in the statute and no word in the Section may be construed in isolation Syed Hasan Rasul Numa v. Union of India , AIR 1991 SC 711. Where the language of the provision is plain, clear and unambiguous, only the plain meaning of the prov....
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....can be taken into account if they provide good means for finding out the meaning of the offending provision, in case of vagueness or ambiguity when the language of provision is capable of giving more than one meaning but not in the case of use of any expression which is incapable being given any precise meaning. 90. In State of Maharashtra v. Marwagee F. Desai and Others AIR 2002 SC 456 : (2002) 2 SCC 318 : LNIND 2001 SC 2858, at para 11 the Supreme Court held that "true intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction, but that by itself cannot be termed to be and by itself cannot be interpreted. It is a useful guide but the interpretation and the intend shall have to be gathered form the entirety of the statute. 91. In Hari Singh Nalwa v. Kartar Singh Bhadana AIR 2001 P & H 86 : LNIND 2000 PNH 247, the Supreme Court at Paragraph 45, held that a Statute is an edict of the legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. A statute is to be construed accor....
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....nder Section 23 of the Act. As stated supra, Section 23 starts with the opening sentence, "In any proceeding before him, under this Act" which means that if the Magistrate is satisfied, he may grant an ex parte order, on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person, under Sections 18 to 22, against the respondent. 94. Though Mr. P. Raja, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, was filed in the year 2010 and when the same was pending for two years, application filed under Section 23(2) of the Act, for various reliefs, stated therein, in the year 2012, ought not to have been entertained and further submitted that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order lumpsum payment, this Court was not inclined to accept the said contentions, for the reason that deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources, to which, the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom, whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity, can always be considered and ordered, under Section 20 of the Act. 95. It is the case of the Wife that she had to quit h....
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.... welfare legislation. Let me consider some of the decisions, where the Supreme Court has explained, as to how, a beneficial legislation has to be interpreted. (i) In Jeewanlal Ltd. and Others v. Appellate Authority 1984 Ind. Law SC 198, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "In construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible is construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficient purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the tempta....
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....islation requires interpretation to advance social and economic justice and enforce the constitutional directives and not to deprive a person of his right to property. The statutory provisions should not be construed in favour of such deprivation. Interpretation of a beneficial legislation with a narrow pedantic approach is not justified. In case, there is any doubt, the court should interpret a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would be against the legislative intent. For the purpose of interpretation of statute, the Act is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying the principles of purposive construction. The Court must be strong against any construction which tends to reduce a statutes utility. The provisions of the statute must be construed so as to make it effective and operative and to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. The court has the duty to construe the statute to promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and should not efface its very purpose. (vide S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta and Others, AIR 1....
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....ans 'compensating or being compensated, thing given in recompense'. In legal sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. 103. When the Domestic Violence Act, | vests jurisdiction with the Court to award compensation, it has to be construed widely, enabling the Court to determine the compensation, for any damage or suffering by the aggrieved person, which in law, is otherwise included in the widening meaning of the word, "compensation". 104. Reading of the Act in entirety makes it clear that the legislature has enumerated certain contingencies and circumstances, in relation to domestic violence and empowered the Court to pass just and proper orders, to redress the grievance of the aggrieved person. From the reading of the Act, it is manifestly clear that the Domestic Violence Act, is independent of other laws. 105. It is a complete code in itself, dealing with the entire gamut of family relationship between Husband, Wife and children and the remedies available to an aggrieved person, on account of domestic violence. Chapter III deals powers and duties of Protections Of....
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....l facility. ... 9. Duties and functions of Protection Officers: (1) It shall be the duty of the Protection Officer- (a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under this Act; (b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed and to the service providers in that area; (c) to make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the Magistrate, if the aggrieved person so desires, claiming relief for issuance of a protection order; (d) to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and make available free of cost the prescribed form in which a complaint is to be made; (e) to maintain a list of all service providers providing legal aid or counselling, shelter homes and medical facilities in a local area within the jurisdiction of the Magistr....
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....o suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any service provider or any member of the service provider who is, or who is deemed to be, acting or purporting to act under this Act, for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in the exercise of powers or discharge or functions under this Act towards the prevention of the commission of domestic violence. 11. Duties of Government: The Central Government and every State Government, shall take all measures to ensure that- (a) the provisions of this Act are given wide publicity through public media including the television, radio and the print media at regular intervals; (b) the Central Government and State Government officers including the police officers and the members of the judicial services are given periodic sensitization and awareness training on the issues addressed by this Act; (c) effective co-ordination between the services provided by concerned Ministries and Departments dealing with law, home affairs including law and order, health and human resources to address issues of domestic violence is established and periodical review of the same is conducted;....
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....ise the same, for his other personal expenses. Monthly maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- for the son has been ordered to be deposited on or before, every 5th day of the English Calendar Month, in the personal account of the son, till the disposal of D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010. 110. Though, Mr. K. Thilageswaran, learned counsel for the respondents has sought for upward revision of the maintenance amount ordered by the appellate Court, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner/husband, as regards the denial of the prayer for maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- each, by the learned Magistrate, no appeal has been filed by the respondents. Had the respondents filed an appeal against the denial, the appellate Court, would have considered the said prayer. In the absence of any appeal, the respondents, are now seeking for upward revision of interim maintenance. At this juncture, if the said prayer is allowed, it would amount to modifying, reversing or altering the order of the learned Magistrate in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 dated 15.06.2012, without there being any challenge to the same. 111. In Criminal Revision No. 1418 of 2012, there is a continuation by th....
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....capitation fee in two instalments cannot be sustained in the light of the Tamilnadu Educational Institutions Prohibition of Collection at Capitation Fee Act, 1992. As per the definition and in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court, as to how, the statute has to be interpreted, the petitioner is obligated to compensate the expenses incurred, and loss suffered. As stated supra, as per section 2(k) of the Act, petitioner is bound to bear the expenses and loss suffered, at any stage of any proceeding. 117. As per the memorandum dated 15.12.2014 of Shri Krishna College of Technology, Kovaipudur, Coimbatore, the 4th respondent, the total educational expenses/fees for the course, is Rs. 4,24,500/-. In the light of the statutory provisions and considering the expenses already incurred towards education, maintenance etc., the petitioner is bound to pay the same. The main D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, is pending before the learned Magistrate, and therefore, at this stage, this Court is not inclined to mulct the petitioner, with a liability to pay the entire monetarily relief. It is made clear that restriction on the quantum of monetary, to the tune of Rs. 2,11,200/- does not mean that the....