AI Drafter - (New and Powerful) 
Generate professional replies, appeals, opinions to Show Cause Notices, assessment orders, audit objections, and other legal communications using TaxTMI's AI Drafter. 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2019 (9) TMI 1717
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... sake of convenience) is allowed and total compensation of Rs. 207,75,63,348/- (Rupees two hundred and seven crore, seventy five lakh, sixty three thousand, three hundred and forty-eight only) at the rate of Rs. 8,624/- per square feet has been awarded in lieu of Rs. 4,620/- per square feet awarded by the SLAO. Determination has also been made under Section 26(c) and additional compensation of 75% of the total compensation under Section 27 and 100% solatium under Section 30 of 2013 Act has been awarded. Further, interest on the amount calculated at the rate of 12% under Section 69(2) of 2013 Act and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the excess amount from the date of taking over of possession of the acquired property i.e., from 16/01/2014 for the first year and interest at the rate of 16% per annum for the subsequent years till deposit of entire compensation amount under Sections 72 and 80 of 2013 Act have also been awarded. 2. Being aggrieved by the enhancement of compensation made by the reference court, this appeal has been preferred. There is a delay of 75 days in filing the appeal. Hence, IA No. 1 of 2019 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. Statement of objec....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tion 29 of the Limitation Act to contend that the savings clause under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act are not applicable. This is because, Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which is a special law, excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. In this regard, several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other Courts were cited to contend that the application filed by the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act be dismissed as the said Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which shall be discussed later. 6. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader preferred that though 2013 Act is a special enactment, Section 74(1) of the said Act does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 7. In the circumstances, at the outset, we have to decide, as to, whether, the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant ought to be condoned or not. 8. While considering this question, we have construed this appeal to have been filed under Section 74(1) of 2013 Act though ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... x x x "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." x x x "29. Savings.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....d. 13. Exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for.--In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal in any case where an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and rejected, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave shall be excluded, and the court may, on payment of the court fees prescribed for such suit or appeal, treat the suit or appeal as having the same force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance. 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.--(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any a....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....t such an application has been filed and it may be allowed. That Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act particularly Section 5 thereof, is the submission of learned HCGP. 12. At the outset, it must be noted that Section 74 of 2013 Act deals with filing an appeal to the High Court by a person being aggrieved by an award passed by the reference Court. Right to file an appeal: 13. It is a settled position of law that the right to file an appeal is a statutory right or a creature of the statute and no other right to file an appeal can be recognized de hors a statute. A right of appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal can be filed unless it is clearly expressed in terms of a statute. Further, the right of appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure. It is a vested right which can be exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. Though it exists from the date the lis commences, such right is governed by the law prevailing on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of the filing of the appeal, vi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....asualty. That cannot be." 17. With regard to filing of a suit or an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] (N. Balakrishnan), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....to, it would imply that an appeal could be filed within sixty days from the date of the award; that 60 days is the prescribed period of limitation under the 2013 Act. But, a further period of sixty days is provided to file the appeal provided the appellant satisfies the High Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days. Thus, the submission of the learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respondent is that beyond the period of one hundred and twenty days (120 days) from the date of the award no appeal is maintainable and cannot be entertained by the High Court. 20. As already noted, in the instant case, the application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the appellant herein seeking condonation of delay of seventy-five days (75 days) in filing the appeal. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to contend that even if the appeal has been filed beyond the extended period of sixty days i.e., beyond one hundred and twenty days from the date of the award, the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e Limitation Act, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss a suit or appeal, if filed after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence or there is no defence raised on the issue of limitation, even at the appellate stage, because in some of the cases, it may go to the root of the matter. However, Section 3 is subjected to Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act essentially deal with computation of period of limitation under certain circumstances and in substance excludes time from the prescribed period of limitation. It is not necessary to go into the details of those sections at this stage, except to highlight the fact that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law and in the instant case to appeals. 23. Hence, the question in the instant case is, whether Section 74(1) of 2013 Act, which is a special law prescribing a different period of limitation than as prescribed under the schedule to the Limitation Act, in terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act excludes the applic....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....election petitions and if so, whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Also, whether the facts of the case therein warranted condonation of delay. Thus, unless Section 5 of the Limitation Act was made applicable, the discretion of the Court to extend the time would not be available. 27. In the said case, a comparison of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 was made and the question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. It was observed that even if the Limitation Act was applicable to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, whether Section 5 thereof particularly was excluded from application in the case of an election petition. It was contended in the said case that the words 'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be an "express reference" made in a special or local law to the specific provision of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. But, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that what has to be seen is whether the scheme of the special law and the nature of remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended i....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. The proviso thereto further states that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, "but not thereafter". Interpreting the expression "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the said phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would, therefore, bar the application of Section 5 of the Act. It was held that the expression "but not thereafter" clearly meant that an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the provision to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was sufficient indication of the exclusion. In the circumstances, after going through the history and scheme of the Arbitration Act, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....d that in view of express provision for condonation of delay, coupled with a non-obstante provision which states that the provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law or in any decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, excluded application of Sections 5 to Section 42 of the Limitation Act to the provisions of the said Act. 31. Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, [(2008) 3 SCC 70] (Singh Enterprises) considered the expression "sufficient cause" and elucidated on the same. The said expression is found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and also other special statutes which prescribe a specific period of limitation and thereafter, a further grace period within which an appeal or any other proceedings could be filed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that sufficient cause therein means adequate or enough. There cannot be any straight jacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation offered for condoning the delay caused in taking steps. It was also observed that whe....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ation Act is inapplicable as it stands excluded under Section 29(2) of the Limitation. Further, it was also observed that even though Section 5 of the Limitation act is not applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award, one need not conclude that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would also be inapplicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. (a) In the said case, His Lordship, Raveendran J. gave a separate but concurring opinion. His Lordship referred to Section 43 of the Arbitration Act to hold that Section 43 makes an express reference to the Limitation Act both in the Court and in arbitration. That there is also no express exclusion by an application of the provision of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act. But, there are some specific departures from the general provisions of Limitation Act, such as, the proviso to section 34(3) and sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 43 of the Act. His Lordship observed that where the schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for appeals or applications to any court, and the special or local law provides for filing of ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....lusion of time when proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. While considering Section 14 in light of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and the proviso thereto, it was observed that the use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso makes it clear that even if a sufficient cause is made out for a longer extension, the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Differentiating between the proviso to section 34(3) of Arbitration Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was observed that they both vest a discretion in a court to extend the prescribed period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5 of Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in regard to the period of extension, whereas the proviso to sub-section 3 of section 34 of the Arbitration Act places a limit on the period of extension of the period of limitation. It differs in regard to period of extension and it has the effect of excluding section 5 alone of the Limitation Act. Hence, it was held that having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 14 of the Act would be applica....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....5 of the Limitation Act. Section 35-H(1) states that the Commissioner of Central Excise or other party, within a period of 180 days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35C, direct the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal. In the said matter, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise had approached the High Court by way of a reference application beyond the prescribed period of 180 days. After referring to the scheme of the Central Excise Act (special law) and the nature of remedy provided therein, it was held that the said enactment was a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. It is observed there that if, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. It was further observed that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....tion was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved persons to file an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 states that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the appellate tribunal, may file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908). The proviso states that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 39. At this stage itself, it may be stated that the proviso to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act is similar to the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act. But, the main Section under Section 125 of the said Act prescribes a limitation of sixty....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... was held that the period of limitation for seeking a reference would commence from the date the award was made known to the party under Section 12(2) of the said Act. It would be useful to extract paragraph 6 of Harish Chandra Raj Singh: "6. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....e one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting point....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....f the Appellate Tribunal beyond 120 days. Section 35 of the said Act states that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law arising out of the said order. The proviso states that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. In the said case, the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act also came up for consideration. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked or otherwise, it would tantamount to amendment of the legislative mandate by which the special period of limitation has been prescribed. But, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not excluded. Hence, it could be available where an aggrieved party may have prosecuted with due diligence a remedy before a wrong forum, but on facts, the benefit of Section 14 was not made available to the appellant therein. 46. In M.P. Steel....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ld be preferred within 45 days from the date of issue of the order to a person and the said period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown, by another 15 days, but not thereafter. That the said period is absolute and cannot be extended under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It was held the appellate authority lacked jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 25(1) of the SICA, 1985 beyond the period prescribed thereunder and Section 5 of the Limitation Act was excluded from its applicability beyond sixty days enacted in the said provision. It was further held that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot permit or direct an infraction by the authorities created by a statute and that an adjudicatory or appellate authority cannot be directed to breach the provision of limitation prescribed under Section 25(1) of SICA, 1985. 49. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited and Others, [(2017) 5 SCC 42] (....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....hat the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the Revenue lent ample credence to such a conclusion. Therefore, it was held that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act was excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in Section 84 of the said Act. 51. In P. Radha Bai and others vs. P. Ashok Kumar and another, [AIR 2018 SC 5013] (P. Radha Bai), the question that arose was the applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay caused on account of alleged fraud played on the objector (party challenging the award), beyond the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. In the said case, there was a delay in filing the suit and an application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was filed. The trial court had dismissed the said suit/application stating that it was filed beyond the limitation period stipulated under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. But the High Court had remanded the matter by stating that the trial court had not considered the applicability or otherwise of Section 17 of th....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days from the date aforesaid, but within a further period not exceeding forty-five days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 states that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while distinguishing Partap Singh vs. Directorate of Enforcement, [(1985) 2 SCC 72], which dealt with Section 37(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and Mangu Ram vs. MCD [(1976) 1 SCC 392], and by following other decisions such as in the case of Popular Construction Company, ONGC Limited and Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board, held that Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days being for filing an appeal, but also goes on to state that another period of 45 days, being a grace period, given by the Legislature cannot be exceeded, provided sufficient cause is made out within the aforesaid grace p....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ndone the delay. Hence, there was an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under Section 29(2) thereof. In the said case, there was delay of 164 days in filing the appeal and the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. 55. Farhan Shaikh vs. State (National Investigation Agency), (Farhan Shaikh) is also a matter which arose under Section 21 of the NIA Act, but the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court after considering the case regarding the delay in filing the appeal noted that the appellant therein had sought condonation of delay of 314 days in filing the appeal and further delay of 44 days in re-filing the appeal. It was held that the appellant had proved sufficient cause for the delay in filing and re-filing the appeal and condoned the same. Further, this judgment is contrary to the judgment of the Kerala High Court where the delay of 164 days in filing the appeal was not condoned and the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. 56. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Ghafoor and Another v. State of Bihar, [(2011) 14 SCC 465] (Abdul Ghafoor), observed that the law of limitation indeed must get due respect and observance by all courts. ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....n (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20th June 1979. Prior to the amendment, deprivation of property save by authority of law was guaranteed by Article 31 as a fundamental right. But on repeal of Article 31, the said right is no longer a fundamental right but a Constitutional right. Article 300A ensures that the right to property cannot be abridged or curtailed by the State except in accordance with law. 60. In the context of Article 300A, deprivation of property could take place in a myriad ways including acquisition of property under the eminent domain doctrine. Entry No. 42 of List-III of the VII Schedule deals with "acquisitioning and requisitioning of property". The doctrine of eminent domain means that the person has a inherent or natural right to property irrespective of any Constitutional guarantee but the State has the power to over-ride the said natural right by compulsorily acquiring such property in exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain provided the acquisition is made for a public purpose and the State pays the compensation to the expropriated owner. [Source: "Commentary on the Constitution of India" by Dr. Durga Das Basu, 8th Edition, Volume 8,....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement. The 2013 Act also ensures that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 62. In order to achieve the aforesaid objects, the 2013 Act has been enforced with effect from 01/01/2014, wherein several time-lines have been prescribed under various Sections in order to mitigate the difficulties of a land-loser and also, at the same time, be conscious of the requirement of land for developmental purposes whether infrastructural or other such purposes, including socio-economic purposes, which are public purposes. Chapter II of the said Act deals with determination of social impact and public purpose. It is in two parts: part-A deals with preliminary investigation for determination of social impact and public purpose, while part-B deals with appraisal of social impact assessm....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....on under Section 11 is not issued within twelve months from the date of appraisal of the Social Impact Assessment Report submitted by the Expert Group under Section 7, then, such report shall be deemed to have lapsed and a fresh Social Impact Assessment shall be required to be undertaken prior to acquisition proceedings under section 11. Further, the appropriate Government has the power to extend the period of twelve months, if in its opinion circumstances exist justifying the same after recording in writing the reasons. Once a land is notified under sub-section (1) of section 11, any person interested in such land may within sixty days from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification, object to-- (a) the area and suitability of the land proposed to be acquired; (b) justification offered for public purpose; (c) the findings of the Social Impact Assessment report; after the objection are heard, the Government shall take a decision on the same. 66. Further, Section 16 of the Act pertains to the preparation of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme by the Administrator. The Draft Scheme must include a time limit for implementing the said scheme. When the appropriate....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ity, after giving reasonable opportunity of making representation in the matter to any person to be prejudicially affected. Under Section 37(2) of the Act, on the making of the award, the Collector has to give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested who are not present personally or through their representatives when the awards are made. 70. Under Section 38, the power to take possession of the land acquired is envisaged. The Collector can take possession of the land after ensuring that the full payment of compensation as well as rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are paid or tendered to the entitled persons within a period of three months for the compensation and a period of six months for the monetary part of rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements listed in the Second Schedule commencing from the date of the award made under section 30. However, the components of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Package in the Second and Third Schedules that relate to infrastructural entitlements shall be provided within a period of eighteen months from the date of the award. In the case of acquisition of land for irrigation or hydel project, being a ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... of the land and payment of fair compensation to the land-loser is based on specific time lines at various stages. Thus, the object of 2013 Act is to ensure that the land which is sought to be acquired is not subject to uncertainty and endless passage of time and the said land-owner is not in any way prejudiced on account of the acquisition sought to be made by the authority. It is in light of the said scheme of the Act that Section 74(1) must be interpreted by bearing in mind Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In this regard, it is also significant to note that any appeal filed under Section 74(1) of the Act to the High Court must be heard expeditiously and an endeavor must be made to dispose of such appeal within six months date of which it was presented to the High Court. Object and purpose of Limitation Act: 74. As a preface to the matter under discussion, paragraphs 12 and 13 of Basavaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] (Basavaraj) could be cited as under: "12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....igour. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the Statute. If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice. (Vide: CIT (Ag.), West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265; and D.D. Joshi. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 420). 24. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 661 it was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law, and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect to it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may be. The words, 'dura lex sed lex' which mean "the law is hard but it is the law." may be used to sum up the situation. Therefore, even if a statutory provision causes hardship to ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71). 28. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause. 29. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation." 76. At this stage, it is nec....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court re-opens. The explanation states that the Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of the Section, if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. 79. In computing the period of limitation in filing an appeal, a litigant is not entitled to take into account the time taken in obtaining the judgment and decree appealed from, if the application for those copies is made before the expiry of the period of limitation notwithstanding the fact that the right to file an appeal still subsists in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Section 4 does not extend or enlarge the period of limitation, but such a provision has been made having regard to the practicality of the matter. 80. Section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. The moot point in the instant case is, whether having regard to Section 74 of 2013 Act, whether Section 5 of the Act is excluded. Section 5 states that an appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisi....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....s is as to whether Section 4 and any of Sections 6 to 24 of the Limitation Act are excluded. The expression used in Section 74(1) of the Act is sixty days from the date of the award. The said expression has to be construed in light of the contingencies which arise subsequent to passing of the award which will have to be discerned in light of Section 4 to Section 24 of the Limitation Act when they are applicable to appeals. We have already dealt with Section 4 of the Act. Sections 6 to 11 both inclusive are not relevant to the present case. 83. The exclusion of time in legal proceedings is delineated in Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 states that in computing the period of limitation for, inter alia, an appeal, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 states that in computing the period of limitation inter alia, for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, award or order appealed from shall be excluded. Sub-section (3) states that where a decree or order is appealed from or wher....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... the appeal within the period of sixty days under sub-section (1) of Section 74 as well as the extended period of sixty days under the proviso thereto, as the case may be. Thus, the expression "not exceeding sixty days" cannot be applied in a literal sense as application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not excluded under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. In such circumstances, the expression "not exceeding sixty days" cannot be given a verbatim meaning or a plain meaning but a contextual and practical meaning as, in our view, the said expression is applicable in relation to Section 74(1) of 2013 Act. Any other interpretation would deprive an appellant of his remedy before the High Court. 85. Even though the High Court may be one for the State, but as far as State of Karnataka is concerned, there are three Benches and territorial jurisdiction are assigned to the Principal Bench at Bengaluru and the Benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi and hence, time spent in prosecution of an appeal before a Bench not having competency to deal with the appeal and being transferred to another Bench or being returned to be re-filed before the appropriate Bench or if the appeal being withdrawn bef....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ecific limitation prescribed in the 2013 Act, which is a code by itself in the matter of grant of fair compensation in respect of acquisition of land and other matters incidental thereto. Therefore, the special statute having a specific provision regarding limitation period would prevail over the Limitation Act, which is a general law and hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act as it prescribes a specific period of limitation different from what is prescribed under Article 116 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 89. But, the matter does not end. The further consideration which has to be made is as to whether the other provisions of the Limitation Act which are applicable to appeals would apply to Section 74 of the 2013 Act having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. While on a consideration of the scheme of the 2013 Act, in light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is held that Section 5 of the Act does not apply, it is necessary to consider as to whether Sections 4 and 12 to 14 would apply. Thus, the interpretation is to be placed on the expression "within sixty days from the date of the Award" in ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
.... computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing of an appeal under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for, the time during which the appellant has been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave regarding payment of the Court fees prescribed for filing of an appeal to the High Court, shall have to be excluded by treating the appeal as having the same force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance. Section 13 of the Limitation Act may have relevance to appeals filed by land losers as court fees would have to be paid on the enhanced compensation sought by the land-loser. 91. Similarly, in computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act, the time spent in prosecuting bona fide with due diligence an appeal before an appellate court not being the competent court in good faith has to be excluded. In fact, Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act in the cases of Popular Construction Limited, Consolidated Engineering Enterprises, Ketan, Western Builders, Simplex Infrastructure Limit....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....n the other hand. This would also advance the cause of justice of the stake holders involved in the acquisition of land under the 2013 Act as in the instant case. 93. The application of the aforesaid principles to the instant case must be now made having regard to the facts herein. On a perusal of the certified copy of the impugned judgment of the reference court, it is noted that the impugned judgment was rendered by the reference court on 29/10/2018 and the impugned Award was signed and made on 27/11/2018. The time period till the making of the Award or till the date of the Award (the date on which the Award was made), namely till 27/11/2018 has no relevance as limitation period begins from the date of the award. If the limitation period of sixty days is calculated mechanically, then the period of sixty days from 27/11/2018 would end on 26/01/2019. The said date being a holiday (Republic Day) and 27/01/2019 being Sunday, the appeal had to be filed on or before 25/01/2019 in terms of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act de hors Section 4 of the Limitation Act. But, the expression used is "within sixty days from the date of the Award". It does not mean, fifty-nine days, it means sixty ....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....ived by the appellant, the calculation of the limitation period of sixty days is incomplete, the reason being, the appellant could not have preferred the appeal without receiving the certified copy of the Award. But it is not known as to on what date appellant actually appeared before the concerned officer of the reference court for receiving the copy. No doubt, having regard to the specific period of limitation prescribed under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and there being exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, due diligence must be exercised by the aggrieved party in availing the certified copy of the impugned Award by applying for the same, within a period of sixty days from the date of its preparation and to file the appeal within sixty days from the date of the award after excluding the day on which the Award was made and the time taken for preparation of the certified copy. In the instant case, the date on which certified copy of the award was applied for, was within the period of sixty days and it was also ready within the said period and the appellant was also to appear within the period of sixty days and it was also ready within the said period and the appellant was....
X X X X Extracts X X X X
X X X X Extracts X X X X
....he instant case, while we accept the contentions of learned counsel for the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act and there cannot be any condonation of delay as contemplated under the said Section in the instant case, nevertheless, Sections 4, 12 to 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act while computing the period of sixty days + sixty days under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. Further, we do not venture to condone any delay that has occurred in filing of this appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as the same is not applicable to Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. 97. In the above context, we also have perused the affidavit in support of the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal in order to ascertain the real reason for the delay in not filing the appeal in time and as per Section 74(1) of 2013 Act. The relevant portion of it reads as under: "4. I submit that pursuant to the order, the present Appeal is filed on the grounds which are urged in the Appeal. It is further submitted that the opinion of the District Government Pleader was required in the p....