TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2023 (8) TMI 1425
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.... order dated 17.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack in W.P. (C) No. 30620 of 2020 by which the High Court allowed the writ application filed by the original petitioner (respondent No. 1) before us, setting aside the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Cuttack Bench, Cuttack and thereby holding that the respondent No. 1 herein, namely, Dr. Bikartan Das is entitled to the benefit of enhancement of retirement age from 60 to 65 years as applicable to the AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry of AYUSH. FACTUAL MATRIX 2. The respondent No. 1 herein was appointed by the Council as a Research Assistant w.e.f. 07.10.1985. The Office Order No. 183 of 1985 dated 11.10.1985 reads thus: "No. P.1-67/86-CRIA/DDSR/Estt./748(5) Dt 11.10.85 OFFICE ORDER No. 183/85 Dr. Bikartan Das is appointed as a Research Assistant (AY) with effect from the forenoon of the 7th October, 1985 until further orders in the Central Research Institute (AY), Unit, Bhubaneshwar-9. He will be on probation for a period of two years from this date. He will draw a basic pay of Rs. 425/- per month in the scale of Rs. 425-15-500 PB-15-560-20-700 with u....
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....ectorate General of Armed Forces Medical Service), Department of Defence Production (Indian Ordnance Factories Health Service Medical Officers), Dental Doctors under D/o Health & Family Welfare, Dental doctors under Ministry of Railways and of doctors working in Higher Education and Technical Institutions under Department of Higher Education]". 2. The decision of the Cabinet is applicable to the AYUSH doctors directly working under the administrative control of Ministry of AYUSH i.e. AYUSH doctors working under CGHS. The decision of the Union Cabinet is not applicable to autonomous bodies functioning under Ministry of AYUSH i.e. Research Councils/National Institutes. 3. All such representations are therefore being sent to there spective Councils. It is requested that the Councils may inform them accordingly. Yours faithfully, N. K. Lakhanpal Senior Consultant" 6. By order dated 24.11.2017, the Ministry of AYUSH enhanced the age of superannuation to 65 years for the AYUSH doctors working in the Ministry of AYUSH and in CGHS Hospitals w.e.f. 27.09.2017. The order dated 24.11.2017 reads thus: "F.NO. D.14019/4/2016-E-I(AYUSH) Government of India ....
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....her rules, above doctors except in Central Armed Police Forces and Assam Rifles shall hold the administrative posts till the date of attaining the age of sixty-two years and thereafter their services shall be placed in Non-Administrative positions." [F.No.25012/4/2016-Estt.(A-IV)] GYANENDRA DEV TRIPATHI, Jt. Secy." 8. By letter dated 25.01.2018, the appellant Council circulated the clarification letter issued by the Ministry of AYUSH dated 31.10.2017 referred to in para 5 as above. The letter reads thus: "F 3-8/2017-CCRAS/Vig/3094 Dated: 25 JAN 2018 To All the Heads of Institutes/Centres/Units functioning under this Council. Sub: - Enhancement of superannuation age of 65 years. Sir/Madam The undersigned is directed to circulate herewith the clarification on the subject mentioned above received from Ministry of AYUSH vide letter FTS No.32797/2017 dated 31.10.2017 for information. The contents of Ministry's letter may be circulated among all officers working under your control. Yours faithfully (SB MISRA) Administrative Officer (Vigilance) For Director General" It is pertinent to note t....
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....; x x Pending finalization of the Original Application, the Applicant prays to stay the order under Annexure-3 and allow the Applicant to continue in the service." 11. By order dated 17.04.2018 the CAT issued notice, however, declined to grant any interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1 herein. As CAT declined to grant any interim relief and the respondent No. 1 was to retire on 30.04.2018, he went before the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack by filing W. P. (C) No. 6663 of 2018 questioning the order passed by the CAT declining to grant any interim relief. The High Court passed the following order dated 25.04.2018: "SI. No. of Order- 03 Date of Order- 25.04.2018 Heard Mr. B. Senapati, le....
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.... working directly under the Government of India. Its applicability to the employees of the Council is on account of Clauses 34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws. This issue was considered by the Hyderabad Bench of the CAT vide order dated 04.09.2020, wherein it was observed that- "Clause 34 of the bye-law makes it crystal clear that the Governing Body has to take a decision in regard to the enhancement of the retirement age. The Governing body has no necessity to take a decision in the context of the Ministry of AYUSH, Govt. of India having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not applicable to an autonomous body like CCRAS. Therefore, the G.O.I. rule of not extending the enhancement of retirement age to CCRAS compliments the clauses 35 & 47 of the byelaws. We do not find any error in the decision taken by the respondents in terms of the bye laws." (Emphasis supplied) (ii) CAT did not accept the respondent No. 1's argument of Clause 35 and application of the Fundamental Rules mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Council saying that the clause relates to the general applicability of FRs, Supplementary Rule (SRs) and General Financial Rules (....
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....vii) The CAT placed reliance on the decision of this Court in DDA v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 672 to hold that there are certain specific grounds on which a policy decision can be subjected to judicial review, and in this situation there was no valid ground to challenge the policy decision of the AYUSH Ministry as per the clarification letter dated 31.10.2017. (viii) In the last, the CAT considered that even if the respondent No.1's contention that he had treated patients was to be accepted, such acceptance could not have negated the decision taken by the Ministry of AYUSH in its clarification letter dated 31.01.2017, which was further accepted by the Council in its subsequent letter dated 25.01.2018. 15. The respondent No. 1 feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the CAT challenged the same before the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 30620 of 2020. The High Court allowed the writ application filed by the respondent No. 1 holding as under: "On the analysis of the above factual matrix, we find that though the petitioner is functioning as Researcher under the Research Council/ National Institute, but as a r....
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....ng despite acknowledging that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a researcher under the Research Council and his service conditions were governed by different laws. Of course, the High Court also took support of Clauses 34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws while granting relief to the respondent No. 1. 17. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here before this Court with the present appeal. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS 18. Mr. Aman Lekhi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants made the following submissions: a. The issue involved in the present case is the entitlement to seek extension in superannuation age as per FR 56(bb) and its applicability to the appellant Council which is an autonomous body. The said FR has been amended from time to time and the rule applicable in the present case i.e. at the time of the retirement of the respondent No. 1 is of 05.01.2018. b. The respondent No. 1 was an employee of CCRAS having joined as Research Assistant and his terms of service were governed under the Rules of CCRAS. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Research Officer and at the time of superannuat....
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.... shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Central Council." (Emphasis supplied) d. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rules indicates that the employees are recruited through a selection committee of the Council and the FRs will not directly apply where the Governing Body finalises the rules of superannuation. e. In terms of Clause 34, the Governing Body had decided to fix the age of superannuation to be 60 years on 01.12.1998. The said decision was ratified on 27.01.2000 in the 14th Meeting of the Governing Body of CCRAS as Agenda Item No. GB 14.4. f. The decision of the Governing Body as aforementioned applied on 30.04.2018 i.e. the date of superannuation of the Respondent. g. No reference has been made by the respondent No. 1 to the aforementioned decision of the governing body in his representation. In fact, the Respondent relied on Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws which on its terms indicates that the rules governing the retirement of employees of Government of India will not apply in the instant case. h. Reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 in its representation on the case of Salma Khatoon is equally inapt as the rel....
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.... (iv) Employees of autonomous bodies are governed by their own rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity with government employees. T.M. Sampath and Others v. Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources and Others, (2015) 5 SCC 333 para 3 at page 336 & para 15 at page 345; State of Maharashtra and Another v. Bhagwan and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 193 para 24-26 at page 203204. m. The reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 on the judgment of this Court North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma and Others reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 540 is completely misplaced. The issue in the said case pertained to different dates of enhancement of age of superannuation of AYUSH and CHS doctors of NDMC. In the said case, the policy decision of enhancing the age of superannuation to 65 years was adopted by NDMC for AYUSH doctors but it was applied from a later date which was found to be discriminatory. Whereas, in the present case the appellant is an autonomous body with its own service rules and the government decision was never adopted by the Governing Body at any point of time. n. The reference made to the appointment of Director of the Institute of Teaching a....
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....) the respondent No. 1 is an AYUSH Doctor and (ii) the Institute is under the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH. d. In view of the aforesaid admitted facts, it is evident more particularly from the Union Cabinet decision of the appellants that the Government of India had approved the enhancement of age of superannuation from 60 to 65 years. This decision of the Cabinet was applicable to the respondent No. 1. In terms of the said decision at "iii. that the superannuation age has been enhanced to 65 years in respect of doctors under their administrative control of the respective Ministries/ Departments [M/o of AYUSH (AYUSH Doctors,.........". e. The Cabinet has not made any distinction or difference in treatment between the AYUSH Doctors working under the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH in the matter of enhancement of retirement age up to 65 years. It is reiterated that only two conditions are required to be satisfied to avail the enhanced age of superannuation up to 65 years of age viz., (i) AYUSH Doctor and (ii) being under the Administrative Control of the Ministry. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 is squarely covered by the Cabinet's....
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.... achieve i.e, exclusion of the AYUSH Doctors working in autonomous bodies and secondly, it creates an artificial distinction of AYUSH doctors working in the Ministry and elsewhere, although both are similarly qualified and discharge functions of OPD/IPD treatment of patients including surgery etc, albeit at different places. The respondent No. 1 also drew NPA (Non-Practicing Allowance). These facts have not been disputed. v. That it is well settled in law where the classification has no nexus with the object it seeks to achieve and that there is artificial distinction the same would fall foul of Articles 14 and 21 in the matter of conditions of service of an employee. vi. That even otherwise, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to the benefit of enhanced age of retirement of 65 years on the strength of plain reading of Clause 34 of the Society Rules extracted @ Pg 12 of the Judgement by the High Court, on which extensive reliance is placed by the appellants contending that the applicability of the extension of age is dependent upon the decision to be taken by the Governing Body of the autonomous body, and hence the Central Govt rule of age of superannuation is not au....
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....e in age of superannuation up to 65 years whereas other AYUSH doctors working in the Ministry of AYUSH and other autonomous institutions have been granted extension of age up to 65 years. ix. That similarly, AYUSH doctors working in CGHS have been granted increase in age up to 65 years vide letter dated 24.11.2017. Therefore, the letter not to grant identical benefit to the respondent No. 1 is not only arbitrary but it is discriminatory and hence it is unsustainable. h. This Court has dealt with the issue of extension of age of superannuation of similar AYUSH doctors working in the NDMC in Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (supra), where in paras 23 and 24 it was held as follows: "23. The common contention of the appellants before us is that classification of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in different categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the findings of the Tribunal and the Delhi High Court that the classification is discriminatory and unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the same function of treating and healing their patients. The only difference is that ....
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....icants are qualified Unani Doctors by qualification and are equivalent to any other qualified Doctors, be it MBBS Doctors or otherwise. b. The Intervenors/applicants are working under the Direct Administrative Control of Ministry of AYUSH and their service conditions are governed by the Ministry in spite of them performing the duties in CCRUM. c. The Intervenors/applicants have been receiving the Non-practicing Allowance while working under CCRUM which clearly indicates that the Intervenors/applicants are indeed qualified doctors at par with the other Doctors who also get the same allowances. d. The Recruitment Rules which apply to the Intervenors/applicants are: "for functional purpose, a medical officer (Ayurveda) when posted in the Ministry of AYUSH will be designated as Research officer (Ayurveda) and thus the medical officer and Research officer are one and the same and there cannot be any distinction between the two". e. That the Government of India (Cabinet) vide its order has granted the benefit of enhancement of superannuation age to 65 years to the doctors under the administrative control of the respective Ministries/Department (Ministr....
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....e OPD & IPD duties and thus are not allowed to practice outside the scope of their official duties and in lieu were given the Non-Practicing Allowance. j. It is submitted that those doctors are considered as AYUSH doctors who have completed the degree course either in BAMS, BHMS, BUMS, BNYS & BSM in Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unami, Siddha, Yoga and Naturopathy and are at par with any other qualified Doctors. k. The Intervenors/applicants Council is an autonomous body under the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India and the Council has a Governing Body comprising of the Union Minister-In-Charge of AYUSH as its President and Secretary, Ministry of AYUSH as its Vice President. Its Bye-Laws reveal the pervasive control of the Union Government over the Central Council. l. The aforesaid is clearly depicted from the Bye-Laws of Intervenor/applicants council. That the Clauses - 34 and 35 of the Bye-Laws deal with the superannuation of the employees of the Council which are quoted herein below: Clauses-34 & 35 of the said Bye-Laws deal with superannuation which read as under: "34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the Government of India as a....
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....uitments, appointments and promotions to all posts shall be made according to the recruitment rules laid down by the Governing Body or designated competent authority for the posts. Selection shall be made through the Selection Committees/Departmental Promotion Committees duly constituted with the approval of the respective appointing authority. Superannuation 34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the Government of India as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing Body shall apply to the employees of the Central Council. Provided that an employee can be retained in service after the prescribed age of superannuation if he continues to be physically fit and efficient and it is in the interest of the Central Council to retain him in service. 35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central Council. Other Conditions of Service 47. In respect of matters not provided for in these regulations the rules as applicable to Central Government servants regarding the general conditions of s....
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....failed to consider the Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws referred to above, which states that the FR, SR and (GFR) as amended from time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Council, was without any merit and deserved to be rejected. The CAT in our opinion rightly rejected such argument. We say so because the applicability would be subject to the provision specific to the Clause 34 governing superannuation of the employees of the Council. 29. There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws referred to above on the basis of which, it could be said that the same will have an overriding effect on Clause 34 as regards the age of retirement. Clause 47 of the Bye-Laws makes it abundantly clear that for the matters not specifically provided in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to the government employees would apply. However, as there is a specific provision regarding superannuation in Clause 34, the rules governing the government services in respect of superannuation are not applicable to the employees of the Council unless it is in accordance with Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws. 30. We shall now deal with one another submission canvassed by Mr. R. Balasubramanian, the learned....
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....L.J.: "You do sometimes read "or" as 'and' and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'. And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not to be resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done". Where provision is clear and unambiguous the word 'or' cannot be read as 'and' by applying the principle of reading down. But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd, result 'and' may be read for 'or' and 'or' for 'and' even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of 'and' and 'or' produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following 'and', 'or' cannot be read in place of 'and'. The alternatives joined by 'or' need not always be mutually exclusive." 34. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we reject the submission canvassed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as regards the interpretation of the Clause 34 of the Bye-L....
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....one i.e., from the date of his appointment that he was being appointed as a Research Assistant. His service conditions and mode of recruitment are different compared to the AYUSH Doctors. It is a different thing that he might have treated the patients but that by itself would not entitle him to claim that his age of superannuation should be at par with the AYUSH Doctors. 38. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar and Another v. Teachers' Association of Govt. Engineering College and Others, reported in (2000) 10 SCC 527 wherein, the respondents were teachers of three engineering colleges owned by the State of Bihar. They were recruited through the Bihar Public Service Commission. Their service conditions were governed by the Bihar Service Code. Under the relevant provisions of the Bihar Service Code, the age of superannuation up to 1989, was 58 years. However, with effect from 01.10.1989 it was raised to 60 years. They claimed that their age of retirement should be the same as the age of retirement of Bihar Engineering College which was a college of the Patna University. Its teachers were recruited through th....
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....ng reliance on two decisions of this Court: (i) T.M. Sampath (supra) and (ii) Bhagwan (supra). Both these decisions have been relied upon to fortify the contention that the employees of autonomous bodies are governed by their own rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity with the government employees. We must look into both these decisions. Paras 3, 15, 16 and 17 respectively of T.M. Sampath (supra) are as follows: "3. The facts of these appeals are briefly stated hereinafter. The appellants herein are the employees of National Water Development Agency ("NWDA") which was established as a society in July 1982 and was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society NWDA, which falls under the aegis and control, both administrative and financial, of the Ministry of Water Resources, is fully funded by the Government of India, headed by the Union Minister for Water Resources as the President. NWDA framed rules and regulations for its smooth functioning. Whatever emoluments have been prescribed for the government servants by the Central Government Office Memorandum ("the OM", for short) the same apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of NWDA. Bye-law 28....
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.... * * 21. The High Court ... is not correct in thinking that there is any compulsion on KSRTC on the mere adoption of Part III of KSR to automatically give all enhancements in pension and other benefits given by the State Government to its employees." Thus, as the appellants are governed by the CPF Rules, 1982, the OM applicable to the Central Government employees is not applicable to them." 16. On the issue of parity between the employees of NWDA and Central Government employee....
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....aim parity with the State/Central Government employees. This is more particularly, when the employees of such autonomous bodies are governed by their own Service Rules and service conditions. The State Government and the autonomous Board/body cannot be put on a par." (Emphasis Supplied) 42. We must also look into the decision of this Court in the case of Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Associations v. State of Kerala and Others reported in AIR 2018 SC 2652, wherein the Assistant Public Prosecutors were seeking parity with respect to the age of superannuation to that of Public Prosecutors. This Court took notice of the fact that the method of selection between the two posts is very different and that the former are considered to be government employees, whereas the latter are not. The Court thereafter, proceeded to hold that merely because the nature of work between the two is similar, the same does not imply that the age of superannuation ought to be similar as well. The relevant portion is produced hereunder: "6. ... The fact that the nature of duties and functions of Assistant Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors are similar, per se, cannot be the basis to....
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.... classification of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in different categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the findings of the Tribunal and the Delhi High Court that the classification is discriminatory and unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the same function of treating and healing their patients. The only difference is that AYUSH doctors are using indigenous systems of medicine like Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are using Allopathy for tending to their patients. In our understanding, the mode of treatment by itself under the prevalent scheme of things, does not qualify as an intelligible differentia. Therefore, such unreasonable classification and discrimination based on it would surely be inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. The order of AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017 extending the age of superannuation to 65 Years also endorses such a view. This extension is in tune with the notification of Ministry of Health and Family Welfare dated 31.05.2016. 24. The doctors, both under AYUSH and CHS, render service to patients and on this core aspect, ther....
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.... CAT. By virtue of such interim order which the High Court ordinarily should not grant, the respondent No. 1 although was to retire in 2018 yet continued in service till 2021. It is only when this Court stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the High Court while issuing notice that the service of the respondent No. 1 came to an end. The Court or the Tribunal should, therefore, be slow and circumspect in granting interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated. But if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and merely caused injustice to his immediate junior. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the High Court was conscious of the fact as very much recorded in the impugned order that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Research Assistant and was functioning as a Researcher under the Research Council and his service conditions were also different compared to the AYUSH doctors serving with the Ministry of AYUSH. The High Court misdirected itself saying that the benefit of enhanced age of superannuat....
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....uitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not. 52. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440. The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in 'all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner' so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows: "7. ... In granting a writ of 'certiorari', the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal ..... 8. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in ....
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....y inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit a....
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....itself jurisdiction. 58. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and Another, reported in (1969) 2 AC 147, the House of Lords has given a very broad connotation to the concept of 'jurisdictional error'. It has been laid down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the first instance and then do something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid: "But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not r....
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....expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court would not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a tribunal. A finding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the court or the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. It is also well settled that adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot be agitated before the writ court." 62. In the aforesaid context, it will be profitable for us to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of I....
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....he case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See: King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC)) 66. We may quote with profit a decision of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde (supra) to understand the true purport and meaning of an error apparent on the face of the record or an error which could be termed as self-evident. The facts of that case were as below: 67. The respondent made an application in the Revenue Court of the Mamlatdar of Sirsi praying for the delivery of possession of property which the appellant was on that date possessing as the tenant under him on the basis of a 'Mulegeni' deed executed by the respondent's predecessor-in-interest in favour of ....
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....e governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. ...." 70. We may also quote with profit one more decision of this Court explaining the true scope of issue of a writ of certiorari and what is an error apparent on the face of the record, which could be corrected by issue of a high prerogative writ like certiorari. In the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawabai Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, reported in (1952) 1 SCC 798, this Court made the observations in paras 12, 13, 14 and 15, which we quote below: "12. The remaining three questions canvassed before us, unless they are of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated 13-5-1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari. It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-....
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....ablishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases, I have mentioned it is erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." 14. The tribunal constituted to hear appeals under Section 24 has been constituted in these terms: "Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 7, Section 16, Section 19 or Section 38 may prefer an appeal in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed - (a) to the Custodian, where the original order has been passed by a Deputy or Assistant Custodian; (b) to the Custodian General, where the ori....
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....ed to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to determine questions which it left undecided [Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 AC 179 (HL)] ; but no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. (Emphasis supplied) 72. In another case, the same Court held: ""A certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of the appellate tribunal on these points on the ground that the decision is wrong" - 'Ebrahim Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property', 1952 Mad W.N. 502 (SC)." 73. It is, therefore, clear that in all findings on matters of fact and interpretation of law except in cases of defective jurisdiction, the decision of the tribunal must be deemed to be final. 74. The position is authoritatively summed up in Halsbury's Laws of England Vol.IX in para 1493 where it is laid down thus: "1493. Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the magistrates had jurisdicti....