TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1985 (5) TMI 258
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....ter referred to as the Act). The Life Insurance business of about 243 companies was nationalised with effect from 1-9-1956 under the above enactment, which replaced its predecessor Ordinance. Chapter IV of the Act consists of Sections 7 - 17, which provide for transfer of existing life insurance business to the Corporation. Section 11 of the Act deals with transfer of service of existing employees of insurers to the Corporation. It is necessary to extract this provision in full since the substantial controversy centres round the provisions of this section:-- 11. (1) Every whole-time employee of an insurer whose controlled business has been transferred to and vested in the Corporation and who was employed by the insurer wholly or mainly in connection with his controlled business immediately before the appointed day shall, on and from the appointed day, become an employee of the Corporation, and shall hold his office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension and gratuity and other matters as he would have held the same on the appointed day if this Act had not been passed, ....
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....rce, the transfer of the services of any employee of an insurer to the Corporation shall not entitle any such employee to any compensation under that Act or other law, and no such claim shall be entertained by any court, tribunal or other authority. Section 23 of the Act deals with staff of the Corporation, and enables the Corporation to employ such number of persons as it thinks fit. Section 48 of the Act deals with the power to make rules. Clause (j) of Sub-section (2) thereof enables the Central Government to frame rules relating to conditions, subject to which the Corporation may appoint employees. This provision does not obviously refer to transferred employee. Section 49 of the Act vests power to make regulations in the Corporation with the previous approval of the Central Government by notification in the Gazette of India. Clauses (b) and (bb) of Sub-section (2) thereof deal with "the method of recruitment of employees and agents of the Corporation and the terms and conditions of service of such employees or agents", and "the terms and conditions of service of persons who have become employees of the Corporation under Sub-section (1) of Section 11". Section 43 of the Act ....
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....fe Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1956, issued under Section 49(2)(b) and (bb), providing for conditions, of service of employees, including the Field Officers/Development Officers, were substituted by the 1960 Regulations framed under the same provisions. The service conditions were sought to be modified by agreements entered into between Representative Organisations of the employees and the Corporation in 1964, 1965 and 1971. According to the latest of these agreements, Development Officers were to canvass business consisting on 100 lives and involving scheduled First Year Premium of not less than Rs. 25,000 with effect from 1-4-1971, and 125 lives and Rupees 30,000 as scheduled First Year Premium with effect from 1-4-1974 as the minimum for each Development Officer. A joint divisional committee was to consider representations of any employee falling behind the norms of performance and who was subject to penal consequences. The unanimous recommendations were to be given effect to by the Divisional Manager. In case of differences in the committee, the Divisional Manager was to devise the action in his discretion. 5. A committee appointed by the Government o....
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....t decision was upset in appeal by a Division Bench in the decision reported in L.I.C. of India v. Chauhan 1983 Lab IC 1767 . A Division Bench of the, High Court of Delhi in the decision reported in Man Singh v. Union of India 1983 Lab IC 1471 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in M. L. Dandavate v. Union of India 1983 Lab IC 516, also repelled the challenge against Exts. P2 and P3. It was held in all these decisions that Development Officers were not workmen as defined in the I.D. Act. Patna High Court in the decision of a Division Bench in Writ Jurisdiction Civil Case No. 2905 of 1979 : (reported in 1983 Lab IC 74) also upheld the validity of Exts. P2 and P3. The High Court of Madras also followed suit, in the judgment of a Division Bench consisting of Ramaswamy and Swamikannu JJ. It was in the meantime, that the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Amendment) Act, 1 of 1981, was promulgated apparently to get over the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in L.I.C. v. D. J. Bahadur (1981) ILLJ 1 SC . The office of that enactment was to delete Clause (bb) of Section 49 of the Act, enabling the Corporation to frame regulations relating to servi....
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....uthority and notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the time being in force. 3. Amendment of Section 49.- In Section 49 of the Principal Act.- (a) in Sub-section (2),-- (i) in Clause (b), the words "and the terms and conditions of service of employees or agents" shall be omitted. (ii) Clause (bb) shall be omitted; and (b) after Sub-section (2), the following subsection shall be inserted, namely:-- (3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid or both Houses agree in making any modification in the regulation or both Houses agree that the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, howe....
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....el submits that the other High Courts in deciding on the validity of Exts. P2 and P3 had held that Development Officers were not 'workmen' as defined in Section (2) of the I.D. Act, and that position has now been completely altered by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in S. K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983) IILLJ 429 SC . The increase in volume of business of the Corporation which was attributable at least in part to the Development Officers is referred to in detail in an attempt to make out that there was no merit in the Corporation's case that the continuance of the Development Officers in employment was uneconomical. Reference is also made to recent notifications inviting applications afresh for appointment as Development Officers. It is submitted that due to no fault of his, a Development Officer is likely to suffer reduction in emoluments to a considerable extent, reversion as Class III employee or even termination of service without affording him a reasonable chance of pleading before a representative appraisal machinery, that there was no fall in performance below the norms or that deficiency in performance, if any was due to circumstances beyond his con....
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....), or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or in any other law for the time being in force. According to him, this latter limb is independent of the former as found by Rajasthan, Patna, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Madras and Calcutta High Courts in the decisions referred to earlier. It is the submission of counsel that the Blue Order was issued in exercise of the powers of the Corporation under the first limb of Section 11(2), whereas Ext. P2 was issued in exercise of the powers under the second limb. According to him, an order issued under Section 11(2) as also the Regulations issued under Section 49(2)(bb) of the Act are subordinate legislative instruments, in the making of which, the only enquiry which the court can undertake is to ascertain whether such exercises were within the precincts of the power conferred by the statute and the competence of the authorities concerned. If once it is found that the authority exercising the power to issue subordinate legislative instruments has the power to do so, the motive behind the exercise of the power and such other considerations as in form the issue of the instruments, are not matters for investigation by courts. It is his case that 1976 or....
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....of service conditions of transferred employees? (ii) Does Ext. P2 travel beyond the power of the Central Government under Section 11(2) of the Act and is it for that reason invalid? (iii) Is Ext. P3 invalid for the reason that it was issued under compulsion of the dictate contained in para 4 of Ext. P2? In other words, does the direction in Ext, P2 to frame Regulations render Ext. P3 invalid, since the only power the Central Government has under Section 49 of the Act is the power of prior approval and not antecedent direction? (iv) Do Exts. P2 and P3 constitute change in the conditions of service of the petitioners to their prejudice, for effecting which, notice under Section 9A of the I.D. Act is obligatory? Does the non-compliance with Section 9A of the I.D. Act render them invalid ab initio? (v) Are Exts. P2 and P3 arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India? (vi) What is the effect of Act 1 of 1981 on the validity of Exts. P2 and P3? We will deal with these points one after the other. 11. The scope and effect of Section 11(2) of the L.I.C. Act: This will take in points (i....
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....v. D. J. Bahadur (1981) ILLJ 1 SC . We will refer to the opinions of Krishna Iyer and Pathak JJ. who constituted the majority in that decision. It was observed by Krishna Iyer, J. (Para 9):-- The statutory transfer of service from the former employers and standardisation of scales of remuneration and other conditions of employment had to be and were taken care of by Section 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (for short, the LIC Act). The obvious purpose of this provision was to enable the Corporation initially to absorb the motley multitudes from many companies who carried with them varying incidents of service so as to fit them into a fair pattern, regardless of their antecedent contracts of employment or industrial settlements or awards. It was elementary that the Corporation could not perpetuate incongruous features of service of parent insurers, and statutory power had to be vested to vary, modify or supersede these contracts, geared to fair, equitable and, as far as possible, uniform treatment of the transferred staff. Unless there be unmistakable expression of such intention, the I.D. Act will continue to apply to the Corporation employees. The office of ....
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.... when regard is had to the mosaic of sections in which the provision is located. Admittedly, the first limb of Sub-section (2) relates to transferred employees only, and it must be held that so does the second limb. Both provisions are intended to constitute a composite process for rationalising the scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of transferred employees with a view not only to effecting a standardisation between the transferred employees but also to revising their scales of remuneration, and terms and conditions of service to a pattern which will enable the newly established Corporation to become a viable and commercially successful enterprise. The standpoint of the second limb of the sub-section as its language plainly indicates, is provided by the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders. For that reason, it is open to the Central Government under the sub-section to ignore the guarantee contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 in favour of the employees, or anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or any other law for the time being in force or any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force. Benefits ....
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....d only to transferred employees and is related only to reduction of remuneration and alteration in the conditions of service of transferred employees for the purpose of effectuating the transfer and integration of employees and standardisation of the conditions of their services. 14. A similar provision of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 57 of 1972, was considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ajay Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1130, 1984 Lab IC 691. Section 16(1)(g) of Act 57 of 1972 enabled the Central Government to frame schemes for the "rationalisation or revision of pay scales and other terms and conditions of service of officers and other employees wherever necessary''. Sub-section (2) however provided that the object of the Central Government in framing the schemes should be "to ensure that ultimately there are only four companies (excluding the Corporation) in existence". Schemes were framed in 1973 amalgamating and Merging all the general insurance companies into four companies. The schemes became effective from 1-1-1974 on completion of the amalgamation and merger. A scheme of rationalisation and revision ....
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....n after and as a part of the process of transfer. We are not emphasising so much the periodicity of the exercise of power under Section 11(2) of the Act but do rely on the emphasis rightly laid by the Supreme Court in Bahadur's case 1980 Lab IC 1218, on the immediacy of its exercise after the process of transfer and for effectuating it. We have no doubt that if the necessary causal connection is established and the order is issued as a part of the process of transfer and integration of services, the provisions of Section 11(1) of the Act and the Industrial Disputes Act would be excluded. If the causal connection is not discernible, Ext. P2 order may have to suffer invalidation as overstepping the limits of authority under Section 11(2) of the Act. It should necessarily follow that Ext. P2 in so far as it overstepped the purpose of carrying into effect the transfer and integration of services and standardisation and rationalisation of service conditions including reduction of remuneration of the transferred employees has travelled beyond the competence of the enabling statute, just as much as a similar order issued under Section 11(2) of the Act reducing the non-profit sharing b....
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....r, to be lost sight of is that most of the English decisions, particularly the leading case, Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91, dealt with municipal bye-laws or corporate bye-laws and not subordinate legislation by the Executive Government. Even in relation to such subordinate legislative instruments, Prof. Wade was cautious to observe that the only examination by Courts must be confined to testing the reasonableness of the instrument by its contents. It was observed:-- Just as with other kinds of administrative action, the courts must sometimes condemn rules or regulations for unreasonableness. In interpreting statutes it is natural to make the assumption that Parliament could not have intended powers of delegated legislation to be exercised unreasonably, so that the legality of the regulations becomes dependent upon their content. 19. In Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91, Lord Russel of Killowen C. J., upheld the validity of a Municipal Bye-law against singing within 50 yards of dwelling houses for the following reason:-- But, when the Court is called upon to consider the bye-laws of public representative bodies clothed with the ample authority which I have descr....
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....was reasonable in the narrow sense of that word, the cases in the books on this subject are no guide; for they reveal, as indeed one would expect, a wide diversity of judicial opinion, and they lay down no principle of definite standard by which reasonableness or unreasonableness may be tested. 20. It is therefore needless to add that the courts shall approach subordinate legislative instruments with considerable amount of caution and examine them for absence of competence or reasonableness or fairness and other invalidating circumstances with almost the same standards as legislative enactments are dealt with by courts. The presumption of constitutionality, competence and reasonableness ordinarily attaches to such instruments just as much as to legislative enactments, as is evident from the following observations from "Administrative Agencies and the Courts" by Cooper:-- Where the legislature has clearly delegated such authority, the only issue that can normally be raised as to the validity of the rule concern the question whether it is ultra vires as exceeding the scope of the authority delegated, and whether it is violative of due process guarantees. These issues are ....
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....tainable. If it were otherwise, no enactment or subordinate legislative instrument will be safe. If subordinate legislative instruments do constitute, at least in some measure, an extension of the power to legislate, this presumption is essential to safeguard them from wanton attacks on imaginary or flimsy grounds. 23. We were informed that a contrary view seems to have been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in O.P. No. 5242 of 1984 by casting the burden of proving the reasonableness and fairness of a rule made by him on the Chief Justice of the High Court as the constitutionally designated rule-making authority and by approximating the exercise of the rule-making power to that of administrative actions. We have perused that judgment, and are constrained to hold that both the assumptions made in that judgment are faulty. The basic principle which one should bear in mind in dealing with an attack against legislation, both primary as well as subordinate, is that there is a presumption --of course rebuttable -- that the power was properly exercised and that the power shall not be equated with administrative actions. The assumptions to the contrary informing th....
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....f service as suggested. Nor are we persuaded to go in any further detail into the petitioner's submission that the Corporation was acting under the dictates of the Central Government in issuing Ext. P3 Regulations. We do not think it necessary to consider the decisions reported in Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas [1952] 1 SCR 135 and C.I.T. v, Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. [1983] 144 ITR 225(SC) , referred to in support of that submission. Reference was made to "Judicial Review on Administrative Action" by De Smith, and "Administrative Law" by Prof. HWR Wade. We are afraid that these references are inapposite, except in a case of administrative or quasi judicial/judicial action, where administrative/quasi judicial/judicial discretion is compelled by extraneous authority, including even an official superior, whose directives the authority having discretion, was bound to carry out otherwise. It is indisputable that the regulations framed by the Corporation have to be consistent with the Act and Rules made thereunder, and shall be so framed only for purposes of giving effect to the provisions therein. Such regulations can be effective only with previous approval of the Central Government....
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....aff Regulations of 1960 and they formed the service conditions of Development Officers. The respondents contend that the agreements were not industrial awards or settlements enforceable under Section 18 or Section 19 of the I.D. Act. Counsel for the respondents also contends that the only manner in which service conditions of employees of the Corporation could be promulgated being by framing regulations under Section 49, apart from orders under Section 11(2) of the Act, the agreements could not be countenanced by the courts. He referred us to the decision in Sukhdev Singh's case (1975) ILLJ 399 SC in support of this submission. We are, however, not persuaded to accept this submission in view of the position taken up by the Corporation in regard to the same agreements in earlier litigations on almost the same matter. Dealing with the 1964 agreement, this was what was observed by Chandrasekhara Menon J., in the decision reported in 1976 I LLJ 28 : (1976 Lab IC 1242 :- It would appear that all agreements relating to the terms and conditions of the Development Officers throughout India were entered into with this Federation. On 10th March, 1964, there was a settlement betw....
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.... to the terms of that provision:-- 9A Notice of change.-- No employer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change:-- (a) without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or (b) within twenty-one days of giving such notice ; Provided that no notice shall be required for effecting any such change - (a) where the change is effected in pursuance of any settlement, award or decision of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (48 of 1950); or (b) where the workmen likely to be affected by the change are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations....
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.... disadvantage. The reply affidavit in which specific reference was made to Section 9A of the I.D. Act and in which alteration in conditions of service relating to wages and other incidental benefits was specifically pleaded was filed in 1982, and we are hearing the Original Petition in 1985, after the matter was fully heard by a Division Bench. In paragraph 22 of the Original Petition which was filed as early as in 1979, it was urged that Exts. P2 and P3 result in "arbitrary denial of normal increments due, reduction in salary amounting to reduction in provident fund and gratuity, recovery from pay or withholding of increment, or reduction in or termination of service, which are punishments under Regulation 39 of the LIC (Staff) Regulation, without compliance with the fair procedure prescribed therein". In paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit it was urged that "a reduction in the remuneration payable and a revision of other terms and conditions applicable to the aforesaid class of employees were called for". It is true that specific reference to Section 9A of the I.D. Act was not made in the Original Petition. That is understandable, since the first occasion when Development Offic....
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....e appropriate Government in the official Gazette". It is not the case of the respondents that the rules and regulations issued under the LIC Act had been "notified in this behalf" as contemplated in Clause (b) of the proviso. This submission cannot therefore be sustained. 32. Counsel for the respondents contends that even assuming that conditions of service were changed, such change must be proved to be to the prejudice of the workmen, in which case alone, Section 9A of the I.D. Act would be attracted. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. R. M. Ray (1973) ILLJ 427 SC , to support this submission. He produced a detailed statement of remuneration drawn by some of the Development Officers in the Kerala Region during the financial year 1983-84 in support of his submission that the conditions have only improved and not worsened by Exts. P2 and P3. One of the Development Officers working in Alwaye Branch drew a total amount of Rs. 2,10,675 inclusive of salary, additional conveyance allowance and incentive bonus 16 persons had drawn between Rs. 70,000 and Rs. 1,00,000, whereas nine persons had drawn between Rupees 40,000 and Rs. 70....
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....rt to produce the minimum volume of business. However, the very short question to be decided is as to whether conditions of service of Development Officers obtaining immediately prior to the issue of orders under Section 11(2) and the regulations under Section 49 of the Act in 1976 and then in 1978 were altered to their prejudice without notice as provided in Section 9A of the I. D. Act. We feel no doubt that in spite of the provision for better earnings for more industrious workmen and greater amount of total remuneration drawn by such industrious workmen, the office and the intent of Ext. P3 was to alter the service conditions in relation to wages and customary privileges and benefits. If such alterations did really work to the prejudice of the workmen, notice under Section 9A of the I.D. Act could not have been avoided. It cannot be disputed that the Development Officers, who were on assured salary with periodical increments, stood to gain on the basis of incentives for larger volume of business generated by them. It is equally beyond dispute that such of the officers as could not or would not generate at least the optimum business were to lose their increments, were to suffer r....
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....stically, arbitrarily and therefore vindictively. 34. As far as the first of these submissions is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the Development Officers were being treated as a well defined and separate class ever since the formation of the Corporation. They stand out as a separate class by reason of the nature of the duties performed by them, the service conditions under which they were working and the benefits which they were enjoying unlike the other categories of employees of the Corporation, the Development Officers are working in the field with no fixed hours of work; and the only method of measuring their work is to assess the volume of business with reference to ascertainable standards. A complaint that other officers of the Corporation who are distinct and separate classes are dealt with differently cannot at all be countenanced. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations contained in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ajay Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1130 : 1984 Lab IC 691 35. We, have already dealt in some detail with the latter aspect of the submission. We have held that determination of operational areas with reference....
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....goes back to its nativity and the order becomes unenforceable ab initio. It is in this sense and in this sense alone can a distinction be made between void and voidable orders. The exercise of power becomes void when it is so declared. The same principle is stated by Friedman in his Treatise on Principles of Australian Administrative Law as follows:-- A regulation which falls outside the scope of the powers conferred by Parliament will, if contested, be held void by Courts as ultra vires. 37. A further consideration of this point seems to be academic at this stage in view of the fact that we have declared Exts. P2 and P3 ultra vires of Section 11(2) of the Act, and violative of Section 9A of the I.D. Act. On the basis of the observation of the Supreme Court contained in the decision reported in Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat 1974 CriL J1054 , the declaration dates back to the date of promulgation of Exts. P2 and P3. The effect of such declaration is that Exts. P2 and P3 were never validly enacted. Effect of Act 1 of 1981 on the validity of Exts. P2 and P3. 38. Counsel for the petitioners submits that what Act 1 of 1981 seeks to resurrect are these instruments which....
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....nd Sub-section (2C) and any rules made under the said Clause (cc) shall have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment etc." Ext. P3 regulation shall have effect as rules from the date of its promulgation, viz., 19-12-1978. According to him, Section 2C creates a fiction that Section 48(2)(cc) is deemed to have had effect from 19-12-1978 so as to validate Ext. P3. Regulation and Ext. P2 order as Rules made thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment etc., the I.D. Act or any other law. He relied upon a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Sahadeva Kurup v. Board of Revenue ILR (1979) Ker 275, upholding the validity of an amendment to the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules with effect from the date of promulgation of those rules -- 17-12-1958 -- in exercise of the power under Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 since Section 3 of that Act had provided for continuance of existing rules as if made under that Act by deeming that the "Act had been in force on the date on which such rules were made". He also refers to the decision of the Supreme Court i....
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....ined in Rule 3 of Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules 1981 to nullify the effect of the writ of mandamus issued in Bahadur's case (1981) ILLJ 1 SC , we need not consider the question any further. 41. Though this may be sufficient to dispose of this point, we feel that it is desirable that other aspects of the matter argued by counsel may also be considered in view of the fact that the matter may be taken up in appeal by either side. Counsel for the petitioners submits that Exts. P2 and P3 impose unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to receive increment in the scale of salary, which is property within the comprehension of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that those instruments are liable to be declared invalid as violating Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India, since the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right only with the deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution by the Constitution of India (Forty fourth Amendment) Act with effect from 20-6-1979. It is urged that it was held by the majority of judges in Madan Moh....
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....dan Mohan Pathak's case (1978) ILLJ 406 SC , and Nachane's case (1982) ILLJ 110 SC , were different in the sense that the enactment in the former case and the rule in the latter case were meant to nullify judgments upholding settlements duly entered into and could not therefore be held to be in the interests of the general public. 42. The further point which we have to consider is whether the validation attempted by Section 2 of Act 1 of 1981 would cover Exts. P2 and P3 which were not legally in force on the date of promulgation of the amending Act. The decisions which we have to notice in this regard are Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry [1967] 2 SCR 650 , and Akar v. Attorney General of Sierra Leone (1969) 3 All ER 384. In the former, the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court, per Subba Rao C.J., Shelat and Mitter JJ. held that "where there is abdication or effacement of the legislature concerned in truth and in fact acts contrary to the instrument which constituted it, and the statute would be void and still born". In the latter, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest held; It is to be observed that Act No. 39 does not refer to Act No. 12. It does not at....
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....nd Sub-section (2B) and any rules made under the said Clause (cc) shall have effect and shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any judgment etc., has efficacy to validate Exts. P3 and P2 as rules under Section 48(2)(cc) of the Act. Section 48(2)(cc) is projected back to the date of promulgation of Exts. P2 and P3 namely 19-12-1978, after providing that such deemed rules could be made notwithstanding the provisions of the I.D. Act or any other law etc., for the time being in force. This naturally enables the framing of rules altering service conditions to the prejudice of the workmen without compliance with Section 9A of the I.D. Act or without regard to Section 11(2) of the Act. 44. Counsel for the petitioners, however, submits that it has been held by the Supreme Court in D. J. Bahadur's case (1981) ILLJ 1 SC . that the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act are general provisions in relation to Industrial Relations and would be superseded by the provisions of the I.D. Act in relation to such matters. This pronouncement was made in spite of the fact that Section 11(2) of the Act did contain a non obstante clause, almost identical to....