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2022 (9) TMI 280
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.... & Mr. R. Jawaharlal , Advocates JUDGMENT ( Virtual Mode ) Justice M. Venugopal , Member ( Judicial ) : Company Appeal ( AT ) ( CH ) No. 43 of 2022 : Introduction : The Appellant/Respondent has preferred the instant Comp. App (AT) (CH) No. 43 of 2022 in renumbered TCP/1/2016 (CA/1/2014, on the file of Company Law Board) in CA/69/2016, on being dissatisfied with the 'impugned order' dated 26.05.2022, passed by the 'National Company Law Tribunal', Chennai Bench, in allowing TCA/1/2016. Appellant's Submissions : 1. The Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Dhruv Mehta, appearing for the 'Appellant' / 'Chettinad Coal Washeries Pvt. Ltd., submits that the 'Applicant' ('Deceased') filed CA/1/2014, as per Section 73 (4) read with Section 74 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, claiming that the 'Interest - Free Loan' given by him earlier to 01.04.2013 when Section 73 and 74 of the Companies Act, 2013 (came into force) had obtained the 'Nature of Deposit', under Section 74 of the Companies Act, 2013, and that the 'Appellant'/'Company' should be directed to return the same (Principal Sum - Rs.55,26,38,122.91, Interest Sum - Rs.11,05,27,625/-). 2. The Learned Counsel for the Appel....
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....at the 'Appellant' had filed 'Documents' to demonstrate that with the consent of the 'Applicant' (Deceased - during his lifetime) the same was converted into long term (10 years interest free loan) and after adjusting the sum payable by the Applicant (Deceased) Rs.38,52,88,189/- was standing in the Books and it would become payable to the 'Legal Heir', only during March 2023. 8. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant takes a stand that assuming that the 1st Respondent is impleaded and the 'Tribunal' holds that the 'Loan' is actually, in the nature of deposit and directs the 'Appellant' to repay to the 1st Respondent and assuming the 'Will' is held as 'not legal' and 'valid', the 1st Respondent's argument that all the movable properties including the 'Loan', listed in the Schedule to the 'Will' were orally gifted, will stand automatically disproved. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant proceeds to point out that if the 'Will' is not 'Proved' in the 'Testamentary Proceedings', before the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the Schedule attached to the 'Will' also stands disproved. Hence, the 1st Respondent's claim that the movables listed in the 'Schedule' to the 'Will' was orally gi....
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....ans voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another". Therefore, transfer of possession of the alleged deposit is a requirement to comply with the ingredients of Section 123 of the TP Act, read with Section 2 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. 14. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant comes out with a plea that even assuming the alleged deposit, forming part of the 'Schedule' to the 'Will', handing over of the 'Will', will not constitutes 'Delivery' and for an illustration, if a rare painting was orally gifted, by writing on a 'piece of paper' the name of the painting and handing over the paper, the same would not constitute delivery, as contemplated in Section 123 of the TP Act read with Section 2 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act. 15. Alternatively, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that if the said amount is taken as a 'Loan' (subject matter of the Application as well as Interlocutory Application, filed by the 'Appellant', on maintainability), it would constitute an 'Actionable Claim', as per Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 16. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant adverts to Section 130 of the TP Act, 1882, by stating that an 'Actio....
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.... a single Judge decision of Gentle J. reported In re Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd. (1), where the question was whether a fixed deposit receipt could be transferred by an endorsement on its back, and it was held that it was not a negotiable instrument and an endorsement on the back did not have the same effect as an endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note and that under Section 130, Subsection (1), of the Transfer of Property Act, a written instrument was necessary. Evidently the endorsement on the back of the promissory note was not accepted as an instrument in writing signed by the transferor. The two other cases cited by him are reported in Doraisami v. Doriswami Iyangar (2) B.N. Ry. Employee's U. Bank v. Seager (3). The first was not a case relating to a fixed deposit and the question mainly was as to what amounted to a written assignment of the debt. The second was a case of a creation of an equitable charge. None of these three cases are really very helpful on the point before us, but on a careful examination of the section, I have come to the conclusion that the proper section applicable was Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. ....
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....he 'Private Trust Deed' and hence the same is 'conveyance', as per Section 2 (10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, subject to stamp duty under Tamil Nadu Stamp Act. Moreover, the 1st Respondent had not produced any stamp document and as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, no instrument chargeable with duty (and if not duty is paid) shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Therefore, it is the contention of the Appellant that the 1st Respondent cannot place any reliance on the alleged transfer of the 'Loan'/'Deposit' by the 'Private Trust' to the '1st Respondent'. 18. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the '1st Respondent' had placed reliance on the 'Will' of the 'Applicant' (Deceased) to 'Claim' that the 'movables' listed in the 'Schedule' were orally 'Gifted' on 30.09.2015. Added further, even assuming that the execution and validity of the 'Will' is not established by the 1st Respondent in 'Testamentary Proceedings' before the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the very basis of oral 'Gift' fails and that the 1st Respondent cannot be impleaded, based on the reliance made on the 'Will'. In this connection, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant points out that t....
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.... possession in future'. Clause 9 : The said Clause of the Trust Deed indicates the 'Beneficiaries' of the Trust and it is evident that Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar will be the sole 'Beneficiary of the Trust', during his life time. Clause 9 (3) : In the said Clause of the Trust Deed, it is mentioned that after the lifetime of the settlor, the properties of this Trust would go to Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar of Chettinad Charitable Trust, the charitable trust registered under Doc. No. 51 of 2015 dt. 09/02/2015 in the Office of SRO, Mylapore. Clause 14 : The said Clause of the Trust Deed, provides that the duration of the Trust shall be for the lifetime of the 'Settlor' and thereafter as provided by Clause 9 (3) aforesaid, the properties of the Trust shall vest in the Trustees of Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar of Chettinad Charitable Trust." 22. The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent points out that the perusal of the registered 'Will' dated 18.02.2015 of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' under Clause 5 mentions about the constitution of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Trust' and 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar of Chettinad Charitable Trust' and....
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....epted by the 'Private Trust'. That apart, following the demise of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy on 02.12.2015', the properties gifted by 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' on 30.09.2015 to 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar Trust', became the properties of the '1st Respondent' / 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar of Chettinad Charitable Trust'. 27. The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent submits that the '1st Respondent' / 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar of Chettinad Charitable Trust' is entitled, to step into the shoes of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy', before the 'National Company Law Tribunal', because of the fact that the 'Deposits', lying with the 'Appellant' / 'Company' was gifted to 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy Chettiar Trust' and consequent to the demise of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' on 02.12.2015, it became the property of the '1st Respondent' in view of 'Clause 9 (3)' of the 'Deed of Trust' dated 16.02.2015. 28. It is pointed out on behalf of the 1st Respondent that the 'Appellant'/'Company' cannot take advantage of the fact that it had not issued the 'Deposit Receipt' and further that 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' had listed out all the movable properties, through a registered 'Will' dated 18.02.2015 and handed over....
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....ll ownership of Mrs. Mitter of this house, it would amount to this that the appellant was saying that Mrs. Mitter was the owner of the house as the legatee under the will made by Dr. Miss Mitter. The appellant would thus be asserting the ownership of Mrs. Mitter of the whole house as a legatee, and this is what sub-section (1) of Section 213 clearly forbids, for it says that no right as a legatee can be established in a Court of Justice, unless the Probate or letters of administration have been obtained of the will under which the right as a legatee is claimed. It is true that so far as the will of Mrs. Mitter in favour of the appellant is concerned, she has obtained letters of administration of that and she can maintain her right as a legatee under that will; but that will in her favour only gives her those properties which really and truly belonged to Mrs. Mitter, that will however does not create title in the appellant in properties which did not really and truly belonged to Mrs. Mitter that will however does not create title in the appellant in properties which did not really and truly belong to Mrs. Mitter but which Mrs. Mitter might have thought it fit to include in the will.....
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....The right under the will which was claimed was that Mrs. Mitter became the owner of the entire house. Of course without the will Mrs. Mitter was an equal heir with her daughters of the property left by Dr. Miss Mitter, as the latter would be taken to have died intestate, and would thus be entitled to one-fourth. It will be seen from the judgment of the High Court that it has held that the appellant is entitled to the one-fourth share to which Mrs. Mitter was entitled as an heir to Dr. Miss Mitter and granted the plaintiff-respondent a declaration with respect to only half the house. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that Section 213 would bar the appellant from establishing the right of her mother as a legatee from Dr. Miss Mitter as no Probate or letters of administration had been obtained of the alleged will of Dr. Miss Mitter in favour of Mrs. Mitter. The contention of the appellant on this head must therefore fail. Re. (ii). 8. Turning now to the question of res judicata, learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to point out any judgment inter parties in which the question of title to this house has been decided and which would bar the plaintiff-r....
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....id to have acted in her turn with respect to this house simply because Mrs. Bose said in her application for letters of administration that the house belonged to Mrs. Mitter. It appears that after the death of Mrs. Mitter the three sisters put forward sthree separate wills each in her favour and there was no question of one sister acting on any representation made by another. We are therefore of opinion that no question of estoppel arises in this case. 33. The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent cites the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Commissioner, Jalandhar Division & Ors. v. Mohan Krishan Abrol & Anr., (2004) 7 SCC Page 505 at Spl. Pg. 513, wherein at paragraph 10, it is observed as under: 10. "A bare reading of Section 211 shows that the property vests in the executors by virtue of the will and not by virtue of the probate. Will gives property to the executor; the grant of probate is only a method by which the law provides for establishing the Will. In the case of Kulwanta Bewa v. Karam Chand Soni [AIR 1938 Calcutta 714], it has been held that Section 211 provides that the estate of the deceased vests in the executor; that the vesting is not of the....
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....e legacy of the demised premises in the Hospital and consequently, the eviction proceedings were maintainable under the 1973 Act." 34. The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent adverts to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Manovikas Kendra Rehabilitation & Research Institute v. Prem Prakash Lodha, (2005) 7 SCC 224 Spl. Page at 226 , wherein at Paragraph 3, it is observed as under: 3. " Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. What would be the effect of the death of the landlord on the decree for eviction, passed by two courts below, shall have to be examined by the High Court if it can take note of such subsequent event, but before a decree under appeal may be reversed someone shall have to be heard in support of the decree. The term "legal representative" has been defined in clause (11) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as meaning a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermediates with the estate of the deceased. The question of abatement would arise only when there is no legal representative. The....
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.... proved only in an appropriate probate proceeding. Unless the said Will of the year 1993 is proved that it is the last Will of the deceased and it satisfies all the other legal requirements, the earlier Will for which Letters of Administration proceeding has been initiated cannot be negatived. Proof of the same cannot be made in the present Suit because the same could be done if only the Respondents approach the Court for probating the said Will either by making a counter claim or by initiating separate proceedings. For the Respondents, the right to oppose the issuance of probate in respect of the earlier Will itself is derived only from the unprobated subsequent Will. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in Ganshmdoss v Gulab Bi Bai, AIR 1927 Mad 1054, the bar contained in Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act is applicable even to a Defendant in a Suit. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the purpose for which the Will of the year 1993 is sought to be proved by the Respondents in evidence is only for the main purpose to establish that the said Will is the last Will cancels the earlier Will and the said purpose is not merely collateral as it is sought to be made out by t....
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....father, because of his 'unsound state of mind', acceded to such evil designs. 41. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant points out that the 'Appellant' / 'Legal Heir' of the 'deceased Applicant', had applied for a 'Legal Heir' Certificate, before the Tahsildar, Mylapore Taluk, Chennai, which was contested by the '1st Respondent' and that after the detailed enquiry, based on the supporting documents furnished by the 'Appellant' and arriving at a satisfaction, the 'Legal Heir Certificate' was issued on 11.03.2016. 42. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant brings it to the notice of this 'Tribunal', that the 'Appellant' as 'Sole Legal Heir' of the 'Applicant' (since deceased), preferred an 'Application' on 29.02.2016 under Regulation 28 of the Company Law Board Regulations, for 'substituting himself' as the 'Legal Heir' and later filed an 'Application' for substitution on 31.03.2016 and at that point of time,. the 'National Company Law Tribunal Rules', were not notified, hence they are inapplicable. In this connection, it is the plea of the 'Appellant' that Regulation 28 of the Company Law Board Regulations should have been considered and the said Regulation runs as under: ....
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....1st Respondent' has claimed that 'all movables were gifted on 30.09.2015' by the 'Applicant' ('Deceased') to the 'Private Trust', before the Hon'ble Madras High Court, the '1st Respondent' had claimed 'Right' to the 'Shares' of 'Chettinad Cement Corporation Limited' (even though shares are movable) and thus the '1st Respondent' takes a 'contra' stand to suit its convenience. 48. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that in regard to certain other movables Viz. Motor Vehicles (which were also 'allegedly', 'orally', gifted by the 'Applicant' ('Deceased') to the 'Private Trust' and on the death of the 'Applicant' ('Deceased'), were to be transferred to the '1st Respondent', it is brought to the fore that, the '1st Respondent' filed a 'Writ Petition No.11045 of 2017', wherein it had prayed for an 'issuance of direction' against the 'Regional Transport Officer', Chennai, to transfer ownership to the 'Charitable Trust' and on 13.07.2018, the Hon'ble High Court of Madras at paragraphs 12 to 14, had observed the following: 12. "Having considered the facts and circumstance of the case the main contention of the petitioner is that 12 Vehicles which are subject matter of ....
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....erted as TOS No. 27 of 2021). The purported Trust Deeds dated 09.02.2015 and 16.02.2015 not having got the sanction of any court of law, the suit is barred and liable to be thrown out in limine and no cause of action is made out (Appl No. 1129 of 2019)." and that the said 'Application' was dismissed on 17.03.2022. 50. In this regard, the 'Appellant' submits that the 'Hon'ble High Court' had opined that the 'issue involved needs to be tested in 'Trial' and therefore, 'Tribunal' could not have decided the matter in a 'Summary Proceedings'. 51. It is the version of the 'Appellant' that the 'Appellant' had filed O.S.A. 127 of 2022 (an 'Appeal' before the 'Hon'ble High Court of Madras' and that an 'interim stay' was granted on 06.06.2022 and the main 'Appeal' is pending consideration. In fact, the '1st Respondent' is indulging in 'Forum Shopping', in a bid to appropriate the 'movable properties', even before determination of the 'Title' to the 'Movables', owned by the 'Applicant' ('Deceased'), which can only be done either in the pending 'Testamentary Proceedings' or by way of a 'Civil Suit'. 52. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the '1st Respondent' is not....
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....cord. After the death of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy', as per Clause 9 (3) of the 'Trust Deed' dated 01.02.2015, all the properties are vested with the '1st Respondent'. The 1st Respondent is the 'Successor-in-interest' of the 'Donee' of the 'movable property', gifted by 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' and therefore, it is contended that the '1st Respondent' is entitled to get itself substituted in place of 'Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy'. 59. The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent submits that the 'National Company Law Tribunal' is entitled to decide all the disputed questions of fact and if need be, may direct the 'Parties' to adduce the evidence by means of an 'Affidavit' and also permit the 'Parties' to be cross-examined. Citation of 1st Respondent: 60. The Learned Counsel for the '1st Respondent' relies on the decision in Cherichi v. Ittianam AIR 2001 Kerala 184, wherein at Paragraphs 7, 8 and 10, it is observed and held as under: 7. "Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") says that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court unless a Court of competent jurisdiction has granted probate of the Will under which the....
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....Will must be one in respect of which probate has been granted. Obtaining of probate in respect of a Will can also be for purposes other than the purpose for which it is not necessary to get a probate and for that reason also it cannot be said that after the amendment to Section 213 of the Act, there is no need for granting probate, or Letters of Administration. 10. In Sheonath Singh v. Madanlal, AIR 1959 Rajasthan 243, it was held that Section 213 of the Act does not vest any right or rather any substantive right in anybody and what it really does is to regulate the mode of proving a Will, that is, procedure. It was further observed in the above decision that what Section 213 really does is that it lays down a rule of procedure, that Rule being that a person seeking to establish his right in any Court of justice as executor or legatee under a Will must have obtained the probate of the Will under certain circumstances mentioned in the Section. The Section precludes the establishment of a right as executor or legatee in a Court of justice but does not affect the right as such for which the Court must look elsewhere. The High Court of Rajasthan was of the definite view that S....
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....of the deceased and it is not necessarily confined to her alone. Therefore, the 'Executors', 'Administrators', Assignors are 'persons' acquiring interest by devolution under 'Order 20 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code' or a 'Legatee' under the 'Will' or 'Legal Representatives', as per decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Chiranjilal v. Jasjit Singh, reported in 1993 (2), SCC Page 507. Indian Succession Act, 1925: 65. Section 211 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, 'Character and property of executor or administrator' as such - reads as (1) 'The executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such' (2) 'When the deceased was a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, [Sikh, Jaina or Parsi] or an exempted person, nothing herein contained shall vest in an executor or administrator any property of the deceased person which would otherwise have passed by survivorship to some other person'. 66. It is pointed out by this 'Tribunal', that in the Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras dated 07.09.2015 in O.S.A. No. 174 of 2015 (Division Bench), between....
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....f 1913), and having the debt mentioned therein, or (iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (7 of 1889), or (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein.' (2) 'The word "debt" in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes.' 70. Section 215 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, - under the Caption 'Effect on certificate of subsequent probate or letters of administration runs to the effect that -(1) 'A grant of probate or letters of administration in respect of an estate shall be deemed to supersede any certificate previously granted under Part X or under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 (7 of 1889), or Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, in respect of any debts or securities included in the estate.' (2) 'When at the time of the grant of the probate or letters any suit or other proceeding instituted by the holder of any such certificate regarding any such debt or security i....
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....t of loan. Whether a deposit amounts to a loan depends upon the terms of the contract whereunder the deposit is made." Companies Act, 1956: 76. To be noted, that the 'Explanation' to Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, provided for the purpose of this Section 'Deposit' means, any 'disposition' of 'money' with and includes, any 'amount' borrowed by a 'Company', shall not include such 'Categories of Amount', as may be prescribed in consultation with the 'Reserve Bank of India'. For invoking the jurisdiction of the 'Tribunal', even partial failure by the 'company', would suffice in the considered opinion of this 'Tribunal'. Companies Act, 2013: 77. Section 2 (31) of the Companies Act, 2013, defines 'Deposit', which includes, any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form by a company, but does not include such categories of amount as may be prescribed in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India. Filing of Suit: 78. Under Section 75 of the Companies Act, 2013, action can be taken by an 'Individual Depositor' or by a 'Group of Depositor' or 'Association of Persons', by filing a 'Suit' or the 'Proceedings' against the 'Company' and its 'Officers....
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....written with a 'positive vein'. 86. What is important is that, the reasons are clear and explicit, so as to exhibit that the 'Tribunal'/'Adjudicating Authority' had given due weightage / consideration to the points in 'controversy', in a given case. Undoubtedly, the assigning of reasons in a 'given proceedings', specified by an 'Authority'/'Tribunal', is the 'Heart' and 'Soul' of any 'Order', which will stand the test of 'scrutiny' before a 'Superior Forum'. Assessment (in Comp. App (AT) (CH) Nos. 43 & 45 of 2022): 87. It transpires from the contents of CA/1/2014 (on the file of erstwhile 'Company Law Board', Chennai Bench), later on renumbered as TCP/1/2016 (on the file of 'National Company Law Tribunal', Chennai), the 'Applicant' ('Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy', since deceased) had prayed for issuance of directions in making the repayment of the 'Deposit Sum' / 'Loan' of Rs.55,26,38,122.91 along with 'Interest' due thereon. In reality, in CA/1/2014 (TCP/1/2016), the 'Applicant' ('Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy' - Deceased) had claimed the actual sum due Viz. (Principal - Rs. 55,26,38,122.91), (Interest - Rs.11,05,27,625/-). In CA/1/2014 in TCP/1/2016 at Serial No. V, under the Caption 'Te....
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....n' was given by the 'Applicant' from 23.03.2013 to 31.03.2013, as a 'Member' to a 'Private Company' of which he was a 'Member' (Company) and hence the fetter as per Section 73 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, has no 'Application' whatsoever. 92. Besides the above, Section 73 (4) of the Companies Act, 2013, will apply, only in respect of 'Deposits' taken from 'members' after the commencement of the Companies Act, 2013, and that that too, in compliance with Section 72 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013, therefore, invocation of Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board, as per Section 73 (4) of the Companies Act, 2013, is not maintainable. 93. The clear cut position taken by the 'Appellant' / 'Chettinad Coal Washeries Private Limited' in its 'Reply' (to CA/1/2014) was that Section 74 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013, relates to 'Deposit' under the Companies Act, 1956, as defined in the 'Deposit Rules, 1975. Hence, a 'Loan' which falls within the exclusion under Rule 2 (b) ix of the Deposit Rules, 1975 (as in the present case) does not fall in the ambit of Section 74 (1) of the Companies Act, 2013. 94. Further, in the instant case, according to the 'Appellant', a 'Loan' was given before th....
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.... to the 'Appellant' / 'Company' and further the 'Applicant' also owed monies to 'Chettinad Corporation Private Limited' (another Group Company) and with the consent of the 'Applicant' (since Deceased), the aforesaid dues were settled by adjusting a sum of Rs.12,95,49,934/- from the long-term-interest-free loan in the Financial Year 2013-14. Therefore, the total sum of long-term-interest-free loan standing in the Books of the 'Appellant' / 'Company', in the name of the Applicant (since Deceased) is only Rs.38,52,88,189/- and this particular fact was suppressed by the 'Applicant' in 'CA/1/2014'. 99. On behalf of the 'Appellant'/'Company' ('Chettinad Coal Washeries Private Limited') in Comp. App (AT) (CH) No. 43 of 2022, it is brought to the notice of this 'Tribunal, on 24.07.2017 in CA/1/2016 in CA/1/2014, the 'National Company Law Tribunal', Division Bench-I, Chennai, had passed the following order: "Counsel for Petitioner present. Counsel for Respondent also present and submitted that the matter has been filed under the testamentary jurisdiction in the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in relation to probate of the will of late Dr. M.A.M. Ramasamy Chettiar. The same has been....
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.... 104. It must be borne in mind that in CA/1/2014 (filed before the Company Law Board, Chennai), the 'Applicant' was Dr. M.A.M. Ramaswamy (deceased) and a direction was sought from the 'Appellant' / 'Chettinad Coal Washeries Private Limited' (Respondent in CA/1/2014), to make 'repayment' of the 'Deposit' / 'Loan' along with interest, due thereon. Further, in TCA/1/2016 in TCP/1/2016 and CA/69/2016 in TCP/1/2016 before the 'National Company Law Tribunal', Division Bench-I, Chennai the 'Appellant' in Comp. App (AT) (CH) No. 43 of 2022 is shown as 'Respondent'. Taking into account of the fact that the 'Appellant'/'Chettinad Coal Washeries Private Limited' as Respondent had filed a detailed 'Reply' in CA/1/2014, filed by the 'Applicant' (Deceased), taking different pleas, denying the 'Claim' of the 'Applicant' in 'CA/1/2014' that the 'interest-free loan' was in fact interest bearing (15%) deposit, was an after thought, unsupported by any documentation, etc., this 'Tribunal', keeping in mind the 'reliefs' sought for, by the respective 'Applicants' in TCA/1/2016 (CA/1/2016) and CA/69/2016 (in TCP/1/2016) comes to a categorical conclusion, that the 'Appellant' in Comp. App (AT) (CH) No.43....
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....9. Continuing further, the 'validity', 'execution' and 'legality' of the 'Will' is inter-oven with the 'Claim' of the '1st Respondent' / 'Trust' that all the 'Movable Properties', including the 'Loan' given by the 'Applicant' (Deceased) was orally gifted to the 'Private Trust' in terms of the 'Deed of Trust' dated 16.02.2015 and by the covenants of the said 'Deed of Trust', they were transferred to the '1st Respondent'/'Trust', on the death of the 'Applicant'. 110. It cannot be brushed aside that the 'Tribunals' are chosen to deliver 'justice' to the 'Litigants'. The 'National Company Law Tribunal' is performing a 'judicial function' to 'dispense justice' and cannot 'dispense with justice', in our processual system of jurisprudence. 111. As far as the present case is concerned, that on behalf of the '1st Respondent'/'Trust' (in Comp. App (AT) (CH) No. 43 of 2022), that a plea was raised before the 'National Company Law Tribunal', Chennai Bench, that the 'Oral Gift of all Movables', including the purported 'Deposit' was made by the 'Applicant' (Deceased) on 30.09.2015. As a matter of fact, the 'Appellant'/'Chettinad Coal Washeries Private Limited', in its 'Reply' took various ....