TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2008 (9) TMI 1026
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..... The Appellant resultantly of the accident sustained permanent disability to the extent of 48%. He filed a Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being Case No. 26, of 1987 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Latur, which was contested and decided finally by the Tribunal vide its judgment and award dated 5th May 1989 awarding compensation of Rs. 51,000/- only with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the claim petition. This judgment of the Tribunal was impugned by the Claimant by filing First Appeal No. 638 of 1989 before this Court praying for enhancement of the compensation awarded. The owner-driver of the jeep died on 16th July, 1987 during the pendency of the Claim Petition before the Tribunal. 2. The Insurance Company had denied its liability and the present Appeal was only preferred against the respondent No. 1-owner of the vehicle. The Deputy Director of Health Services-original respondent No. 1, being owner of the jeep also preferred Appeal being First Appeal No. 637 of 1989 impugning the judgment of the Tribunal. First Appeal No. 637 of 1989 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide common judgment dated 12....
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....atter came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on 22nd February 2008, the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties relied upon different judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court to argue for and against the very maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal in view of the provisions of Sections 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "M.V. Act") Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench of this Court noticed the view expressed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Asha d/o Bhalchandra Joshi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.: 2008(2)BomCR76 , and the view of the other Benches and noticing the difference of opinion expressed in different judgments, directed the matter to be referred to a larger Bench for settling the legal issue involved in the present case with regard to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal. 6. It will be useful to refer to the Order of Reference dated 22nd February 2008 which reads as under: 1. The learned Counsel, appearing for the appellant, stated that Full Bench Judgment of this Hi....
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....edure is specific but still of wide connotation and impact. It contemplates that in absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law, special judicial jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed under any other law. This section, upon its plain construction, indicates the purpose for incorporating such a provision. The Code of Civil procedure being a Code to control and regulate the proceedings before the Courts under various remedies and enforcing law makes a clear exception in regard to operation and effect of a specific provision contained in any other law unless some provision of Code specifically excludes an application of that other provision. General Rule is that wherever a special provision renders the general provision incapable to apply to a remedy, then the provisions of the Code will not limit or affect such special provision. 9. An appeal to be filed under a decree or order passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction is again controlled by the specific provision of the Code. Under Section 9....
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.... 1882 was replaced by Code of 1908. However, Section 100A was introduced for the first time by Amending Act 104 of 1976. The intent was to bar third appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the Single Judge deciding a matter in a Second Appeal. By the amending Act of 1999, the earlier Section 100A was substituted. Section 100A as introduced by Amending Act 46 of 1999, though attained the assent of the President on 30th December 1999, it was not enforced because of various factors. Clause (b) of Section 100A was subsequently deleted finally and as already noticed, by the amending Act of 2002, present Section 100A was introduced. Present Section 100A reads as under: 13. Section 100A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single judge. The design behind frequent amendments of these provisions is obvious. Legislative a....
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....on the value of the case, the appeal from the original decree is either heard by a single Judge or by a Division Bench of the High Court. 16. Where the regular first appeal so filed is heard by a Division Bench, the question of there being an intra-Court appeal does not arise. It is only in cases where the value is not substantial that the Rules of the High Court may provide for the regular first appeal to be heard by a single Judge. In such a case to give a further right of appeal where the amount involved is nominal to a Division Bench will really be increasing the workload unnecessarily. We do not find that any prejudice would be caused to the litigants by not providing for intra-Court appeal, even where the value involved is large. In such a case, the High Court by Ryles, can provide that the Division Bench will hear the regular first appeal. No fault can, thus, be found with the amended provision Section 100-A. 17. Of course, the application of Section 100A is stated to be prospective and would not affect the right and remedies of an Appellant who had filed the Appeal prior to 1st July, 2002. In other words, accrued right of appeal vested in a suitor was not affected. Th....
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....e right of Second Appeal the intra-Court appeals are impermissible specifically in face of the fact that constitutional validity of Section 100A has been upheld. The scope of Section 100A is so wide that it would take into its sweep not only other laws but even the Letters Patent of a High Court. The intention of the Legislature in taking away of right of appeal by abolishing an intra-Court appeal to a Bench of two Judges of the very High Court against a decision rendered by a Single Judge, is in no way prejudicial to the protected right of appeal of a litigant. The Scheme of Section 100A thus indicates that intra-Court appeal from an appellate jurisdiction of a Single Judge of the High Court is not permissible. 20. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is considered and was enacted as social welfare legislation to provide adequate compensation to the people who sustained bodily injuries or to dependents of persons who are killed in vehicular accident expeditiously. This Act has been considered even as a self-contained Code as it provides methodology to be adopted for institution of claim petition, powers of the Tribunal and passing of an award and how such an award would be executed. Th....
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....wers vested in a Civil Court in relation to the procedural matters and is vested with wide powers including Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code. Some of the other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are also applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal. Some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure i.e. Orders V, VI, VII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXII, XXXVII AND XXXIX are also applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal. These provisions clearly indicate that the Tribunal has all trapping of a Civil Court may be in stricto sensu it is not a Court within the meaning of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure by and large are applicable in all matters to the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in exercise of its power is obliged to determine all issues in controversy of fact and law in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. As already noticed, even the provisions relating to amendment of pleadings additional evidence, service of summons and proceedings by an indigent person, all are applica....
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....#39;. Further in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and Anr. reported in (1965)ILLJ433SC , it was stated by the Supreme Court that the presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possesses the said trapping, is the judicial power of the State or not, and the main and the basic test, however, is whether the adjudicating power which is the particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. 26. Applying this principle, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 was a Tribunal having the trappings of a Court. More so, in the case of State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi and Ors. reported in [1979]3SCR184 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, stated that as under: The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will apply to the ....
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.... case was whether a claimant before the Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the 'Act' is entitled to the benefit of Order 33, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. The Tribunal had, in that case, negatived this claim holding that Order 33, Civil Procedure Code was not one of those provisions which had expressly been made applicable by the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Rules, 1964. In support of its view the Tribunal had relied upon an earlier opinion expressed by Dua, J. that Section 110C of the M.V. Act by no means clothed the Tribunal with all the characteristics of a Civil Court. But in Darshana Devi's case AIR 1978 Punj and Har 265, Koshal, C.J. did not subscribe to the earlier view of Dua, J. but referred, with approval, to a Full Bench judgment of that Court in Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala, in which, Jain, J. speaking for the Full Bench had said (at p.72): The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal closely resemble the proceedings in a Civil Court and to use the language of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore's case 1967CriLJ1380a , the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the ....
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....nder consideration. Supreme Court said: In view of the observations of this Court in State of Haryana v. Dharshan Devi, we are of the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the M.V. Act is a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. We are satisfied that the cases before us are fit cases for being transferred from the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Moradabad to the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Delhi.... (Emphasis supplied) This pronouncement of the Supreme Court should now serve to put the controversy at rest. In view of this pronouncement, the view taken in State of Karnataka v. Subbanna AIR 1974 Kar 109 and in Revanappa's case AIR 1983 Kar 164 that such a Tribunal is not a 'Court' cannot continue to hold the field. 31. A Bench of this Court in Gurucharansing Hardayalsing Sethi v. Narhari Laxman Shinde and Ors. reported in (1996)98BOMLR184 observed that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a persona designata and stated that it is a Court subordinate to High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ....
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....on characteristic viz.; both the Courts as well as Tribunals are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial functions as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. It is the State's inherent judicial power which is discharged by the Courts and Tribunals. If the Company Law Board constituted under the Companies Act in its adjudicatory powers has the trappings of a Court and an appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act from its order to the single Judge is not amenable to further appeal (Letters Patent) to the Division Bench of the same Court because of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, a fortiori, an order passed by the Single Judge in appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act from the order/award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal shall not be subject to intra-Court appeal in view of the bar created by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure effective from 1st July, 2002. (Emphasis supplied) 34. In the light of the above judgment and consistent view taken by the Courts there can hardly be any doubt that the Tribunal does have trappings of a Court. It satisfies all the tests stated above. ....
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....ects. It provides for filing an appeal by any person aggrieved by an award of the Claim Tribunal provided the amount in appeal is not less than Rs. 10,000/-. Such appeals are to be filed within 90 days and the appeal would be entertained by the High Court subject to satisfaction of the conditions stipulated under the proviso 1 of Section 173(1) of the Act. In terms of proviso 2 of Section 173(1) of the Act, the High Court can entertain an appeal even after the expiry of 90 days if it has shown sufficient cause for preferring an appeal beyond time. In other words, this provision indicates the scope of powers of the High Court while entertaining an appeal under the said provision. The ambit, scope and the powers thus have been outlined by the Legislature itself and may not be dependent on the provisions of other laws. 37. There is no provision in the entire M.V. Act which provides for further appeal from the judgment passed by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. Once the M.V. Act provides for a remedy of First Appeal and does not specify availability of any further right of appeal, it is obvious that the Legislature does n....
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....al right. 39. An appeal is an application to a superior Court or Tribunal praying for reversal or varying or setting aside a judgment under appeal. A right which is conferred by statute or equivalent legislative authority is not a matter of practice or procedure and neither the superior nor the inferior Court or Tribunal nor both combined can create or take away such a right. Even the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal in England is bound by its own decisions. No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of Appeal as to whether a judgment or order is, for any purpose connected with an appeal to that Court, final or interlocutory. Right to appeal thus should be created by vested specific jurisdiction. (Halsbury Laws of England, Fourth Edition). 40. In the case of Garikapati Veeraya (supra), the Supreme Court in unambiguous terms stated the principle that right of appeal is a vested right which is created by a statute alone. This was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a more recent judgment and was followed with approval in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), where the Court held that right to prefer appeal is a statutory right and it could be exercised only in case of adverse decisio....
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....statutory right can be conditional or qualified. It cannot be said that such a law would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the statute does not create any right of appeal, no appeal can be filed. There is a clear distinction between a suit and an appeal. While every person has an inherent right to bring a suit of a civil nature unless the suit is barred by statute, however, in regard to an appeal, the position is quite opposite. The right to appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for maintainability of an appeal there must be authority of law. When such a law authorizes filing of appeal, it can impose conditions as well. (Para 8). 43. Right of appeal is neither a natural nor inherent right vested in a party. It is substantive statutory right regulated by the statute creating it. Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. [1999]2SCR728 , and Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and Anr. AIR 2008 SCW 2417. Thus, it is evident that the right to appeal is not a right which can be assumed by logical analysis much less by exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It essentially should be provided by the law in force. In absence of any specific provision creating a....
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....notwithstanding anything herein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a Judgment of one Judge of the said High Court from a Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judge of the High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs of successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided. 46. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is the provision which grants right of appeal to the aggrieved party against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Court to Letters Patent Bench. The exception carved out to this right of appeal is that the judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisd....
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....om language of Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act holding that appeal under Clause 15 would lie to the Letters Patent Bench. It needs to be noticed that in this case, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the provisions of the Specific Relief Act which in comparison to the Contempt of Courts Act is a statute of general impact. Furthermore, the provisions of Section 6(3) contemplates that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under that Section nor shall any review of such order or decree be allowed. 49. It was on the language of the Section that the Supreme Court was of the view that jurisdiction of the Court under Section 15 of the Letters Patent was not ousted and the appeal was consequently, restored to the file of the High Court. Similarly, in the case of State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Kartick Chandra Das and Ors. AIR1996SC2437 , the Supreme Court again emphasised the principle that in absence of specific exclusion, the provisions of Sections 4 - 24 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act were applicable to the appeals filed under Clause 15 including those under the Contempt of Courts Act. In that case, it was not an issue ....
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....cial dictum does not have a direct bearing to the matters in issue before us in the present appeal. In fact, in the case of Kartick Chandra Das (supra), it was specifically conceded that appeals against notice of contempt lies and there was no determination on the question of maintainability of appeal even with reference to the provisions of Limitation Act. Moreover, these were primarily determination of lis between the parties in regard to certain personal reliefs and were not the cases of discharge of power within special jurisdiction as to contempt. As is evident from the discussion of the judgments relied upon by the appellant, right of Letters Patent Appeal can be taken away by an express provision in an appropriate Legislation. It is not necessary that the Section should expressly use the word "Letters Patent" but if on plain reading of the provision, it is clear that all further appeals are barred then even a Letters Patent Appeal would be barred. The judgments cited by appellant do not have any direct bearing on issue in hand. In the controversy before us inasmuch as the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act....
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....tainly not to permit or grant statutory right of appeal unless the order passed was for grant of punishment for contempt. The Section is self-contained provision and even provides that the appeal shall lie to two Judges Bench of the High Court where the decision is of a Single Judge of that Court and to the Supreme Court where the order is by a Bench of the High Court. The complete mechanism of right to appeal and forum to which the appeal would lie has been spelt out by the Legislature and, thus, there is no reason for the Court to expand its scope to hold that appeal would lie by adding that even the order of discharge shall be included in the expression 'punish for contempt'. .... 54. The appeals are filed against a decree or an order which is I determination of a lis in accordance with law. The appeal would lie against such order or decree with the exception that such order or decree was not made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. A decree as even contemplated under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code would be a finding on matters in issue between the parties and would decide such issues. Thus, the matter referred would be the one which decide the rights of....
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.... is anything in the reported decisions which are contrary to the view I am suggesting. The definition given by Sir Richard Couch, Chief Justice, in the two Calcutta decisions is considered to be a locus classicus as far as the definition of the expression "judgment" is concerned in Clause 15, Letters Patent. The first of these decisions is reported in 8 Beng. L.R. 433. That was a case where an order was made directing the issue of a writ of mandamus to the Justices of the Peace for Calcutta to compel them to refer to arbitration question of compensation, and the question arose whether an appeal lay from that order, and Sir Richard Couch said in his judgment (p. 452): We think that 'judgment' in Clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. In the subsequent decision reported in 13 Beng. L.R. 91 the interpretation was slightly extended and the learned Chief Justice said (page 101): 56. A judgment "is not a mere formal order, or an order merely regulating the procedure in the suit, but one that has the effect of giving a jurisdiction to the Court which it otherwise wo....
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....that in this case the appellant's rights are undoubtedly affected and that a liability has been imposed on him on a final adjudication by the learned Judge. But it is contended by Mr. Taraporewalla that the decision in 38 Bom. L.R. 571 is of wider import than the facts on which it was decided. It is suggested that that decision lays down that there is no appeal from any order made by a Judge in contempt proceedings whether he refuses to commit or whether he makes a committal order. 58. I refuse to read that judgment of the Court of Appeal in that light. What is contended is that that judgment relies on the definition given by Sir Richard Couch C.J. and it is argued that the decision of Bhagwati J. is not a decision between parties and, therefore, it cannot constitute a judgment. Now it is to be remembered that most of the decisions reported in the books dealing with the definition of 'judgment' were cases between parties and usually the question that fell to be determined was whether a certain order was final or interlocutory; and if interlocutory, whether it was 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 15, Letters Patent. What we are concerned with here is no....
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....re Code. The Court clearly stated the dictum that it cannot be said that every order passed by the trial Judge would amount to judgment. 60. It seems that the word "judgment" has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. The Court held that an order even though it keeps the suit alive but still decides an important aspect of the trial and which affects the vital right of the defendants would be liable to be construed as judgment. The Supreme Court in its earlier judgments and reference can be made to the case of Nachiappa Chettiar and Ors. v. Subramaniam Chettiar [1960]2SCR209 , wherein the Apex Court held that the word "judgment" cannot refer to the various interlocutory orders and judgments that may be passed during the hearing of the suit and so the word "judgment" cannot be given the meaning assigned to it by Section 2(9) of the Civil Procedure Code. It cannot mean in the context the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. It must mean a judgment which finally decides all matters in controversy in the suit. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Shri Radhey Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh [1971]1SCR783 ....
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....is clear that right to appeal shall only be available in the cases where there is an order of punishment. The matter primarily and substantially being between the Court and the contemnor, parties to the lis cannot be permitted to raise issues or litigate on the view of the Court that a case of contempt is made out or not. Where the Court in exercise of its judicial discretion and keeping in mind the well settled principles of contempt jurisdiction finds that contempt proceedings need not be initiated, or no contempt is made out or discharges the contemnor on merits of the case, the appeal before the Division Bench even with the aid of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would not be maintainable. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has concluded, as already noticed, that the petitioners themselves are not sure as to which of the contemnors are allowed to use the Welfare Centre and while taking an overall view of the matter held that this was not a fit case where action under the Contempt of Courts Act can be taken. This order of the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, is not appealable in view of the unambiguous language of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and an ap....
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.... provision to appeal can be excluded by a statute expressly and it cannot be excluded by juridical provision barring the appeal. We will shortly proceed to discuss the effect of provision of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure where the Legislature has specifically used non obstante language with particular reference to Letters Patent. Interpretation of Statutes:* * 66. A statute is stated to be a will of the Legislature. It expresses a will of the Legislature, and function of the Court is to interpret the document, according to the intent of them that made it. It is a settled rule of construction of statute that the provisions should be interpreted with application of plain rule of construction. The Courts normally would not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used by the statute. In other words, the Court would keep in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. The right of appeal being creation of a statute and being a statutory right does not invite unnecessary liberal or strict construction. The best norm would be to give literal construction keeping the legislative intent in mind. 67. The Supreme Court in the cas....
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....aimini', the author of Mimamsat Sutras, originally meant for srutis were employed for the interpretation of Smrities also. While referring to the said historical background, the Commission said thus: It is well settled principle of law that as the statute is an edict of the Legislature, the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of legislature. The intention of legislature assimilates two aspects; one aspect carries the concept of 'meaning', i.e., what the word means and another aspect conveys the concept of 'purpose' and 'object' or the 'reason' or 'spirit' pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both the literal and purposive approaches. However, necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different meaning defeating the object of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation would arise. In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. N....
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....ns. 71. The above observations have also been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Pannalal Bansilal Patil v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in [1996]1SCR603 and in the case of T.R. Thandur v. Union of India reported in AIR1996SC1643 . Of course, a non obstante Clause has to be distinguished from the phrase "without prejudice". A provision enacted "without prejudice" to another provision does not have the effect of affecting the operation of the other provision and any action taken under it must not be inconsistent with other provision. It is also to be kept in mind that the wide meaning of non obstante Clause and the enacting words following it cannot be curtailed when the use of wide language accords with the object by the Act. 72. While dealing with interpretation of statutes regulating appeals the treatise of principles of statutory interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh ( 11th Edition 2008) explains: An appeal is the "right of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress an error of the Court below" and "though procedure does surround an appeal the central idea is a right". The right of appeal has been recogn....
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....Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would have to be construed on their plain reading and without any conflict. Discussion On Merits: 75. The factual matrix of the case has already been stated by us above. Suffice it to note that the present appeals have been filed after coming into force a provision of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. 1st July, 2002). All these appeals have been preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeals before the learned Single Judge were preferred in terms of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and were accordingly decided by the learned Single Judge vide judgments dated 12th February, 2004 and 25th January, 2005. There is undoubtedly no provision contained in the M.V. Act which gives right to appeal to any dissatisfied litigant to prefer an appeal against the appellate judgment of the learned Single Judge. In other words, special statute does not provide any right of second appeal against the judgment of the appellate Court. The Tribunal certainly has trappings of a Civil Court, may be, it is not a Civil Court in stricto sensu. Once the special law and even the ....
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....stante Clause and provided over-riding effect over the provisions of Letters Patent, other law and even other instrument having the force of law. The intent of the Legislature to provide precedence to enforcement of Section 100A is patently clear from the unambiguous and definite language of Section 100A. We must notice here that both the Motor Vehicles Act and the Code of Civil Procedure are Central enactments. No State amendment has been carried by the State of Maharashtra to dilute or alter the effect of the language of either Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act or Section 100A of the Civil Procedure Code. The Legislature was fully aware of the provisions of Section 173 as well as of the Letters Patent when it introduced Section 100A which came into force on 1st July, 2002. Once the Legislature, being aware of the existing law, has worded Section 100A in specific terms, then it has to be given its natural and effective meaning. The Court while construing these provisions by applying the principles of harmonious construction or otherwise, cannot frustrate the object of provisions of Section 100A which has been given overriding effect by use of non-obstante Clause and with speci....
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....uld make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo. The mischief which is sought to be controlled and avoided by the Legislature is not to grant repeated right of appeal and to introduce the concept of finality to the appellate judgment, decree or order. 81. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act do not recognize an appeal from an appellate jurisdiction of the High Court passed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On the contrary, Section 100A specifically bars filing of an appeal against such judgment. The provisions of Section 100A have a precedence and take limited exception to the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. On plain reading of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court from the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed while deciding an appeal against the appellate judgment, and decree or order passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the High Court would not be maintainable. The only exception to this general rule is that where the learned Single Judge gr....
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.... 117 Company Cases 651. As against this, learned senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that Section 10F of the Act came into being with effect from 31-5-1991. Prior to that application under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act was being filed with the Company Judge in the High Court. But after the amendment of the Act by Act 31 of 1988, this power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act has been given to the CLB. Under Section 10E of the Act, the Company Law Board was created. It deals with applications under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act. 84. Therefore, learned Single Judge has not exercised original jurisdiction and as such the appeal contemplated under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable. Learned senior Counsel invited our attention to Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure which came into being with effect from 1-7-2002. This Section starts with non-obstante Clause that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High....
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....ction 10F of the Act. Therefore, the position which was obtaining prior to the amendment in 1991 was that any order passed by the Single Judge exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, the appeal used to lie before the Division Bench of the High Court. But after the amendment the power has been given to the CLB and the appeal has been provided under Section 10F of the Act. Thus Part 1A was inserted by the amendment with effect from 1-1-1964. 86. But the constitution of the Company Law Board and the power to decide application under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act was given to the CLB with effect from 31-5-1991. Therefore, on reading of Sections 10E, 10F, 397 and 398 of the Act, it becomes clear that it is a complete code that applications under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act shall be dealt with by the CLB and the order of the CLB is appealable under Section 10F of the Act before the High Court. No further appeal has been provided against the order of the learned Single Judge. Mr. Nariman, learned senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that an appeal is a vested right and therefore, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, the app....
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....n appeal from the original order. Original order in the present case was passed by the CLB exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act and appeal has been preferred under Section 10F of the Act before the High Court. Learned single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as the Parliament in its wisdom has taken away its power. Learned Counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a letter from the then Law Minister. That letter cannot override the statutory provision. When the statute is very clear, whatever statement by the Law Minister made in the floor of the House, cannot change the words and intendment which is borne out from the words. The letter of the Law Minister cannot be read to interpret the provisions of Section 100A. 88. The intendment of the Legislature is more than clear in the words and the same has to be given its natural meaning and cannot be subject to any statement made by the Law Minister in any communication. The words speak for itself. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Therefore, the power of the High Court in exercising Letters Patent in a matter where a single Judg....
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....A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which has all the trapping of a Civil Court, discharges its judicial functions subject to the superintendence and control of the High Court. In fact, the High Court being its appellate Court, would exercise all the control over the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 90. It can be useful to notice at this stage itself that in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited v. Dabhol Power Co. and Ors. AIR2004Bom38 , that appeal shall lie against the judgment of the Single Judge passed in Appeal against the order of Company Law Board as the Letters Patent Appeal or a statutory appeal under special enactment and will not be affected by the provisions of Section 100-A, was specifically rejected and the view taken by this Court was held to be incorrect proposition of law. 91. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai and Anr. v. State Bank of India AIR1999SC2000 , the Court was concerned with maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 from the judgment and order of the Single Judge passed on an Appe....
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....Section 217(1) of the Act is a first appeal in a second forum/Court and an appeal under Section 218-D of the Act is the second appeal in the third forum/Court, no further appeal would be competent before the fourth forum/Court in view of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (supra). 92. At this stage, even at the cost of repetition, we may notice that the provisions of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act provide for an appeal against the Award of the Tribunal specifically and do not contemplate any further appeal. Thus, the statute does not specifically provide for any further right of appeal. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Hyperlink "http://R.S. R.T.C/" Hyperlink "http://R.S. R.T.C/" R.S. R.T.C. and etc. etc. v. Vaibhav Kumar and Ors., etc., while dealing with identical questions relating to maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against the appellate order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, held that the further intra-Court appeal is barred by Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 93. It mainly relied upon the judgment of the Kamal Kumar Dutta's case (supra), while a....
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....d in Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act. We may observe here that the said provision is similar to erstwhile Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 regarding further appeal to the Bench of two Judges from the decision of the Single Judge. The Full Bench of Kerala High Court has thus held that the right of further appeal as provided under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act stands abrogated by Section 100A of the Civil Procedure Code w.e.f. 1st July, 2002. The Supreme Court in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul and Anr. [2003]1SCR1092 , was concerned with the question whether the Letters Patent Appeal would lie from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court filed under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act. Pertinently in Subal Paul's case the Supreme Court observed that whenever a statute provided such a bar it did so expressly as would appear from Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also important to notice that in Subal Paul an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench from the order of the Single Judge prior to 1st July, 2002. 96. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in P.S. Sathappan (dead) by L.Rs. v. Andhra ....
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.... would not be maintainable. 97. It would be seen that the Supreme Court held that the power exercised by the Company Law Board under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act is a quasi-judicial power as original authority. It may not be a Court but it has all the trappings of a Court and, therefore, the Company Law Board while exercising its original jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act passed the order and against that order appeal would lay to the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed. The legal position exposited by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta 2006 AIR SCW 4694, applies on all fours to the order/award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and where such order/award is carried in an appeal under Section 173 of that Act. Even if it be assumed that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court as is the term ordinarily understood, it is beyond doubt that such Tribunal has all the trapping of a Court. Though the Tribunals occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of the Courts and Tribunals and special matters and questions a....
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....of the Motor Vehicles Act is not maintainable. Similar view was taken by a Five Judge Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. S. Surya Prakash Reddy and Anr. 2006 (4) ALT 448, and a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Laxminarayan v. Shivlal Gujar AIR2003MP49 . With respect, we also adopt the reasoning given by the two High Courts in support of our view. We also add and follow the view of these Courts which is in consonance with the judgment of the Supreme Court afore-referred. This principle would not apply to the Appeals which were preferred prior to 1st July 2002 as the provisions of Section 100A are prospective in their operation and limitations. 101. It is a settled principle of law that appeal is continuation of original proceedings and the procedural law regulating the right of appeal would be prospective unless and until it is clearly spelt out to the contrary. Equally well settled is the principle that right of appeal being a statutory right can be regulated and/or even taken away by a subsequent Legislation. There being no fundamental right or a general right to prefer appeals, the appeals institut....
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....de in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to superintendence of the High Court; (e) A single judge of this Court hearing appeals under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act from awards of Claims Tribunal consequently does not deliver a judgment in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction; (f) It would, therefore, follow that such judgment of Single Judge would be subject to an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 104. With greatest respect, we are unable to contribute to the conclusions arrived at by the Bench as, in our opinion, it is not a correct exposition of law. Inter alia, we may notice the patent reasons for which we are unable to accept the law in Asha Joshi's, case (supra). (a) Despite the fact that the judgment was pronounced on 12th December 2007, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) decided on 11th August, 2006, which has a direct bearing and to a large extent answers the controversies in issue was not brought to the notice of the....
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.... (g) The Division Bench placed heavy reliance upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Devi (supra) stating that the provisions of Letters Patent were akin to the constitutional powers of the Court, but it was clarified and in fact not accepted by the Constitution Bench in P.S. Satthapan 's case (supra) where the Court held as under: ...At this stage it must be clarified that during arguments, relying on the sentence "the powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court" in para 9 of this judgment it had been suggested that a Letters Patent had the same status as the Constitution. In our view these observations merely lay down that the powers given to a High Court are the powers with which that High Court is constituted. These observations do not put Letters Patent on a par with the Constitution. (h) In our considered view, the Division Bench while determining the controversy before it could have hardly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jindal Vijaynagar Steel v. Jindal Praxair Oxygen....
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....Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited's case (supra) which had taken the contrary view and held that the judgment of Company Court pronounced in the appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act would not be a judgment and decree within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, the appeal was not barred in terms of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench in Asha 's case (supra) ignored the fact that the view of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited's case (supra) was not approved by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta 's case (supra), and in fact, diametrically opposite view has been expressed by the Supreme Court which we have already discussed in some detail. It was expected from the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties to bring these judgments to the notice of the Division Bench, which, if brought, we have no doubt in our mind that the Bench would have come to a different conclusion and preferably to the one indicated above. 108. It is a settled norm of interpretation of s....
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.... July, 2002. The Supreme Court was primarily concerned with the interpretation of Sub-section (2) of Section 104 and held that, that provision will not bar a remedy which otherwise is provided under any other law. We may find it necessary to refer to at this stage itself that the provision of Section 104 unlike the provision of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not contain any non obstante Clause or legislative exception. 111. In paragraph 20 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has specifically noticed that the provisions of Section 104 does not contemplate order or decree passed under a special statute and thus the restrictions carved out under Section 104 would not prohibit an appeal in terms of Section 299 of the Succession Act. The real catchword of the judgment of the Supreme Court in this case is: 20. By reason of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure the bar of appeal under a special statute is saved. A plain reading of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure would show that an appeal shall lie from an appealable order and no other order save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code of or by any law for the time....
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....judgment of the Supreme Court in Sharada Devi's case (supra) was pronounced on 13th March, 2002 i.e. prior to 1st July, 2002 when the provision of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure was added and none of the contentions which we have considered above were raised before the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, again this judgment is of no help to the appellants. It is always not possible to state the legal proposition and answers to them with absolute precision. Still the Court makes attempt to answer the proposition of law accurately and adequately, with reference to the material facts as well as the points to be decided. The Courts are guided by the written laws, which they interpret and develop a meaningful set of rules by the process of case by case adjudication. 115. The reasons for deciding the earlier case have been provided as the guidelines for future decision. We have attempted to cull out the reasons for taking the view that we have taken above. "Experientia docet" and "expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium" are the two accepted maxims which are equally applicable to the interpretation of statutes. We have to keep in mind the intent of the Legislat....